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Herewith is the report on our exammation of selected 
activitres of the economic and technical assistance program 
for Korea for the fiscal years 1957 through 1961. During 
this period the program was administered by the Interna- 
tional Cdoperation Admlnistratlon (succeeded by the Agency 
for International Development), Department of State. 
For the perrod covered by our examination (l957-61), 
the program for Korea was the largest mdividual country 
program for economic and technical assistance fmanced under 
the Mutual Securlty Act of 1954. Total aid obligated from 
mutual security f'unds , including loans ($22 million) from 
the Development Loan Fund, aggregated close to $1.2 billion 
for the 5-year period. This aid was supplemented by more 
than $250 mlllion worth of surplus agricultural commodities 
made available under Publlc Law 480. 
Measured in relatlon to this financial outlay the prog- 
ress achleved in the economic development of Korea was con- 
siderably less than was reasonable to expect. A variety of 
interconnected causes account for this disparity. At the 
center of these causes were (1) a level of aid (averaging 
more than $200 milllon annually) which the Korean economy 
could not absorb productively nor the Korean Government ad- 
minister efficiently, (2) limited technical skills In Korea, 
and (3) failure of the responsible Unlted States agencies 
to recognize sufficiently these llmltations in the annual 
programing of aid. The availability of such relatively 
large resources was a dlslncentlve to fiscal prudence and 
tendgd to encourage personal and governmental standards out 
of proportion to economic realities. 
The more specific causes of the programrs poor economic 
showing are summarized in part I and further described in 
part I1 of the accompanying report. They are attributable 
mainly to deficlencles In certain sectors of the Korean eco- 
nomic structure, lack of cooperation by the Korean Govern- 
ment, and poor program plannlng and administration by ICA. 
These causes deal wlth areas of the Korean economy, the bet- 
terment of whlch is vital to Korean economic development 
and the success of the aid program. We belleve that only 
if these causes are eliminated or greatly minimized 1s it 
logical to expect that economic development in Korea and 
the productive utilization of aid f'unds through better ad- 
minist-ration will be attainable in any degree reasonably 
commensurate with the amount of aid. 
The agency although not agreeing with all aspects of 
our findings has expressed the over-all view that our re- 
port represents a competent study of the Korea program and 
that our recommendations are in accord with the agency's 
policy although some of them wlll not prove readily feasible. 
The agency has further advised us of certain actrons under 
way or to be taken to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
program. The substance of the agency's comments, the ac- 
tions taken or planned by it, and the measures recommended 
by us as to the individual matters discussed in our report 
are included in the respective sectlons of the report. 
The aid level for 1962 was reduced to $125.7 milllon, 
which brmgs the ald program within more manageable finan- 
cial dimensions. This and other events described on pages 9 
and 10 of our report offer the basls for redirecting the 
aid program toward the more expeditious and less costly at- 
tainment of its economic goals. The accompanying report is 
intended to help pomt the way toward such redirection. 
Copies of thls report are being sent to the President 
of the United States; the Secretary of State; and the Admln- 
istrator, Agency for International Development. 
~dmptroller General 
of the Unlted States 
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INTRODUCTION 
The General Accounting Office has examined the United States 
economic and technical assistance program for Korea for the fiscal 
years 1957 through 1961 as admmistered by the International Coop- 
eration Administration (ICA) of the Department of State under the 
authority of mutual security legislation. This examination was 
made as a part of a continuing audit of selected activities of the 
mutual security program, pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 
1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 
(31 U.S.C. 67), and was a follow-up on an earller examination of 
the aid program in Korea for fiscal years 19% through 1956. (See 
report to the Congress, B-125060, dated June 24, 1957.) 
Qur examination was directed principally to a review of the 
administration of selected activities and was made at the Washing- 
ton office of ICA and at the agency's operations Mission in Korea 
'succeeded by Agency for International Development (AID), pursuant 
to Executive Order 10973 dated November 3, 1961. Since AID did 
not succeed ICA until afier the period covered by our examination, 
we refer to ICA as the administering agency. 
(referred to in this report as the IfMission"). The scope of this 
examination is further described on page 157. 
The General Accounting Office has also issued separate re- 
ports on the responsibilities of the Department of Defense under 
the military assistance program (MAP) for Korea. 1 
The officials primarily responsible for the administration of 
economic and technical assistance for Korea starting with fiscal 
year 1957 are shown in the appendix to this report. (See p. 169.) 
The ICA program in Korea was reviewed by the Office of the In- 
spector General and Comptroller, Foreign Assistance, Department of 
State, and a report was issued in January 1961. A copy of this re- 
port was made available to us toward the end of our field review. 
- 
'see audit reports to the Congress on review of the military as- 
sistance pro ram for Korea (B-125099) dated October 4, 1957, Feb- % ruary 26 19 0, and January 31 1961 (classified lfSecretJ1), and 
'~une 8, 1962 (classified l8~onfjdentialrt). 
DESCRIPTION OF AID PROGRAM: 
NATURE AND OBJECTIVES 
United States economic assistance to Korea from the end of 
the Japanese occupation in 1945 to the start of the current pro- 
gram in 1954 totaled more than $1 billion, administered under sev- 
eral separate programs. 
The current economic assistance program began in fiscal year 
1954, after termination of the Korean hostilities, under the ad- 
ministration of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOB), pred- 
ecessor agency of ICA, and has continued under ICA and ~ t s  ucces- 
sor, the Agency for International Development. 
The objectives of the ICA program In the 1954-56 period (cov- 
ered by our prior report) were basically to reconstruct war damage 
and to assist in maintaining Korean military forces. Assistance 
was given to finance reconstruction and mprovement projects, with 
major emphasis on essential utilities and transportation services. 
Substantial amounts were also made available for the rehabilita- 
tion of existing industries and for establishmg a new industrial 
base. In addition, through the commodity import program, essen- 
tial commodities such as food, fertilizer, and raw materials 
needed to maintain conswnptlon levels were imported, and the local 
currency proceeds were used to support the Korean military budget 
and for local costs of reh?bllitation projects. During 1957, the 
rehabilitation effort was largely completed and pre-Korean-war 
living standards were restored or exceeded. 
The stated objectives of the program in the 1957-61 perlod, 
covered by this report, were to help maintain essential consump- 
tion by importing food, fertilizer, and essential raw materials 
and, through the use of the local currency proceeds derived from 
these imports, to help maintain Korean military forces through 
support of the Korean military budget. In addition, the ICA pro- 
gram was designed to strengthen the basic structure of the Korean 
economy so that the country could provide a larger share of its 
requirements from domestic production. 
Direct United States economic assistance to Korea since the 
end 
ICA 
of the Korean war is summarized 
and predecessor agency: 
Commodity imports 
Project assistance 
Cash grant 
Overseas administration 
Emergency relief and assistance 
Ocean freight on voluntary 
agency shipments 
Total 
Development Loan Fund: 
Development loans 
Public Law 480: 
Title I 
Title I1 
Title I11 
Tot a1 
Department of Defense: 
Armed forces assistance to 
Korea 
a~ata for 1961 not mcluded. 
below: 
Obligations at 
JUG 70. 1961 
Fiscal Years 
1954-56 1957-61 Total 
(millions) 
The armed forces assistance program to Korea, started in No- 
vember 1953, has been administered by the United States Army and 
has consisted generally of rebuilding schools, public health fa- 
cilities, orphanages, and similar civil structures. 
INDIRECT A I D  
The Korean Government received substantial indirect aid in 
the form of profits on the resale of dollars received from the 
United States for purchases of local currency for United States/ 
United Nations ( U S ~ N )  forces and for goods and services procured 
locally by these forces and the ICA Mission. The purchases were 
made at the official rates of exchange, and the dollars so ob- 
tained were resold by the Korean Government at rates generally at 
least double the official rates. From 1955 to 1960, purchases of 
local currency and of goods and services amounted to $113 million 
and $93.5 million, respectively, exclusive of utility services 
which in 1959 (the only year for which the cost was readily deter- 
minable) totaled $13.1 million. 
These forms of indirect aid ceased in February 1961 when the 
exchange rate was established at 1,300 hwan to $1. 
.LOCAL CURRENCX 
Local currency (hwan), which was made available to support 
the Korean military budget and for the local costs of technical co- 
operation and economic development projects within Korea, was de- 
rived from: 
1. Commodity imports financed by ICA under the mutual secur- 
ity program. 
2. Proceeds from the sales of surplus agricultural commodi- 
ties under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 
and under title I of Public Law 480. 
One of the major purposes of local currency has been to sup- 
port the very large Korean military forces under a program desig- 
nated as Local Currency Military Budget Support. This program is 
administered by the United States Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (NAAG) in Korea. A total of 251.6 billion hwan had been al- 
located to this program through December 31, 1960, from the three 
sources of local currency. 
Substantial amounts of counterpart funds were loaned to pub- 
lic and private entities for the development and expansion of vari- 
ous sectors of the Korean economy. At December 31, 1960, counter- 
part funds released to three Korean Government banks for loan pur- 
poses amounted to 112.6 billion hwan, most of which was adminis- 
tered by the Korean Reconstruction Bank. 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAM 
Bilateral agreements 
During the period covered by our examination, the economic 
and technical assistance program for Korea was carried out under 
(1) an economic aid agreement dated December 10, 1948, and ancil- 
lary agreements (described in detail in our prior report) and (2) 
a comprehensive aid agreement dated February 8, 1961, which, with 
one minor exception, superseded the previous agreements. 
United States Operations Mission 
The ICA program in Korea has been administered by the United 
States Operations Mission in a manner similar to that in which ICA 
operations in other countries have been administered, In 1959 the 
Mission superseded the Office of Economic Coordinator (oEC), 
United Nations Command, which had administered the civilian relief 
program of the United States Army and then the I C A  program. In 
keeping with the transfer of responsibility for the ICA program 
from OEC to the Mission, the line of communication, which under 
OEC had been through the Commander in Chief, United Nations Com- 
mand, was transferred to ICA channels. 
At the time of our field audit, the Mission employed 257 
Americans and 1,059 Koreans. In addition there were 173 Americans 
and 256 Koreans connected with the United States economic assist- 
ance program under ICA financed or administered contracts with pro- 
fessional, educatlona1,and voluntary organizations. 
Combined Economic Board 
The Combined Economic Board (CEB), composed of the Director 
of the Mission and the Korean Minister of Reconstruction (MOR), 
was established in May 1952 as the vehicle for agreement between 
the United States and Korea regarding all aspects of the aid pro- 
gram including plans and policies and approval of specific activi- 
ties. (I 
The M O R , ~  which is the Korean counterpart of the I C A  Mission, 
acts as the liaison between I C A  and the various Korean ministries 
and sets forth policies to be followed by those ministries in the 
conduct of the aid program. 
May 1961, after the change in government, the Ministry of Re- 
construction (MOR) became the Ministry of Economic Development 
(MED) which in turn was succeeded in July 1961 by the Economic 
Plamlng Board. a 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
- 
OVER-ALL OBSERVATIONS 
The conditions disclosed by our examination require the con- 
clusion that the aid program in Korea during the fiscal years 1957 
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through 1961 was considerably less successful in advancing the eco- 
nomic progress of the country than was reasonable to expect from 
a program of such substantial financial magnitude. A similar con- 
clusion was expressed by the Office of the Inspector General and 
Comptroller in its report issued shortly before our examination. 
Further affirmation of this conclusion is clearly evident in the 
proposed foreign aid program for fiscal year 1962 presented to the 
Congress by the United States executive branch. This unanimity of 
judgment from these separate sources demonstrates clearly the ur- 
gent necessity of concentrating on the causes which led to this 
judgment to the end that the program may move toward more satisfy- 
ing economic results. 
The disproportionate success of the program is attributable 
to several Interrelated causes. Most notable in our opinion are 
that the level of aid, which averaged in excess of $200 million an- 
nually, was beyond the capacity of the Korean economy to absorb 
productively 02 of its government to administer efficiently, and 
was a disincentive to the prudent use of both Korean resources and 
United States aid funds3 that technical skills in Korea were admit- 
tedly limited; and that these facts were not sufficiently recog- 
nized in the amual programing of aid. We believe that the combi- 
nation of these causes was the root of the program's shortfall in 
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economic progress. Moreover these causes undoubtedly aggravated 
certain basic weaknesses in the Korean economic and political 
structure, which in themselves handicapped the program. Acknowl- 
edged large-scale corruption in Korea and the country's meager ex- 
perience in government responsibility and administration, together 
with resulting political instability, weakened the moral fabric of 
business practice and stultified the growth of the country's econ- 
omy. 
Recent events have afforded the opportunity to remedy the 
basic causes of the program's retarded economic progress. The 
establishment of a unitary and more realistic exchange rate in 
February 1961 should remove the occasion for a variety of abuses 
in foreign exchange and commodity imports, increase counterpart 
funds available for economlc development, and generally contribute 
to an environment of confidence and stability. The Revolutionary 
Government, which came into power in Korea in May 1961, has re- 
ported measures taken and to be taken to revive economic actlv- 
ity, overcome extensive corruption in government, and accelerate 
long-range economic development. Finally the concept of foreign 
aid advanced by the United States executive branch En the pro- 
gram presentation to the Congress for fiscal year 1962 is de- 
signed to provide aid for economlc development on the basis of' 
the recipient country's long-range plans, capabilities, and ef- 
forts to help itself. This concept and the reported plans of the 
Revolutionary Government, if faithfully followed, should be condu- 
cive to positive steps in Korea toward tax refom, proper and 
maximum utilization of the country's resources, and other internal 
measures that will give impetus to economic strength. These 
events provide the foundation for a redirection of the aid program 
in Korea along a more ordered course than it has followed in past 
years. 
This report is addressed principally to those areas of the 
Korean economy and of the aid program which, because they have not 
been actively pursued or successfully carried out, have been the 
main causes or symptoms of causes for the relatively poor economic 
advancement in Korea and which, because of their basic primacy to 
the economic development of Korea, will be essential factors in 
any program of economic assistance in that country. Most of these 
areas were pointed out in our previous report. They are dealt 
with in greater emphasis in this report wfth the particular pur- 
poses of encouraging the fullest consideration of them in the for- 
mulation of future programs and of stimulating the necessary posi- 
tive effort toward resolving the problems involved. We believe 
that only If these problems are resolved is it logical to expect 
that economic development in Korea and productive utilization of 
aid funds through better administration will be attainable in any 
degree reasonably commensurate with the amount of aid. 
We further believe that it is important if not essential to 
reasonable achievement of the objectives of the aid program that 
the responsible United States agencies take an active part and 
have a meaningful voice in the policies, practices, and operations 
of those segments of the Korean economy which bear significantly 
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on that country's economic stability and development. The annual 
level of economic aid averaged more than six times the foreign ex- 
change commodity earnings of Korea. Most other foreign exchange 
earnings have derived from expenditures of United Nations forces 
which consist largely of United States military and civilian per- 
sonnel. The availability of such large resources as are repre- 
sented by United States assistance, in addition to and so greatly 
beyond the countryls own resources, very substantially influenced 
the direction, discipline, and climate of Korean economic policies 
and the related actions of the Korean Government. Because of this 
influence and the sizable dimensions of the United States aid in- 
vestment, the sound formulation and competent administration of 
basic segments of the economy, such as the internal budget, the 
tax system, and the utilization of the countryrs own resources, 
are matters of high concern to the United States. In our opinion 
the present state of Korean political and economic sophistication 
and the history of the aid program over the past years do not of- 
fer any reasonable basis for believing that the formidable task 
of carrying through the hard internal measures vital to Korean 
economic development in correlation with the prudent management 
of aid funds so substantially beyond the normal range of the Ko- 
rean economy, is within the capability of the Korean Government 
without cooperative guidance, forceful support, and effective sur- 
veillance by the United States. 
The aid program was not carried out within the framework of 
any comprehensive economic plan or geared to specific long-range 
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objectives. The need for such a plan was recognized by ICA and 
other United States authorities as well as by the Korean Govern- 
ment. We believe that the aid program suffered from the lack of 
such a plan. A start toward developing a 5-year plan was made by 
the Korean Government in 1960, and ICA assisted through a univer- 
sity contract. However, the efforts were not successful, the con- 
tract was allowed to expire in May 1961, and ICA had not been able 
to obtain a suitable replacement at the time we completed our 
field work. In June 1961 the Revolutionary Government furnished 
ICA with portions of a draft 5-year economic development plan. In 
our view the paramount consideration is that whatever plan ulti- 
mately evolves should be grounded on sound, reliable, and studied 
data on the many factors that bear directly on the movement and di- 
rection of the Korean economy. Insofar as we could ascertain, it 
did not appear that much of such data had been compiled or that 
studies in any depth adequate for decision had been made, which 
would form solid groundwork on which to formulate a substantive 
and workable economic plan. Thus we would stress that such plan 
as may be submitted should be thoroughly examined as to the range, 
depth, reliability, and logic of its underlying substance. 
We believe that the broad considerations noted above, to- 
gether with the more specific aspects of the program which are sum- 
marized below and further discussed in part I1 of this report, con- 
stitute the framework for redirecting the program toward the more 
expeditious and less costly attainment of its economic goals. 
AGENCY COMMENTS 
The agency expressed the over-all comment that in general 
this report is a competent survey of its activity in respect of 
the Korean aid program and that the recommendations presented in 
the report are in accord with AID policy although some of them 
will not prove readily feasible. 
The agency acknowledged defects in the administration of the 
program but stated its belief that, in the context of the size and 
scope of United States diversified efforts in Korea, the program 
has achieved a substantial degree of progress under very trying 
circumstances. 
The agency claims that, since the program was largely one of 
"defense supportn as authorized under the Mutual Security Act of 
1954, it was not, by legislative definition, addressed to long- 
range economic development and that the program achieved for the 
most part its limited objectives of feeding and housing the needy, 
maintaining and improving the country's production plant, curbing 
inflation, and supporting the Korean defense budget. As to the ex- 
tent that objectives have failed to be totally realized, the 
agency has pointed to the major problems faced throughout the pe- 
riod: (1) Korea's meager national resources, (2) its pressing pop- 
ulation problem, (3) United States political and military policies 
not always being in line wlth economic objectives, (4) the chronic 
problems of corruption and obstructionism on the part of certain 
Korean Government personnel involved in program implementation, 
and (5) Korea's almost total lack of institutional framework essen- 
tial to aid program implementation, such as an efficient govern- 
ment apparatus, a modern educational system, efficient and reli- 
able banking and credit institutions, a national tax system, and 
responsfble fiscal policies. 
The agency informed us that comprehensive studies, recently 
made by the Mission of basic program goals to conform to the con- 
cepts of the AID, point toward realistic development of plans and 
goals emphasizing tangible self-help features. According to the 
agency, development is only now an actual as well as reasonable 
program objective. The agency also stated that in the fall of 
1961 arrangements were undertaken with a contractor to assist the 
Korean Government in its long-term planning efforts and in improv- 
ing m d  implementing its somewhat unrealistic and overambitious 
5-year plan published in mid-1961. 
The agency expressed agreement that the United States should 
exercise its influence in shaping economic policy of the Korean 
Government but cautioned against extension of this influence to de- 
tailed operations or to areas not directly related to the purposes 
of the aid program. 
The major problems to which the agency referred, above, are 
among the subjects discussed in this report, together with recom- 
mended actions to overcome or alleviate them. 
We cannot agree with the agency that because the program was 
largely one of defense support it was not adaptable to long-range 
economic development. One of the declared objectives of the 
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program was to strengthen the basic structure of the Korean econ- 
omy. Defense support no more than "supporting assistancerr as au- 
thorized by The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 precluded long- 
range economic development within the framework of applicable law. 
Major development projects financed from defense support funds 
over a number of years constituted a significant portion of the to- 
tal program. Moreover, the annual program presentations to the 
Congress and related testimony referred to the long-term character 
of the aid program. We believe that these circumstances offer con- 
vincing evidence that an integrated long-range economic develop- 
ment plan was feasible during the period covered by our examina- 
tion. 
PROBLEMS JN KOREAN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Need for more productive utilization 
of Korean resources (p. 67) 
Our examination indicated that Koreaas utilization of its for- 
eign exchange and productive capability in agriculture and indus- 
try, and its administration of civil government operations were 
not conducive to solid economic development and in some cases were 
inconsistent with known Korean capabilities or United States agree- 
ments or wishes. 
Korea did not comply with United States-Korean agreements 
calling for close coordination in the use of Korea's foreign ex- 
change resources. Korean foreign exchange (1) was used for pur- 
poses deemed unwise by ICA ( 2 )  was not used for specific commodi- 
ties which Korea needed to purchase, or (3) was not spent at all 
and thereby served to add to Korean foreign exchange reserves 
which increased by $87 million between December 1955 and July 1961, 
or 90 percent over the 1955 level. 
To a significant extent aid funds under the economic and milt- 
tary assistance programs were used to import commodities which 
could have been produced in Korea. Failure to utilize this produc- 
tive capacity caused higher dollar costs to the United States than 
were necessary. Imports of cotton under the ICA aid and Public 
Law 480 programs and soybeans under both the ICA and the MAP pro- 
grams have been responsible in large measure for reducing Korean 
production of these commodities. ICA and MAP discontinued the fi- 
nancing of soybean imports with United States funds, but financing 
of cotton imports continued at high levels. Furthermore, the MAP 
program was financing the purchase of commodities for the Korean 
military forces which could be produced by Korean industry. In- 
creased procurement from Korean sources would assist in the devel- 
opment and stimulation of local industry, which has been a major 
objective of the mutual security program in Korea. 
Because of the aid program the United States has a direct in- 
terest in the use that the Korean Government is making of its own 
local currenoy revenues, including the degree of economy with 
which governmental operations are carried out. ICA officials re- 
ported that the Korean Government resisted any efforts to review 
or influence the preparation of the civil budget. United States 
military authorities review and advise on the formulation of the 
Korean military budget. 
The agencyagreedthat the build-up of Korean foreign exchange, 
particularlyinthe past year, was a matter of concern and stated 
that ithad been discussed wlth the Korean Government inconnection 
with funds for the 1962 program. According to the agency its ac- 
tionstoobtain greater Korean cooperationinthe expenditure of KO- 
reanforeignexchange were limited by varlous considerationswhich 
wedonot agree are valid. The agencyclaimsthat, because of un- 
suitable climate and soil, quality spinnable cotton cannot be grown 
economically in Korea. Bowever, information at the Misslon shows 
a long record of Korean cotton production and its utilization in 
spinning commercial fabrics. The agency further stated that a pro- 
gram initiated in 1960 to expand procurement of Korean-made 
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commodities fop the Korean military forces was suspended because 
of insufficient counterpart funas due to an economic slowdown in 
Korea after the revolution in May 1961, The agency acknowledged 
that the Mfssion had little influence on Korean budgeting but 
stated that the situation had been improving. 
We are making several recommendations for action by the re- 
sponsible United States agencies, aimed toward more productive 
utilization of Korean resources and capabilities, including review 
of the proposed use of Korean foreign exchange and an effective ad- 
visory role in the determination of amounts to be budgeted for 
civil activities. 
Need for tax reform ( p ,  78) 
An inequitable tax system, combined with an unsound collec- 
tion structure and ineffective administration by the Korean Govern- 
ment, has greatly hampered economic growth in Korea and by reason 
thereof has contributed to the continued need for substantial out- 
side a~sistance. ICA recognized the urgency of comprehensive tax 
reorganization as a means to increase government revenues, over- 
come widespread tax evasion and other illegal practices, encourage 
business activity, and attract foreign investment. Technical as- 
sistance initiated in 1959 through an ICA-financed contract was 
terminated by the contractor before completion of the contract 
work. At the conclusion of our field review, ICA was endeavoring 
to recruit two tax advisors in response to request of the Korean 
Government for assistance in the tax field. The Revolutionary Gov- 
ernment recently announced a new tax reform plan whicth would 
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drastically modify tax revisions recommended by the contractor 
prior to its withdrawal and enacted into law by the previous Ko- 
rean Government. The contractor in its final report stated that, 
until such time as satisfactory tax reform was accomplished, eco- 
nomic growth and development of Korea would be stultified. 
We were informed by the agency that one tax administration ad- 
visor had been sent to Korea early in 1962 and that the Korean Gov- 
ernment had intensified its own efforts in the field of taxation 
and admmistration. In view of the paramount importance of effec- 
tive tax reform in Korea, we are recommending that AID augment its 
current assistance in order to accelerate the establishment of a 
sound and effective tax system. 
Because of the low tax rate on the sale of motor vehicle gaso- 
line, all of which was financed by ICA, the price of gasoline sold 
to civilian users in Korea was considerably below gasoline prices 
in other non-gasoline-producing countries, with the result that 
considerable revenues were lost to the Korean Government thereby 
adding to the pressure for higher aid levels, The tax on gaso- 
line was doubled in January 1961; on the basis of consumption in 
1959 and 1960 the increased rate, if it had been in effect in 
these 2 years, would have increased tax revenues by the hwan equiv- 
alent of about $30 million. We understand from the agency that 
the tax rate was further increased in 1962 by 50 percent, 
Corruption in Korea (p. 84) 
It has been widely recognized by United States authorities 
that large-scale corruption within the Korean Government, 
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principally since 1953, has been a major deterrent to economic 
progress in Korea. According to the Revolutionary Government, cor- 
ruption and inefficiency were largely responsible for what it con- 
sidered a condition of economic stagnation in the country but aid 
provided by the United States and the United Nations was, in gen- 
eral, wisely and efficiently expended. The Mission claimed that 
it had taken all appropriate measures to identify instances of cor- 
ruption involving aid funds and to work toward the reduction of 
corruption. These measures were for the most part those which 
have been employed as a matter of regular practice in all country 
aid programs and were not predicated on conditions of widespread 
corruption such as reportedly prevailed in Korea. 
ICA appears to have considered that its responsibility ex- 
tended to the use of aid funds only and that the effectiveness of 
measures to combat corruption depended primarily on the sincerity 
and vigor of the Korean Government. 
We are recommending that the responsible United States agen- 
cies familiarize themselves with the specifics of corruption, de- 
termme the adequacy of Korean Government controls, and maintain 
active communication on the subject with the highest levels of the 
Korean Government. 
Excessive cost and unwise use 
of investment funds ( p .  88) 
Extremely hlgh interest rates in Korea on agricultural and in- 
dustrial loans impeded efforts to channel funds into productive 
uses and thus retarded development of the economy. The high rates 
were attributable mainly to the lnsufflciency of capital in Korea 
20 
and the fundamental deficiencies in the traditional banking and 
monetary structure. These conditions fostered the accumulation of 
funds outside regular banking institutions and the making of loans 
to farmers and private business at usurious Interest rates. The 
consequences perpetuated a state of heavy debt, low living stand- 
ards, and minimal purchasing power in the agricultural community, 
which comprises more than half the country population, and chan- 
neled funds into nonbasic but profitable enterprises rather than 
essential industrial undertakings, thereby discouraging industrial 
growth. 
It appears that ICA considered its function in the field of 
loan capital and interest rates as one of advice and encouragement 
on basic monetary and economic reforms. Mission officials stated 
to us that their work over the past years laid the foundation for 
the emergency measures instituted by the Revolutionary Government 
to relieve the farmers from their oppressive debt burden and to re- 
lease additional funds for industrial loans in the small and me- 
dium industry sector. 
The policy of ICA was addressed to broad basic concepts and 
was not adapted to dealing with immediate problems. This policy 
suggests the question of whether some or all of the conditions 
against which the emergency measures of the Revolutionary Govern- 
ment were directed could have been alleviated by ICA and previous 
Korean Governments if the policy of ICA had been geared to meeting 
existing demands for short-range benefits as well as formulating 
and sponsoring fundamental long-range reforms. 
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The agency advised that banking and financial advisers were 
recently sent to Korea to review the total fiscal problem and that 
the progress made by the Revolutionary Government during the lat- 
ter part of 1961 in attacking usurious creditors, creating a new 
Industry Bank, and examining ways of making more and lower cost 
capital available to various sectors of the economy has been in 
conformity with A I D  concern for action in this area, 
COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM 
Character and control of commodity imports 
were not conducive to economlc development (p. 92) 
In recent years an increasing pr~partion of ICA commodity im- 
port assistance was devoted to consumable goods despite Koreals 
need for capital investment. Significant amounts of I C A  funds 
were earmarked for comparatively low priority consumer goods or at 
the time of our review were not being used while essential activi- 
ties, such as power development, were delayed or not undertaken. 
In 1961 I C A  revised its procurement authorization practices 
by adoption of a "multicode" procurement authorization under which 
a wide range of commodity classifications are included in a single 
authorization generally issued for a relatively large amount and 
without monetary restrictions on individual commodity classifica- 
tions. As a result I C A  had less control over the commodity compo- 
sition of the import program and hence less means of channeling 
available resources Into those areas which would provide the great- 
est impetus to economic grawth. 
We proposed to ICA that (1) it reach agreement with the Ko- 
rean Government on a system of priorities for the allocation of 
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both Korean foreign exchange and aid funds designated for commod- 
ity imports, to put emphasis on capital goods, and (2) it recon- 
sider its revised procurement authorization practices. The agency 
expressed general agreement with our proposals and further advised 
that a comprehensive review was being made of its procurement poli- 
cies and procedures including the multicode procurement authoriza- 
tion. 
Collusive bidding for ICA funds (p. 98) 
For a number of years aid funds made available for financing 
commodity imports were allocated to Korean importers through sev- 
eral systems of auction bidding. In the several years before the 
exchange rate reform in February 1961, local currency, in amounts 
not known but acknowledged to be considerable, was lost to the Ko- 
rean Government through collusive bidding byKorean private indus- 
try. The effects of this coll'usion lessened the resources of 
Korea for meeting its economic and defense needs and thus slowed 
down economic progress and increased the pressures for higher dol- 
lar aid, enabled the collusive bidders to realize windfall profits, 
and encouraged loose ethical standards of Korean business prac- 
tices. 
Defects in financing of 
industrial enterprises as nonproject aid (p. 102) 
ICA financed as nonproject assistance under the commodity im- 
port program, the establishment and major expansion of industrial 
enterprises similar in basic characteristics to projects financed 
under the project assistance program. This type of financing has 
had two fundamental defects: (1) the absence of any system of pri- 
orities in approving individual enterprises and in allocating aid 
funds contributed to unbalanced industrial expansion, as reflected 
by the overexpansion of some industries and the failure of other 
essential industries to receive needed assistance, and (2) the an- 
nual program presentation to the Congress did not show that nonproj- 
ect funds were used to finance the establishment and expansion of 
industrial enterprises as single-package activities (projects) bas- 
ically the same as projects under the project assistance program. 
In some cases nonproject funds financed the same enterprises that 
were receiving assistance as projects. 
We are recommending priorities in the approval of such enter- 
prises tied into the system of priorities recommended in respect 
of capital and consumable goods. We are recommending also that, 
insofar as financing of entergrises from nonproject funds may be 
continued, the agency develop some practical means of disclosing 
this type of financing and discontinue the practice of financing 
the same enterprises from both project and nonproject funds. 
Deficiencies in fertilizer program ( p .  107) 
Fertilizer has been the principal commodity impdrt financed 
by ICA. Total ICA financing aggregated $119.5 million for the pe- 
riod 1954-56 and $235.7 millian from 1957 through 1961. The pro- 
gram has been more costly and less beneficial to the Korean agri- 
cultural sector than it should have been principally because of 
the following conditions 
From 1959 through 1960 the program did not have the bene- 
f i t  of necessary technical  guidance by the Mission. The 
agency claimed tha t  i n  s p i t e  of the absence of a f e r t i -  
l i z e r  technician some effect ive work i n  t h i s  f i e l d  had 
been done. A t  the time of our f i e l d  review the Mission 
f e r t i l i z e r  s t a f f  consisted of one American and one Korean. 
We are recommending t h a t  consideration be given t o  augment- 
ing t h i s  s t a f f  i f  the f e r t i l i z e r  program continues a t  a 
l eve l  approaching t h a t  of past  years. 
2. I C A  did not par t ic ipa te  i n  the determination by the Korean 
Government as  t o  the quantities and types of f e r t i l i z e r  t o  
be imported or as  t o  the use of f e r t i l i z e r  within the agr i -  
cu l tu ra l  sector and by I t s  own acknowledgment had l i t t l e  
knowledge about the needs of the f e r t i l i z e r  program. The 
Mission had been unable to  obtain f u l l  access t o  f e r t i -  
l i z e r  data i n  the Korean Ministry of Agriculture and For- 
es t ry .  However i n  June 1961 the Mission's f e r t i l i z e r  ad- 
visor  was working f u l l  time a t  the Ministry. 
3. Procurement costs were higher than necessary because of 
( a )  f a i l u r e  t o  purchase i n  off season and (b) the al loca- 
t ion  of increased purchasing of f e r t i l i z e r  t o  Korean p r i -  
vate business which paid a higher pr ice  f o r  f e r t i l i z e r  
than the Korean Gove~nment had paid, In  1961 funds were 
programed fo r  advance procurement and the new government 
shor t ly  a f t e r  May I961 ins i s ted  on 100-percent government 
procurement. 
4. Because of i t s  high price, f e r t i l i z e r  produced by the I C A -  
financed Chung-ju f e r t i l i z e r  plant was not used f o r  an ex- 
tended period with resu l tan t  loss  t o  the farmers of a sub- 
s t a n t i a l  quantity of f e r t i l i z e r  f o r  a t  l e a s t  one planting 
season. We were informed tha t  the f e r t i l i z e r  was subse- 
quently sold a t  a price i n  l ine  with tha t  of imported f e r -  
t i l i z e r .  
Aid program encouraged new luxury wants 
and uneconomical importing ( p ,  113 .) 
Despite Korea's extreme trade imbalance and the low standard 
of l iv ing  of most of the Korean people, United Sta tes  a id  funds f i -  
nanced lmports of luxury or semiluxury materials  such as  top- 
qual i ty  wool and nylon yarns which were used t o  produce wearing ap- 
parel .  Before the a id  program the Korean population dressed i n  
clothing made predominantly from cotton and s i l k ,  both of which 
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were produced locally. Thus consumption habits beyond the stand- 
ard possible to be maintained at present by the country's eco- 
nomic resources were encouraged; aid funds were not utilized to 
the best advantage of the Korean economy; and local industries,par- 
titularly cotton, were adversely affected. ICA technical advisory 
personnel reported that it was unwise to continue financing wool 
and nylon yarns because of their very high quality, relatively 
high cost, and luxurious nature. The agency attributed the use of 
aid funds for such purposes to the pressure of Western influences 
and the demands of an industrializing economy. 
The aid program also financed the import of pulp without tak- 
ing advantage of economies that could be realized through the use 
of wastepaper in mix with chemical pulp in the manufacture of cer- 
tain kinds of paper. The agency informed us t'hat it has continued 
to sponsor the use of wastepaper in paper manufacturing but appar- 
ently the industry does not yet fully understand or has not become 
convinced of its advantages. 
We are recommending the adoption of more austere and realis- 
tic standards in allocating resources to assure their utilization 
for purposes of more essential and lasting benefit to the Korean 
economy . 
Korean Government restrictions created shortages 
of pasoline and automotive parts which contributed 
to pilferage of military supplies (p. 117) 
The Korean Government was unwilling to import all the gaso- 
line that ICA estimated was needed for civilian use and consist- 
ently refused to permit the civilian economy to seoure and use 
automotive spare parts excess to military requirements, The short- 
ages of these items for civilian use were responsible in a signifi- 
cant measure for the large-scale illegal diversion of stocks of 
these comodities pr~~ided for the Korean and United States mili- 
tary forces stationed in Korea. 
!The Korean Government accepted a higher funding level for gas- 
oline for calendar year 1961. We are recommending that ICA reeon- 
sider its withdrawal of support for a proposal by the United 
States Army to the Korean Government to permit the sale of those 
automotive parts that are excess to requirements of the military 
forces in Korea and that are not manufactured in Korea. 
PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
Continuing power shortage ( p . 120) 
Electric power is a major requisite to economic development 
in Korea. Its progressively increasing shortage, in spite of 
$70 millfon in aid and substantial counterpart funds for projects, 
has been a major deterrent to economic development. Financial in- 
stability of the power companies, caused mainly by an inadequate 
rate structure; extended delays in implementing aid-financed power 
projects; and failure to agree upon a dependable long-range power 
plan have deprived the power system of significantly greater capa- 
bility to supply Korea's requirements. As a consequence the pres- 
ent industrial plant of Korea has been unable to realize its pro- 
ductive capacity and further industrial expansion has been inhib- 
ited. 
In spite of known power limitations, ICA financed a program 
of industrial expansion without fully assessing the expected avail- 
ability of adequate power to operate these industries. As a re- 
sult, electric power has been rationed to residential and commer- 
cial customers in Korea and industrial facilities, Including those 
financed by ICA funds, have been unable to operate fully because 
of a lack of power. 
Mission officials reported that the power shortage is likely 
to increase until 1964. It was our understanding at the time we 
completed our field work that decisions had not been reached as to 
the types and locations of additional plants to meet the need for 
electric power. 
We are recommending particularly vigorous effort on the part 
of the responsible United States agencies aimed toward formulation 
of a systematic power development plan, more expeditious contract- 
ing procedures to minimize delays in project implementation, and 
timely determination of the financial adequacy of power operating 
results following recent sate increases and organizational changes. 
Unsatisfactory results of industry promam (p. 128) 
Industrial facilities financed by ICA under the small and me- 
dium industry programs were not, for the most part, being success- 
fully operated as business enterprises. At June 30, 1961, only 
14 percent of these enterprises were operating at as much as 
75 percent of capacity and were current in their loan repayments, 
Projects in the once thriving silk industry were so poorly adminis- 
tered that silk production actually decreased, silk filature mills 
were partially unused, and this industry had not made its expected 
increment to farmers1 income or foreign exchange earnings. 
The poor showing of the industry projects was due primarily 
to (1) inadequate planning with respect to available raw materials 
and prospective markets, (2) delays in project implementation 
caused by slow processing of hwan loans and changes in project 
plans, (3) financing difficulties, such as project sponsor irregu- 
larities, excessive size of project loans in comparison with spon- 
sor equity, and the freezing of sponsor deposits for lengthy peri- 
ods, and (4 )  shortage of power supply. Project audits by ICA were 
tardy and infrequent. The agency pointed to the several changes 
in the Korean Government and in Korean exchange rates as having 
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hampered the progress of the industry program and stated that in 
spite of these conditions the operations of the industry projects 
added significantly to the gross national product and to employ- 
ment in Korea in 1961. 
We urged ICA to take such steps as would resolve the problems 
of each of these projects in the most expeditious and beneficial 
manner practicable in the circumstances. The agency advised us 
that many steps had been taken including review on a case-by-case 
basis with a view to refund requests or cancellation where appro- 
priate. 
Major housing projects had not achieved 
their intended ~oals (p. 134) 
Of the three projects which composed the long-range housing 
program, the major one, involving the construction of housing, had 
fallen far behind the timetable fixed for completed units; another, 
for promoting building-material plants, was to be terminated for 
lack of qualified sponsors; and the third one, for housing re- 
search and development, had not undertaken its primary function. 
An emergency subproject for reconstruction of housing because of 
typhoon damage had benefited relatively few families 2 years after 
the typhoon. An important factor In the delay of the construction 
project was the procurement of lumber that was unsatisfactory for 
the purpose intended. 
The Mission had recognized that these projects had not been 
successful and advised us that, pending Mission review of its hous- 
ing program and of the intentions and plans of the new Korean Gov- 
ernment, the composition and extent of the future housing program 
were mdefinlte. 30 
The agency reported that no further dollar financing is con- 
templated and that continuing activities will be financed with 
counterpart funds. Regarding the subproject concerned with ty- 
phoon damage, the agency advised that all families subsequently 
received the assistance as planned. 
Project for construction of new health facilities 
was poorly ~ k m n e d  and administered (p. 139) 
Although estimated for completion by mid-1957, very few of 
the hospitals, health centers, and other facilities included in 
this project were operating satisfactorily at June 30, 1961. Some 
of the structures were not finished, others were either improperly 
constructed or lacked adequate utilities for successfil operation. 
Much of the equipment for these facilities was still at the port 
of entry or was unused at the building site. 
From our exalnination it seems clear that this project re- 
ceived little if any c,onsidered planning, that technical supervi- 
sion and management control were very limited, and that the funds 
were obligated considerably before the project was ready to use 
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them. The record indicates that at the time the initial funds 
were obligated neither engineering plans nor cost estimates had 
been developed in anything more than skeleton form. 
The agency advised in July 1962 that construction of all fa- 
cilities had been completed and that at least basic staff and 
budget had been provided by the Korean Central and Provincial gov- 
ernments. 
Problems in higher education program (p. 140) 
The curriculum at the College of Engineering at Seoul Na- 
tional University (SNU) was developed without direct knowledge of 
the types of engineers and scientists needed in Korea. As a con- 
sequence Korean economic development probably did not receive the 
full potential benefits of this branch of higher education; more- 
over assistance was given to courses which appeared to make a rela- 
tively small contribution toward existing and foreseeable Korean 
economic requirements. In addition much of the equipment fur- 
nished under the program had not been installed and other equip- 
ment had not been utilized because of the lack of power and heat. 
We pointed out to ICA the importance of taking positive steps 
to encourage balanced college education in line with the proximate 
needs and opportunities in the country--with particular stress on 
follow-through with the Korean Government of a joint ICA-Korean 
recommendation for a survey to determine the requirements for engi- 
neers and scientists--and to remedy the above conditions regarding 
equipment installation and utilities. The termination at June 30, 
1961, of the major portion of the contract with a United States 
university for advisory services and training points up the respon- 
sibility of the agency to provide such qualified personnel as may 
be necessary to carry out the above tasks. 
The agency informed us In March 1962 that the education pro- 
gram had been substantially revised, coinciding with a revamping 
of the Korean educational system by the present Korean Government, 
which includes emphasis on vocational training and reduction of 
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college enrollments from 145,000 to 50,000 of which two thirds are 
to be channeled to technical and vocational junior colleges. The 
agency further advised us that the power situation had been im- 
proved and that, as of January 1962, two thirds of the equipment 
had been installed and local currency had been budgeted to com- 
plete installation. 
Unsuccessful expansion of 
government-controlled shipyard (p. 144 ) 
The Dae Han Shipbuilding Corporation (Pusan Iron Works) which 
received ICA-financed equipment and machine tools amounting to 
about $2 million was operating on a very limited scale, and much 
of the ICA-furnished equipment was idle. Although ICA and the 
Korean Government had recognized for several years the need for re- 
organizing and refinancing this corporation, such had not been 
done at the time of our review. 
The Dae Han Shipbuilding Corporation (DHSC) is a former Japa- 
nese enterprise now operated by the Korean Government which owns 
more than 97 percent of the corporation's stock. ICA committed 
$2 million in June 1955 to purchase equipment in connection with 
the expansion of the shipyard, including a modern foundry and a 
machine shop. 
The project had little, if any, planning as to basic requi- 
sites such as (1) the needs of the country for the various types 
of operations which were established or expanded, (2) the channel- 
ing of required needs of other government units to the corporation 
rather than outside the country, (3) the coordination of opera- 
tional capaclty with the limited power availability, (4)  the 
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competency of local management, and (5) the financial status and 
requirements of the corporation. 
AS a consequence the facility had been largely idle while at 
the same time Korean ships were being repaired abroad, duplicate 
machine tool facilities were being established by the Korean mili- 
tary forces, and products that could be manufactured by DHSC were 
being imported. Some equipment could not be used because of a 
shortage of electric power. DHSC encountered financial difficul- 
ties and was unable to pay the duty on the ICA-financed equipment. 
At the time of our visit the equipment was located in the shipyard 
plant and we were informed by the agency that the KoreaneGovern- 
ment had deferred and subsequently waived payment of the duty on 
the equipment. 
We are recommending that the responsible United States agen- 
cies urge upon the Korean Government certain actions to reorganize 
DHSC, to have Korean agencies procure maximum requirements from 
DHSC, and to determine those items that DHSC can supply to the Ko- 
rean military services which are now imported under the military 
assistance program. In a separate report to be issued to the Con- 
gress on the local currency military budget support program, we 
plan to recammend reappraisal of the basis for providing and sup- 
porting machine tool facilities within the Korean military forces 
which duplicate facilities at DHSC. 
Limited success of vocational education Droaram (p, 150) 
Despite Korea's urgent need for skilled workers and techni- 
cians, the vocational education program had littlef kuocess In 
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developing trade skills. Because of poor planning, implementation, 
and country cooperation, much of the equipment provided by ICA for 
more than 50 schools had not been used effectively. In recogni- 
tion of this unsatisfactory progress, ICA decided in 1960 to con- 
centrate on one technical school in Seoul which would serve as a 
national demonstration center. 
The agency reported in March 1962 that all equipment fur- 
nished the Korean technical high schools had been installed and 
that the Korean Ministry of Education with the assistance of the 
Mission was working on a program under which shop students would 
spend more hours per week in shop practice utilizing ICA-financed 
equipment. 
LOCAL CURRENCY 
Inadequate control over deposit 
of counterpart funds (p. 152) 
Although the total amounts deposited into the counterpart de- 
posit account were consistently and substantially less than the to- 
tal amounts required to be deposited, the records and procedures 
of the Mission were not organized to enable ready determination of 
the difference or what it represented. Thus the Mission was not 
in a position to know whether the local currency side of the com- 
modity import program was bemg satisfactorily administered, par- 
ticularly in such important aspects as timely and full deposits 
and the expeditious movement of ald-financed commodities into the 
Korean economy based on deposits made or due on individual commod- 
lty shipments. 
This situation had existed since the early years of the pro- 
gram and was pointed out in our previous report issued in 1957. 
In that report we stated that reliance as to deposits was placed 
principally on Korean reports which were unreliable and were not 
being reconciled with the records of the Mission. Our current ex- 
amination found the situation substantially unchanged. 
Tentative results of a reconciliation of required and actual 
deposits for the period from fiscal year 19% through December 31, 
1960, which was in process at the Mission in June 1961, indicated 
a difference of 46.8 billion hwan, equivalent to $36 million at 
the current exchange rate of 1,300 hwan to $1. 
We suggested to the agency that the Mission complete the rec- 
onciliation and proceed to settle the differences and to put into 
effect the revised procedures which were developed for accounting, 
reporting, and controlling counterpart deposits. 
The agency advised in March 1962 that (1) counterpart bill- 
ings, deposits, and withdrawals through August 31, 1961, had been 
reconciled and (2) current negotiations were being held with the 
Korean Government to simplify and revise accounting procedures. 
AID stated that it was weighing the cost to the Korean economy of 
requiring collection and deposit of counterpart arrears against 
the cost to the aid program of agreeing to write off these arrears 
as an acknowledged subsidy not originally anticipated in the 
United States aid program. 
Faulty administration and control 
of counterpart loan program (p. 154) 
Our review of the counterpart loan program administered by 
the Korean Reconstruction Bank (KRB) indicated several areas of de- 
ficient operation by KRB and a want of necessary over-all monitor- 
ing by the Mission, Many loans were delinquent as to principal 
and interest, and some loans appeared to have been of questionable 
financial risk. We noted several instances in which principal and 
interest payments were not deposited promptly into the counterpart 
account; service charges were being taken on loans in arrears, con- 
trary to CEB authorization; and penalty interest collected was be- 
ing improperly retained by KRB for its own account. The Mission 
had not made and did not have plans for any audits of the eight re- 
* volving funds administered by the three government-controlled 
banks (KRB, Bank af Korea, and Korean Agricultural Bank). Except 
to the extent required, in audits of ICA-Financed projects, the Mis- 
sion had not made any audlts of other loans under the counterpart 
loan program and had not examined the bankst lending practices. 
The fund and status reports received by the Mission from KRB did 
not show delinquent loans or the amounts of principal or interest 
in arrears and thus were not sufficiently informative to provide a 
basis for Mission control. 
In response to our proposal for certain specific actions de- 
signed to correct the above conditions, the agency advised (1) 
that the Mission planned to review the several counterpart loan 
programs and the status of repayments in early 1962, (2) that the 
organization and function of the KRB were then under review by the 
Korean Government and the Mission, and (3 )  that a similar review 
was planned for the loan programs of the other banks, but not, at 
that time, for the revolving funds because of staffing limitations 
and lower priority of the revolving funds in relation to dollar 
and other local currency aid activities. 
STATUS OF PRIOR FINDINGS 
As part of our examination we checked on the major findings 
which were the subjects of our previous report to the Congress, is- 
sued in June 1957. These findings are identified below and are 
followed by a synopsis of their status at the time we checked on 
them in the spring of 1961. Certain matters previously reported 
which are also covered in this report as part of our current exami- 
nation are cross-referenced to the appropriate sectionsofthis re- 
port. 
MALPRACTICES IN TRE COMMODITZl IMPORT PROGRAM 
As meviously renorted 
The commodity import program was burdened by various undesir- 
able practices in connection with proourement by the Korean Govern- 
ment as well as procurement in the private commercial sector admin- 
istered through the Bank of Korea. 
(1) The agencies of the Korean Government ignored specifica- 
tions recommended by Mission advisors and did not follow the ICA 
policy favoring world-wide procurement at lowest prices, espe- 
cially because of reluctance to buy from Japan. 
(2) Laxity by the Bank of Korea in the allocation of aid dol- 
lars to importers had encouraged speculation and led to a number 
of procurement irregularities, such as collusion between supplier 
and importery shipment of defective merchandise, kickbacks, and 
overpricing, 
( 3 )  Considerable quantities of goods accumulated in ware- 
houses for unreasonable lengths of time, This had been, among 
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other reasons, due to shortage of rail facilities, lack of funds 
in the hands of importers, and unclaimed aid goods. 
(4) End-use investigations by the Mission were insufficient 
in coverage of principal procurement areas and In follow-up of un- 
satisfactory situations disclosed. 
As currently checked 
(1) We have been informed by the Mlssion that the Korean Gov- 
ernment procurement agency is now fully cooperative as to bid spec- 
ifications and attempts to procure at the lowest landed cost re- 
gardless of source country. We noted, however, one exception in- 
volving the procurement of cotton for the Korean Army; an esti- 
mated premium price of $100,000 was paid because of unusually 
short delivery provisions and rejection of the Misslonb advlce 
that the invitation to bid be corrected to conform to standards of 
the cotton trade. 
(2) According to the Missiqn, the Bank of Korea now requires 
prospective importers to register with the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry or one of the other ministries, and the irregulari- 
ties between supplier and importer have been minimized by the func- 
tion of a pricing section in the Foreign Fund Operations Depart- 
ment of the Bank of Korea. However, we observed several ICA- 
financed procurements in which bids or offers were identical for 
all suppliers. Prices appeared to have been established by export 
1 
trade associations or thefr agents rather than by free competition. 
The procurements involved fertilizer and cement, commodities of 
considerable dollar value. We also noted that importers often 
submitted only one offer to the Bank, and, in these cases, it 
would appear that there was little assurance of adequate solicits- 
< 
tlon of suppliers or that the offer submitted was the best offer 
received by the importer. Our current findings with respect to 
collusive bidding for ICA f'unds are discussed at page 98. 
(3) Goods valued at $6 million stored in the Korean Office of 
Supply (OSROK) and customs warehouses at February 28, 1961, had 
been there for at least 6 months. The agency informed us that the 
value of goods similarly in storage at November 30, 1961, totaled 
$5.2 million and that an additional $3.5 million worth of goods, 
most of which was for the Dae Han Shipbuilding Corporation (see 
pa 144), had been released to end-users without payment of duty. 
Some of the reasons given as to why these items had not been with- 
drawn from storage were (I) shortage of funds by the end-user to 
pay various charges, (2) project commodities not yet usable be- 
cause of delays in the project and in finding new sponsors, and 
(3) unmarketable goods or those not in demand, such as the more un- 
popular types of fertilizer. Efforts by the Korean Government to 
sell certam items at auction were not successful because the 
floor price was higher than potential purchasers were willing to 
pay, According to Mission personnel, this floor price, estab- 
llshed by the Customs Office in Pusan, covered the commodity value, 
customs duties, customs tax, miscellaneous fees, and a nbenefitH 
or profit allowance to the importer. Revised procedures calling 
for reductions in the floor price at successive auctions have been 
adopted In addition the Mission and the Korean Government have 
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black-listed from additional ICA-financed transactions those im- 
porters who have not withdrawn their cargo from customs. Studies 
by the Mission disclosed that this practice was not oompletely ef- 
fective because of multiple registration8 involving related compa- 
nies, In August 1960, the Mission engaged an outside company to 
devise a system to prevent further accumulation of cargo and to 
train personnel to operate the system. The agency reported that 
this work, completed in 1961 after our field examination, resulted 
in the adoption by the Korean Government of (1) procedures which 
will progressively reduce floor prices to an eventual Hknock-down 
pricen type of auction and (2) a new law subjecting to auction 
goods in warehouses for 2 months and goods not removed within 
10 days after duties and charges have been paid. 
(4) The over-all end-use audit function appeared to have been 
strengthened in staffing and audit coverage except for audits of 
projects and counterpart loans which have lagged in number and 
timeliness. The agency has advised that the Mission Audit Branch 
has been reorganized along funotional lines and that increased au- 
dit attention will be given to project activities financed with 
dollars and local currency. 
DEFICIENCIES IN FERTILIZER IMPORT PROGRAM 
As previously re~orted 
Because of unsound distribution procedures, farmers had not 
received fertilizer at the agreed prices and at the time when 
needed, Extensive black-market operations were reported. The 
sale of the fertilizer within Korea had not produced the expected 
4 2  
cash proceeds. The Mission had not received adequate accounting 
on proceeds realized or an explanation of certain other transac- 
tions affecting the disposition of fertilizer, 
As currently checked 
The fertilizer program was covered in our current examination, 
and our findings thereon are discussed at page 107 of this report. 
WEAKNESSES IN ADMINISTRATION OF COUNTERPART FUNDS 
. 
As ~reviously re~orted 
(1) There was no careful programing of availabilities and re- 
quirements prior to the approval of releases by the Combined Eco- 
nomic Board. 
(2) The Mission had not independently determined or otherwise 
accounted for sales proceeds to be deposited to the aid goods col- 
lection account. The agency relied principally on Korean reports, 
but these had not been found reliable in all instances and neces- 
sary reconciliations with the agency's own records had not been 
made. 
(3) The Mission had no systematic accounting for counterpart 
funds by individual project and lacked meaningful reports. 
(4) The Controllerts Office of the Mission had made no up-to- 
date audit as to progress of principal projects financed with coun- 
terpart funds. 
(5) There was no agreement with the Korean Government on the 
disposition of repayments of loans from the counterpart account. 
4s currently checked 
(1) The Mission established a Counterpart Programing Division 
responsible for these functions, and programing of availabilities 
and requirements appeared to have been generally improved. 
(2) The Mission had not established adequate controls in this 
area. This subject is discussed at page 152 of this report. 
( 3 )  Accounting records were being maintained by project and 
periodically consolidated into status reports. 
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(4) The Mission was still somewhat deficient in this area as 
further discussed at page 132 of this report. 
(5) An agreement had been reached to deposit all receipts in 
a special account to be used subsequently for industrial develop- 
ment. 
TKERMAL POWER PLANTS CONSTRUCTED 
UNDER NONCOMPETITIVE CPFF CO IVTRACT 
As ~reviousls re~orted 
There had been no solicitation of bids for a 30-million- 
dollar cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the construction of three 
thermal power plants. The contract was negotiated and financed by 
ICA at special request of the Korean Government. 
As currently checked 
The three plants were completed ahead of schedule; over-all 
operating supervision and on-the-job training were finished in mid- 
1957. The total cost of the project was $28 million. According 
to Mission personnel, there was a need for more technical training 
in maintenance and supply management, some employees trained under 
ICA participant training projects were assigned to work other than 
that for which they had been trained, funds had not been made 
available in a timely manner resulting in failure to maintain ade- 
quate stock levels, and there was a continuing problem of excess 
employees in the plants. 
COST INCREASES IN THE REHABILITATION 
OF KOREA S MAJOR HYDROELECTRIC PLANT 
As ~reviousls reported 
" 
The rehabilitation of the Hwachon Dam was scheduled for com- 
pletion before the close of calendar year 1957. The project had 
required increases in ICA funding from 5.3 million dollars to close 
to 9 million dollars. After 2 years of survey work and engineer- 
ing and construction services at the site, it had not been possible 
to determine the exact nature and extent of repair work needed be- 
cause of lack of a sufficiently specific survey and the amount of 
war damage suffered which had been extensive and was difficult to 
discover. 
As currently checked 
The rehabilitation was completed in February 1958 at a cost 
of $9.5 million. Mission reports indicated that the plant was op- 
erating in a satisfactory manner. 
PROGRESS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS 
AFTER INITIAL DELAYS AND REPROGRAMING 
As ~reviously re~orted 
We noted progress in the installation of additions to the cen- 
tral telephone exchange in Seoul, under supervision of an Amerlcan 
contractor; rehabilitation of the outslde cable plant and the work 
in the provinces were undertaken by the Korean Government. There 
had been some unrealistic planning and financing in prior years, 
causing delays in the execution of the projects and requiring sub- 
stantial reprograming. 
As currently checked 
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The Seoul exchange and cable projects were completed in 1959, 
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and the outside plant was expected to be finished in October 1961. 
Other old telecommunications projects were expected to be completed 
by early fall of 1961. Mission personnel reported that, in gen- 
eral, the program had been very successful in the last 4 years, as 
indicated by the increase in main-line subscribers from 25,000 at 
the beginning of 1955 to 87,000 at the end of 1960. 
IMPROVEMENT OF WATERWORKS IN SEOUL, 
BUT SLOW PROGRESS IN THE PROVINCES 
As previousl~ re~orted 
A continuing program of rehabilitating and expanding city wa- 
ter supply systems throughout Korea had added significantly to the 
e water supply in Seoul, but progress had been considerably slower 
in other cities. 
As currently checked 
All of these waterworks projects had been completed by 1958, 
and water supply in 56 cities had been increased from 248,000 to 
450,000 cubic meters daily for 6.5 million people. 
PLANNING DEFICIENCIES AM) PREMATURE COMMITMENT 
OF AID FUNDS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FERTILIZER PLANTS 
As ~revlousl~ re~orted 
ICA had committed $40.5 million for construction of two ferti- 
lizer plants, supplemented by local currency financing of $7 mil- 
lion equivalent from counterpart funds. 
Fertilizer plant No. 1 was being erected an a site which tech- 
nicians in Korea considered undesirable. Changes in engineering 
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design and slow negotiations with the contractor had delayed con- 
struction and increased costs. A new process which the plant was 
to use had caused concern to some officials. 
Plant No, 2 had been approved by ICA before the kind of ferti- 
lizer to be produced, the type of raw material to be used, and the 
plant location had been determined. Plans for plant No. 2 were 
subsequently abandoned, and the aid funds were reprogramed. 
A report issued by us in April 1960 to the Congress on our re- 
view of contracts dated May 13, 1955, and March 27, 1959, with 
McG~aw-Hydrocarbon, a Joint Venture for the Construction and Opera- 
tion of a Fertilizer Plant in Korea (B-133290), brought out that 
construction costs had increased substantially, the penalty clause 
for delayed completion of the plant was not effective, the serv- 
ices and training contract was awarded to McGraw-Hydrocarbon with- 
out evidence of satisfactory performance under the construction 
contract, and authorized compensation for services and training ap- 
peared high. 
As currently reviewed 
The plant began producing urea in February 1960, but mechani- 
cal difficulties delayed production at the capacity guaranteed by 
the contractor until early in calendar year 1961. At December 31, 
1960, obligations of ICA and counterpart funds for the project 
were as follows: 
ICA funds Counterpart 
(millions of dollars ) (millions of hwan) 
0 Plant construction 
Training and advisory 
$353 
contract services 5 3  
Hous k g  - .2 
Total 
At the close of the quarter ended March 31, 1961, the plant was op- 
erating at 64 percent of rated capacity. On the basis of operat- 
ing and financing costs, the cost of fertilizer was higher than im- 
ported fertilizer- In order for the plant to be competitive, ad- 
justments in Interest rates on loans and in charges for deprecia- 
tion and write-off of start-up or preproduction costs will be nec- 
essary. Although the contract with McGraw-Hydrocarbon for plant 
operation, maintenance, and training was to terminate in December 
v 
1961, the Korean Government had made no attempt to extend or re- 
place the contract. In the opinion of Mission personnel, Korsan 
employees by themselves neither had nor will have in the near fu- 
ture the technical ability to properly operate and maintain the 
plant, particularly since about 40 key Korean employees were being 
inducted into the Army at the time of our review. Many of them 
had been trained by ICA. 
The agency informed us in March 1962 that production during 
the late month3 of 1961 was considerably better and In December 
reached 103.6 percent of rated capacity, that with Mission persua- 
sion the Korean Government had indicated plans for discontinuing 
subsidies on Government-imported fertilizer, and that the services 
and training contract with McGraw-Hydrocarbon had been terminated 
in favor of a new contract to be executed with another firm. 
(I 
The lag in sales of fertilizer due to its noncompetitive price 
and the effect thereof are discussed at page 111 of this report. 
PLOW PROGRESS IN SMALL INDUSTRY PROGRU 
u
The program for rehabilitation and expansion of small indus- 
tries had not reaeived the necessary technical review and advance 
planning. Many of the projects showed unsatisfactory progress in 
terms of lagging procurement, unrealistic arrangements for financ- 
ing local costs, and unsolved technical problems. Equipment for 
some plants had arrived but was held in customs pending technical 
and financial assistance needed for its installation. 
,As currently checked 
This program was reviewed as part of our current examination 
and is discussed at page 128 of this report. We believe that the 
program has not been successful; the agency does not agree. 
DELAYS IN THE REHABILITATION AND TECHNICAL 
EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
As previously reported , 
Starting in 1954, the Mission had sponsored a program of reha- 
bilitation for Seoul National University and had engaged the serv- 
ices of a United States university for technical advisory services, 
training, and the procurement of laboratory equipmebt. However, 
materials for the rehabilitation of the physical ]plant and equip- 
ment for laboratory facilities did not begin to arrive until Sep- 
tember 1956 and the technical services in Korea as contemplated 
under the contract had not been f'urnished. 
As currently checked 
This program encountered various problems which prevented it 
from achieving i t s  f u l l  aims. These problems are discussed a t  
page 140 of t h i s  report .  
DELAY I N  PROCURING MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING 
AND OTHER TECHNICAL SERVICES 
,As ~ r e v i o u s l y  reported 
I C A  had not procured needed technical  services. Obligations 
recorded i n  1954 and 1955 i n  excess of 3 million do l l a r s  f o r  man- 
agement and engineering services and surveys remained m s e d  a t  
September 30, 1956. In  January 1957, the agency f u l f i l l e d  previ- 
ous plans f o r  an over-all  management engineering contract  and pro- 
cured the services of a group of flrms specializing i n  various 
f i e l d s  essential t o  the development of South Korea. 
As currently checked 
The over-all  management contract was terminated i n  February 
1961; the services formerly rendered by the contractor were t o  be 
carried out by the Mission s t a f f .  A Mission report i n  July 1960 
indicated tha t  some divisions of the Mission were not satisfied 
with the services of the contractor. 
LAG I N  HOUSING PROJECTS 
As Dreviouslv r e ~ o r t e d  
Up t o  1956 I C A  financing i n  housing was limited t o  the provi- 
sion of off lce  space f o r  the Korean Government and quar ters  fo r  
the agency s overseas personnel. Under a 1954 archi tec tua l  con- 
t r a c t ,  costing $142,000, I C A  financed plans fo r  a combined Mission- 
Korean Government office and hotel  bullding. However, American 
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and Korean representatives d i d  not reach agreement on the accepta- 
b i l i t y  of the proposed project  and decided t o  abandon i t .  In  
June 1955, I C A  obligated 1.5 million dol la rs  f o r  construction of 
an off ice  building, for  use by the Korean Government. Further d i s -  
agreements developed concerning the execution of t h i s  second pro- 
posal, and a construction contract had not been awarded a t  the 
time of our examination i n  1956. 
As currently checked 
An addlt lonal  $85,000 was spent f o r  architect/engineering 
services, and construction contracts were f ina l ly  l e t  i n  1960 f o r  
two off ice  buildings--one early i n  the year f o r  the Korean Govern- 
ment buildlng and the other several months l a t e r  fo r  a building t o  
be occupied by the Mission. Construction was on schedule, with oc- 
cupancy expected by August 1961. The contract f o r  the Korean Gov- 
ernment buildlng was awarded on the basis of the lowest of three 
bids received; the contract f o r  the Misslon buildmg was awarded 
t o  the same contractor by d l r ec t  negotiation without solicitation 
of any other of fers .  Both contracts were f o r  lump sums aggregat- 
ing $3.5 million f o r  dol la r  cos ts ,  loca l  costs  were on a reimburs- 
able basls.  P ro f l t s  and fees  on both contracts were estimated a t  
$370,000. A Mission report  on audit  of the two contracts f o r  the 
period from inception of the contracts t o  January 18, 1962, stated 
tha t  (1) cer ta in  work remalned t o  be done fo r  which the contractor 
requested extension t o  June 30, 1962, and (2)  p r o f i t  on the two 
contracts based on the contractor ' s  records In  Korea approximated 
$638,000 subject t o  posslble upward adjustment fo r  ce r t a in  
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rn questioned transactions. The records of the agency indicate that 
the contractor, although not sequdred by the terms of the con- 
I 
tracts, has agreed to renegotiate and adjust for any excess prof- 
its disclosed by final audit. 
UNSAT ISFACTORY PROCEDURES FOR THE PURCHASE AND CONTROL 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPPENT 
There was a need for more discriminate buylng of administra- 
tive supplies and equipment, for a tightening of the requisition- 
ing system, and for proper documentation of price quotations. At 
the time of our examination, the Mission had not established a sys- 
tem of property accountability for nonexpendable office equipment 
and residential furnishings. The agency maintained no inventory 
and use records for consumable supplies. In September 1956 im- 
proved requisitioning and purchasing procedures were drafted, as 
well as a system for property accountability. 
As currently checked 
Procedures with respect to the above operations had been in- 
stituted, and from our observations they appeared to be function- 
ing satisfactorily. 
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DESCRIPTION OF AID PROGRAM 
NATURE AND OBJECTIVES 
The United States provided substantial ec~nomic assistance to 
Korea under a variety of programs from the end of the Japanese oc- 
cupation in 1945 to the start of the current program in 1954, as 
shown by the following summary: 
$378 million for relief and rehabilitation during the pe- 
riod of the American military government between 1945 and 
194-8. 
$200 million for economic aid administered by the Economic 
Cooperation Administration between 1948 and 1951. 
$333 million administered by the Korean Clvilian Assist- 
ance Command of the United States Army during the Korean 
conflict . 
$93 million as the United States portion of the program of 
the Unlted Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. 
These programs and the manner in which they were administered 
were described in our prior report. 
The current economic assistance program began in fiscal year 
1954, after termination of the Korean hostilities, under the admin- 
istration of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), predeces- 
sor agency of ICA and continued under ICA and its successor, the 
Agency for International Development (AID) .I 
The baslc objectives of the ICA program in the 195'4-56 period 
(covered by our prior report) were to reconstruct war damage and 
to assist In maintaining Korean military forces. Assistance was 
given to fmance reconstruction and improvement projects, wlth ma- 
jor emphasis on essential utilities and transportation services. 
Substantla1 amounts were also made available for the rehabilita- 
tion of exlsting lndustrles and for establishmg a new industrial 
base. In addition, through the commodity import program, essen- 
tial commodities such as food, fertilizer, 
needed to maintain consumption levels were 
currency proceeds were used to support the 
and raw materials 
imported, and the local 
Korean military budget 
'since AID did not succeed ICA until after the conclusion of our 
field audit, we refer to ICA as the administering agency in thls 
report. 
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and for local costs of rehabilitation projects. During 1957, the 
rehabilitation effort was largely completed and pre-Korean-war Iiv- 
ing standards were restored or exceeded. 
The stated objectives of the program in the 1957-61 period, 
covered by this report, were to help maintain essential consump- 
tion by importing food, fertilizer, and essential raw materials 
and, through the use of the local currency proceeds derived from 
these imports, to help maintain Korean military forces through sup- 
port of the Korean military budget. In addition, the ICA program 
was designed to strengthen the basic structure of the Korean econ- 
omy so that the country could provide a larger share of its re- 
quirements from domestic production. 
Direct United States economic assistance to Korea since the 
end of the Korean war is summarized below: 
Obligations at June 30. 1961 
Fiscal years 
Total 1954-56 1957-61 
(millions) 
ICA and predecessor agency8 
Commodity rmports 
Project assistance 
Cash grant 
Overseas administration 
Emergency relief and assistance 
Ocean freight on voluntary 
agency shipments 
Total 
Development Loan Fund: 
Development loans 
Public Law 480: 
Title I 
Title I1 
Title I11 
Total 
Department of Defense: 
Armed forces assistance to Korea 
a1961 data not ~ncluded .
COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM 
The commodity import program has been designed to (1) finance 
investment and consumption commodities which Korea needed but 
could not produce locally and d l d  not have the foreign exchange to 
purchase and (2) generate Korean currency (hwan) to support the Ko- 
rean military budget and finance the local costs of economic devel- 
opment projects and related activities. 
The commodity program has been composed of (1) consumption 
goods, such as foodstuffs, fuel, medlclnes, and raw materials 
needed to produce consumption goods--principally cotton and ferti- 
llzer--and (2) investment goods, such as industrial machinery and 
goods needed to produce Investment goods--for example, lumber. 
The types of commodities fmanced under this program are shown in 
schedule 3, page 163. 
ICA program guidelines suggested that the program should be 
so constituted as to (1) stimulate domestic production where pos- 
sible by reducing imports purchased with aid funds as rapldly as 
domestlc production could be developed and (2) provide maximum in- 
centive for Korean exportmg. 
The method by which the Bank of Korea allocates ICA funds to 
applicants has changed a number of times since the start of the 
ICA program. Summarized briefly are the bases that have been used* 
Date 
Prlor to August 1955 Awarded 
of hwan 
August 1955 - 
August 1958 
August 1958 - 
February 1961 
February 1961 - 
April 1961 
Since Aprll 1961 
Basls for dollar allocations 
to hrghest bidder on basrs of amount 
b13 for each dollar of allocatlon. 
Awarded on offlclal rate of exchange (500 hwan 
per dollar) plus rate bld for natlonal bonds. 
Highest amount of hwan bid for national bonds 
determined the priorlty of allocations. 
Awarded on the basis of officlal rate of ex- 
change (500 to 1 untrl January 1960, 650 to 1 
untll January 1961, 1,000 to 1 untll February 
1961) plus an additional amount of forelgn ex- 
change tax. The amount of tax bid determined 
prlority of allocation. 
Awarded on basis of official rate of exchange 
(1,300 to 1). Prlorlty of allocatlon deter- 
mined by amount of lnitlal deposit. 
No competitive award Availability of funds 
announced in newspapers Funds allocated to 
all applicants at official rate of 1,300 to 1. 
PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
ProJect assistance was directed to specific undertakings de- 
veloped jointly by ICA and the Korean Government and covered by in- 
dividual project agreements setting forth the specifics of the un- 
dertaking and the commitments of the United States and Korean Gov- 
ernments. Project assistance generally consisted of (1) financing 
the Import of equipment and materials, (2) furnishing technical as- 
sistance, and (3) providing training to selected Korean nationals. 
For the fiscal years 1957 through 1961 project assistance de- 
cllned progressively from a high of $96.5 million in 1957 to 
$11.6 milllon in 1961. At the time of our review ICA was con- 
cerned more with reevaluating and administering existing projects 
than with initiating new projects. 
Following is a summary of project assistance, by major field 
of activity, for fiscal years 19% through 1961. 
Obligations 
Activity at 6-30-61 
(millions) 
Agriculture 
Industry and mlning 
Transportation 
Health and sanitation 
Education 
Public administration 
Cornmunlty development 
0 ther 
Total commodities and con- 
tract services 472-9 
United States technicians 
Technical support 
Participant trainmg 
Total project assistance 
The major projects in each of the above fields are shown in 
schedule 4, pages 164 to 167. 
CASH GRANT 
In connection wlth the revision of the exchange rate of the 
Korean hwan from 650 to 1,300 hwan to the Unlted States dollar, 
the United States made a grant of $20 mlllion in cash to the Ko- 
rean Government. The grant was considered necessary to compensate 
Korea for expected short-term reductions in foreign exchange 
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earnings resul t ing from the hwan devaluation and to susta in  confi- 
dence i n  the hwan. The contemplated reduction was expected to  
stem principally from reduced sales  of hwan, goods, and services 
to the United Sta tesmni ted  Nations (US/UN) forces i n  Korea, which 
sales  consti tuted one of the main sources of Korean foreign ex- 
change earnings. 
LOCAL CURRENCY 
Local currency was made a v a i l a b l e  t o  support  the  Korean m l l i -  
t a r y  budget and f o r  t h e  l o c a l  cos t s  of t e c h n i c a l  cooperat ion and 
economic development p r o j e c t s  wi th in  Korea, approved by I C A .  
These funds derlved from: 
1. Commodity imports f inanced by ICA under the  mutual secu- 
r l t y  program. 
2. Proceeds from the  s a l e s  of su rp lus  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodi- 
t i e s  under s e c t l o n  402 of  the  Mutual Secur l ty  Act of 195'4. 
3.  Proceeds from the  s a l e s  of surp lus  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodi- 
ties under t l t l e  I of Fubl lc  Law 480. 
Counterpart  f inds  a r e  maintained I n  a Korean Government ac- 
count i n  the government-controlled Bank of Korea. The proceeds 
from s a l e s  of su rp lus  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodities a r e  deposi ted i n t o  
Unlted S t a t e s  Treasury accounts.  The funds from a l l  these  sources 
may be used only f o r  purposes agreed upon by t h e  Korean and United 
S t a t e s  Governments. 
To ta l  c o l l e c t i o n s  of l o c a l  cur rencies  from f l s c a l  year  1954 
through December 31, 1960, and the  purposes f o r  which they  were 
a l l o c a t e d  i n  t h a t  per lod  a r e  summarized below. 
Collections 
Allocated f o r  
Budget support  fo r  Korean na t iona l  defense 
Local cos t s  of p ro j ec t  a s s i s t ance  
Loans through Korean Government banks 
Heqdling charges and r e l i e f  cos ts  
Tra?=portation and communications p ro j ec t s  
, Loaq bas is  
Reserved fo r  United S ta t e s  use 
Mission l o c a l  cos t s ,  5 percent--discontin- 
ued i n  1956 
-0za1 t r u s t  fund f o r  technica l  support 
cos t s  
Other 
Tota l  a l l oca t ed  
Balance 
Counterpart Section 402 Public Law 480 
( b i l l i o n s  of hwan) 
w - 8 1  0  
Counterpart  depos l t s  
P r l o r  t o  January 1, 1961, the  b a s i s  of  counterpar t  depos i t s  
was governed by the  economlc cooperation agreement of  1948 whlch 
requl red  counterpar t  funds t o  be deposi ted i n  a n  amount commensu- 
s a t e  wlth the  d o l l a r  cos t s  of imports f inanced under the  a i d  pro- 
gram. Korea was specifically exempted from s e c t l o n  142(b) (i) of 
the  Mutual Secur i ty  Act of 1954, whlch beginning i n  f i s c a l  year  
1955 provlded f o r  counterpar t  depos l t s  i n  amounts equal  t o  the  pro  
ceeds der ived  from the  s a l e s  of a ld-f inanced imports. 
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Commodities imported by Korean Government agencies whi ch were 
no t  f o r  r e s a l e  i n t o  the  economy o r  f o r  use  i n  revenue-producing 
a c t i n t i e s  were no t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  depos i t  of  counterpar t .  For 
a l l  o the r  Imports the  government-controlled Bank of Korea main- 
t a ined  two separa te  accounts--a counterpar t  depos l t s  account ,  f o r  
amounts requi red  t o  be deposited on the  b a s i s  of b i l l i n g s  by the  
Mission, and an  a i d  goods c o l l e c t i o n  account,  f o r  amounts a c t u a l l y  
deposi ted rep resen t ing  l o c a l  currency of commensurate value pa id  
by commercial importers and revenue-producing government agencies  
on subauthor iza t ions ,  and the  n e t  proceeds from s a l e s  of  imported 
commodltles, principally f e r t i l i z e r ,  i n t o  t h e  Korean economy. I C A  
and the  Korean Government followed a p o l i c y  of l i m l t i n g  r e l e a s e s  
of  counterpar t  h n d s  f o r  expenditure  t o  amounts on d e p o s i t  i n  t h e  
a i d  goods c o l l e c t i o n  account because expenditures beyond the  
amounts a c t u a l l y  deposi ted would r e q u l r e  d e f i c l t  f m a n c i n g  by the  
Korean Government with a t t e n d a n t  inflationary e f f e c t s .  A t  Decem- 
ber  31, 1960, the  u n d e p o s ~ t e d  counterpar t  funds r e p r e s e n t m g  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between the  t o t a l  c r e d i t s  t o  the  counterpar t  d e p o s i t  
account and the  t o t a l  c o l l e c t i o n s  recorded i n  the  a i d  goods col lec-  
t l o n  account amounted t o  46.8 b i l l i o n  hwan. 
Effective January 1, 1961, t h e  b a s l s  f o r  depos i t ing  counter- 
p a r t  f i n d s  w a s  changed t o  r e q u i r e  depos l t s  I n  an  amount commensu- 
r a t e  with s a l e s  proceeds,  as provlded I n  s e c t i o n  1 4 2 ( b ) ( i )  of t h e  
Mutual Secur l ty  Act of 1954, In connection therewith, t h e  Mlsslon 
deslgned a new system of accounting f o r  counterpar t  f i n d s  whlch 
was Intended t o  do away wlth the  unwleldy and complicated d u a l  ac- 
counts under the  o ld  system, overcome l n e f f e c t l v e  c o n t r o l  over de- 
posits i n  the  a i d  goods c o l l e o t i o n  account,  and s t r eng then  the  ac- 
countmg and repor t ing  procedures of the  Korean Government t o  pro- 
vide t h e  Mission wlth more r e l i a b l e  and extensive information on 
counterpar t  operations, These conditions had been the  s u b j e c t  of 
c r l t i c l s m  i n  ppevlous r e p o r t s  by our Off lce and the  agency's Wash- 
ington  o f f i c e .  
Budpet support  f o r  Korean n a t l o n a l  defense 
One of t h e  major purposes of l o c a l  currency generation has 
been t o  support  the  very l a r g e  Korean m i l i t a r y  fo rces  under a pro- 
gram designated a s  Local Currency b l l t a r y  Budget Support. Thrs 
program 1 s  administered by the  Unlted S t a t e s  M i l i t a r y  Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) i n  Korea. A t o t a l  of 251.6 b l l l i o n  hwan was 
a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h i s  program through December 31, 1960, from the  
t h r e e  sources of l o c a l  currency. A review of  t h i s  program w i l l  be 
t h e  s u b j e c t  of a separa te  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Congress. 
Counterpart  loans 
Subs tan t l a1  amounts of counterpar t  funds were loaned t o  pub- 
l i c  and p r i v a t e  e n t i t i e s  f o r  the  development and expansion of  va r l -  
ous s e c t o r s  of the  Korean economy. A t  December 31, 1960, 
counterpart f'unds released to  three Korean Government banks for  
loan purposes amounted to 112.6 b i l l i o n  hwan, most of which was ad- 
ministered by the Korean Reconstruction Bank. Annual i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  on these loans were 3 percent pr ior  to  completion of con- 
s t ruc t ion  and generally 8 percent thereaf ter .  Installment collec- 
t lons  of pr inc ipa l  and i n t e r e s t  on loans are  required t o  be depos- 
i t e d  to  the repayments account of the counterpart find. 
I n i t i a l l y ,  the recipients of loans were selected by the Ko- 
rean Government and the Combined Economic Board (CEB); conse- 
quently, the banks had l i t t l e  authority i n  select ing project  spon- 
sors and the subsequent loan recipients .  In  more recent years the 
CEB authorized individual revolving funds i n  the banks for  spe- 
c i f i c  broad programs, for  some of which loans had not previously 
been avai lable ,  and designated the banks to  investigate the finan- 
c i a l  resources and credi t  ra t ing  of loan applicants. The r e s u l t s  
of inves t igat lons  together wlth the bank Is approval or disapproval 
were passed on to  the Korean Government and the CEB for  f m a l  de- 
c is ion on the loan application. 
Collections by the bank of pr incipal  installments and i n t e r e s t  
are  required t o  be deposited in to  the respective revolvmg funds 
fo r  reloaning. Annual i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  averaged 8 percent on long- 
term loans (2  t o  10 years) and 12  percent to  15 percent on short- 
term loans (6  months t o  1 year).  
A t  December 31, 1960, CEB had authorized 39,550 mill ion hwan 
for  the following revolving funds i n  the three banks: 
Fund 
-
Operating Loan Fund 
Small Industry Devel- 
opment Program 
Housing and Home De- 
ve lopment Fund 
Agriculture loans 
Small industry loans 
Industry operating 
loans 
Fisheries Revolving 
Fund 
Export Promotion Fund 
T o t a l  
Bank 
Korean Reconstruction Bank 
Korean Reconstruction Bank 
Korean Reconstruction Bank 
Korea Agriculture Bank 
do . 
Bank of Korea 
Bank of Korea 
do. 
Amount 
authorized 
(mill ions 
of hwan) 
The agency advised tha t  i n  August 1961 the Korean Agricul- 
t u r a l  Bank was dissolved and i t s  functions and respons ib i l i t i es  
were assumed by the new Medium Industry Bank and the National Agri-  
cu l tura l  Cooperatives Federation. 
DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND 
Through June 30, 1961 the Development Loan Fund (DLF) had 
made seven loans to ta l ing  $22 million, primarily for  indus t r i a l  
development projects  and a c t i v i t i e s .  The operations of the Devel- 
opment Loan Fund have been audited annually by our Office pursuant 
to  the s ta tu tory  requirements applicable t o  Government corpora- 
t ions.  Audit reports  were issued to  the Congress fo r  f i s c a l  years 
1958, 1959 1960, and 1961 (B-133220 dated August 31, 1959, Febru- 
ary 29, 1960, March 27, 1961, and June 25, 1962). 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT 
AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954 (PUBLIC LAW 480) 
Korea received significant quant i t ies  of United States  sur- 
plus agricultural commodities (cot ton,  wheat, barley) under t h i s  
act .  Local currency proceeds from the sa le  of these commodities 
under t i t l e  I have been used for  purposes jo in t ly  agreed t o  by the 
Unlted States  and Korea, pr inc ipa l ly  for  the support of the Korean 
mil l tary budget, (see  p. 60); the remainder has been available t o  
pay United States  expenses i n  Korea. 
Commodities furnished under t l t l e  I1 are  for  famlne r e l l e f  o r  
other extraordinary r e l i e f  requirements. In  1961 commodities val- 
ued a t  $13 million were al located to  the Korean Government to  be 
used as compensation for  workers of the Natlonal Construction Serv- 
i c e ,  a public works undertaking of the Korean Government designed 
to  a l l ev ia t e  unemployment. 
T l t l e  I11 commodities are  donated t o  approved voluntary agen- 
c ies  f o r  distribution to needy persons. 
ARMED FORCES ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
This program, s tar ted i n  November 1953, was administered by 
the United States Army and consisted generally of rebullding 
schools, public heal th  f a c i l i t i e s ,  orphanages, and similar  c i v i l  
s tructures.  
INDIRECT A I D  
The Korean Government ha s received substant ia l  amounts of in-  
d i r ec t  aid a s  a r e su l t  of payment by the United States  f o r  hwan 
and fo r  goods and services furnished t o  US/UN forces i n  Korea, a t  
the o f f i c i a l  r a t e  of exchange whlch was about half the market r a t e .  
From 1955 t o  1960 the United States sold more than $113 million t o  
the Bank of Korea a t  the o f f i c i a l  r a t e  of exchange i n  re turn f o r  
hwan. The Korean Government then resold the dol la rs  thus obtained 
t o  individuals i n  Korea f o r  hwan a t  a r a t e  which was generally a t  
l e a s t  double the o f f i c i a l  ra te .  A 
During the same period the US/UN forces and the I C A  Mission 
paid a t o t a l  of $93.5 million f o r  goods and cer ta ln  services fur -  
nished by Korean sources. The amounts paid f o r  these commodities 
and services were computed a t  the o f f i c i a l  r a t e  of exchange and-- 
except f o r  small varying percentages of such amounts which the re-  
cipient  business firms were permitted t o  retain--came in to  the po- 
session of the Korean Government under the exchange control re-  
quirements. These dol la rs  were a lso sold by the government i n  the 
same manner a s  the dol la rs  described above. 
The value of u t i l i t y  services furnished to  the USDN forces 
was a l so  computed on the basis of the o f f i c i a l  r a t e  of exchange. 
The dol la rs  fo r  these services were paid by the US/UN t o  the 
Korean Government, which i n  turn credited the government u t i l i t y  
agencies i n  hwan a t  the o f f i c i a l  r a t e .  The Korean Government then 
resold the dol la rs  t o  Korean importers a t  a r a t e  much higher than 
the o f f i c i a l  r a t e .  The t o t a l  cost of these services was not read- 
i l y  determinable, except those furnished i n  1959 which totaled $13.1 million. 
These several forms of ind i rec t  aid ceased i n  February 1961 
when the exchange r a t e  was established a t  1,300 hwan t o  $1. 
PDMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRM 
Bi la t e ra l  agreements 
The economic and technical  assistance program f o r  Korea was 
being conducted under authority of a comprehensive aid agreement, 
dated February 8,  1961. This agreement superseded the economic 
aid agreement of December 10, 1948, and, with one minor exception, 
the other agreements (described in detail in our prior report) ne- 
gotiated with the Republic of Korea in connection with the postwar 
rehabilitation and economic assistance programs, 
In our prior report (p. 17), we pointed out that the agree- 
ments which then governed the program did not provide for adminis- 
tration of the technical cooperation program which began in Korea 
in 1956. The new agreement of February 1961 provides for that pro- 
gram. 
United States Operations Mission 
The ICA program in Korea has been administered by the United 
States Operations Mission in a manner similar to that in which ICA 
operations in other countries have been administered. In 1959 the 
Mission superseded the Office of Economic Coordinator (OEC), 
United Nations Command, which had administered the civilian relief 
program of the United States Army and then the ICA program. In 
keeping with the transfer of responsibility for the ICA program 
from OEC to the Mission, the line of communication, which under 
OEC had been through the Commander in Chief, United Nations Com- 
mand, was transferred to ICA channels. The change-over to the nor- 
mal ICA operation pattern rectified the lack of unified administra- 
tion which was discussed in our prior report (p. 45). 
At the time of our field audit, the Mission employed 257 Amer- 
icans and 1,059 Koreans. In addition there were 173 Americans and 
256 Koreans connected with the United States economic assistance 
program under ICA financed or administered contracts with profes- 
sional, educational, and voluntary organizations. The agency re- 
ported that,as of November 1961, Mission personnel had been re- 
duced by 12 American and 194 Korean employees and 42 Americans con- 
nected with ICA-financed contracts. 
Combined Economic Board 
The Combined Economic Board was established in May 1952 as 
the result of an agreement between the United States and the Repub- 
lic of Korea. The CEB, which is composed of the Director of the 
Mission and the Korean Minister of Reconstruction, is the vehicle 
through which agreement is reached between the United States and 
Korea regarding all aspects of the aid program including plans and 
policies and approval of specific activities. Much of the work of 
the CEB was conducted through various component committees. 
The M O R , ~  which is the Korean counterpart of the ICA Mission, 
. acts as the liaison between ICA and the various Korean ministries 
and sets forth policies to be followed by those ministries in the 
conduct of the aid program. 
The agency reported in March 1962 that the CEB method of oper- 
ation had been revamped by agreement between the Mission and the 
Korean Government, to reduce undue formality. excessive number of 
observers, and whit was judged to be unnece'siarily frequent meet- 
ings. CEB functions are now carried out informally by the Mission 
Director and the Chairman of the Economic planning- ~oard .
'1n Mag 1961, after the change in government, the Ministry of He- 
construction (MOR) became the Ministry of Economic Development 
(NED) which in turn was succeeded in July 1961 by the Economic 
Planning Board. 
PROBLEMS I N  KOREAN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Progress In  Korea toward economic s t a b i l i t y  and se l f -  
sufficiency has been and continues t o  be challenged by serious in-  
f i r m i t i e s  i n  some of the basic sectors of the country's economic 
machinery. These in f i rmi t i e s ,  which we discuss below,relate t o  
the poor u t i l i z a t i o n  of Korean resources i n  foreign exchange and 
productive capabi l i ty ,  the urgent need f o r  a more balanced and pro- 
ductive tax system, the widespread corruption withln and outside 
the government, and the high In te res t  r a t e s  on ag r i cu l tu ra l  and 
commercial loans and the depressing e f fec t  thereof on economic 
well-being and growth. 
NEED FOR MORE PRODUCTIVE UTILIZATION_ 
OF KOREAN RESOURCES 
Unlted States  a ld  by v l r tue  of ~ t s  f lnancla l  magnitude has 
been bound up lnextrlcably wlth the Korean economy rn the sense 
tha t  the manner In  whlch c e r t a m  segments of the economy a re  admln- 
l s te red  has a d l r ec t  bearlng on the extent of outslde ass ls tance 
needed. Therefore the Unlted States  has a very spec l f lc  concern 
In  the proper u t l l l z a t l o n  of the ln te rna l  resources of Korea t o  
the end t h a t  the economlc advancement of the country 1s  furthered 
and the need for  outslde a ld  1s relaxed. Our exarnmatlon m d l -  
cated t h a t  Korea's u t l l l z a t l o n  of l t s  forelgn exchange and produc- 
t l v e  capabl l l ty  In agriculture and mdustry,  and ~ t s  admlnlstra- 
t lon  of c l v l l  government operations were not conducive t o  sol ld  
economlc development and In  some cases were mconsls tent  wlth 
known Korean capabl l l t res  o r  Unlted Sta tes  agreements o r  wlshes. 
Korean forelgn exchange 
Korea d l d  not comply wlth Unlted States-Korean agreements 
cal l ing f o r  close coordmatlon In  the use of Korea's forelgn ex- 
change resources. Desplte contmued evldence t h a t  I C A  was d lssa t -  
I s f led  wlth the manner I n  whlch Korean forelgn exchange was bemg 
used, lt does not appear tha t  I C A  made very serlous e f f o r t s  t o  ob- 
t a m  greater Korean cooperation In  t h l s  matter. Korea also added 
substantially t o  ~ t s  forelgn exchange reserves a t  the same tlme 
tha t  lt was requestmg addlt lonal  Unlted Sta tes  asslstance on the 
grounds tha t  more funds were needed f o r  economlc development. 
Korean forelgn exchange reserves increased from about $96 m i l -  
lion In  1955 t o  about $183 mill lon In  July 1961, while I C A  a s s i s t -  
ance In  recent years has decllned t o  about $200 mill lon annually. 
More than half  of Korea's forelgn exchange earnings were obtained 
from purchases of loca l  currency, goods, and services by Unlted Ma- 
t lons  forces In  Korea. The 1952 Economic Coordlnatlon Agreement 
between the Unlted Sta tes  and Korea, I n  recognition of the Impor- 
tance of Korean forelgn exchange earnings t o  the countryrs eco- 
nomic progress, specifled tha t  the use of Korean foreign exchange 
would be coordinated wlth the use of Unlted States  aid funds and 
t ha t  receipts  from Unlted Nations forces would be used only a s  rec- 
ommended by the Combined Economic Board, a jolnt  United States-  
Korean agency. The commodity import program guidelines agreed t o  
annually by CEB cal led fo r  effect ive and coordinated use of Korean 
foreign exchange, and joint  United States-Korean f inancia l  s t a b i l i -  
zation agreements provided for  the  use of dol la rs  received from 
the United Nations forces In  Korea. 
Desplte these agreements ICA was not able t o  get Korea t o  co- 
ordmate the use of l t s  own foreign exchange wlth I C A  aid funds. 
Korean forelgn exchange (1) was used f o r  purposes deemed unwise by 
I C A ,  ( 2 )  was not used fo r  specif ic  commodities which Korea needed 
t o  purchase, o r  (3)  was not spent a t  a l l  and thereby served to  In- 
crease Korean foreign exchange reserves. 
The agency c l a m s  t h a t ,  I n  sp l t e  of l lmlta t rons on Unlted 
Sta tes  control of expenditures of Korean forelgn exchange, ~t has 
made serlous e f f o r t s  t o  obtaln greater  Korean cooperation I n  care- 
f u l  expenditure of  i t s  forelgn exchange. The agency agreed tha t  
f a l l u r e  of the Korean Government t o  expend ~ t s  forelgn exchange 
promptly had contributed t o  a bulld-up of Korean forelgn exchange 
reserves and t h a t  t h l s  bulld-up had been unexpectedly rapld i n  the 
past year because of the  slowdown of the Korean economy. The rela-  
t l v e l y  hlgh l eve l  of these reserves I n  1961 reportedly was of con- 
cern t o  the agency and was discussed wlth the Korean Government i n  
connection wlth releases of approved ald funds f o r  the 1962 pro- 
gram. 
The agency polnted out t h a t  the bilateral ald agreement of 
February 8,  1961, whlch superseded prevlous aid agreements lnclud- 
m g  the 1952 Economlc Coordmatlon Agreement, d i d  not Include the 
provlslons contained i n  the 1952 agreement concerning the use of 
Korean forelgn exchange earned from US/UN forces.  
Use f o r  low p r l ~ r i t y  commodltles 
For several years I C A  officials expressed serious d lssa t i s fac-  
t l o n  with the manner In  which Korean forelgn exchange was belng 
used. In 1957 the Mlsslon mformed ICA/Washlngton t h a t  smce 
ear ly  an f l s c a l  year 1954 it had been d i f f i c u l t  t o  get Korea t o  
program ~ t s  forelgn exchange f o r  essential cornmodltles. Mlsslon 
records i n  1959 and 1960 mdlcated tha t  re leases  of Korean forelgn 
exchange had been made primarily on the basls of pressures exerted 
on the Korean Government by prominent Korean businessmen rather  
than f o r  needed ltems or baslc commodities not covered by I C A  fund- 
ing. In  March 1960 a k s s l o n  In terna l  report s ta ted tha t  Korea 
was lmportlng goods valued a t  from $15 mlll ion t o  $20 mill ion an- 
nually,  whlch, by standards normally applicable t o  ald recipients ,  
were of low p r l o r l t y  and tha t  the balance of Korean imports could 
stand closer scrutiny. Among the principal imports were nylon and 
rayon yarns, wool ~ Q J S ,  and sugar; a lso substant ia l  amounts of Ko- 
rean forelgn exchange were reportedly used f o r  watches, radios,  
and te levis ion sets .  (See pp. 113 t o  115 for  our comments on ny- 
lon yarn and wool tops.) The Korean Government recognized tha t  
sugar i s  a low pr io r i ty  item and tha t  the l eve l  of sugar imports 
had been too high. The Mission reported tha t  importers earned a 
high r a t e  of p ro f i t  on such commodities as wool tops and nylon 
yarn and tha t  consequently the Korean Government had been under 
pressure from in f luen t i a l  businessmen to  provide Korean foreign ex- 
change fo r  these items. 
Despite I C A 1 s  continued d issa t i s fac t ion  with the f a i l u r e  of 
Korea t o  l i v e  up t o  i t s  agreements regarding the use of Korean for -  
eign exchange, I C A  records d i d  not indicate any serlous attempt by 
Unlted Sta tes  aid o f f i c i a l s  t o  require compliance with these agree- 
ment s. 
The agency posit ion i s  tha t  i t  can advocate and even induce 
curbs on luxury lmports but it cannot control the amount of Korean- 
owned forelgn exchange spent on luxury imports under the terms of 
the  mutual assistance agreements. The agency clalms tha t  it f i -  
nances no luxury imports but does permit import of some higher 
qua l l ty  goods within approved categories; t h a t ,  t o  the extent tha t  
lt would c u r t a i l  or  eliminate financing of hlgher qua l l ty  goods, 
normal economic pressures would re su l t  In  t h e i r  ~mportat ion 
through use of Korean-owned foreign exchange over which the agency 
has l l t t l e  or no control; and t h a t ,  withln the above l l m l t s ,  the 
agency endeavors t o  exert i t s  influence on p r i o r l t l e s  of commodity 
lmports, whether Korean or ICA-financed. 
We dlsagree with the agency's poslt lon since it affords no 
means of assurlng t h a t  ald funds and the country's own resources 
w l l l  be used f o r  purposes of prlmary benefl t  t o  the  advancement of 
the country's economy. The record of the program over the past 
years as described I n  t h l s  repor t ,  coupled with the very substan- 
t l a l  l eve l  of a id ,  emphasizes c l ea r ly  the v i t a l  need f o r  such 
means. Moreover the lmplicatlons i n  the agency's posit ion tha t  
Korean-owned forelgn exchange and aid funds are separate and dls-  
t l n c t  elements i n  the Korean economic framework and tha t  the  for-  
mer should not or need not be subject t o  strictures on i t s  use and 
t h a t  the use of such foreign exchange should not be within the l e -  
gitlmate province of United Sta tes  control ,  are not consistent 
wlth economic logic and run counter t o  the objectives of the aid 
program. 
Neglect of e s sen t i a l  commodities 
A t  the same tune tha t  Korea was using a substantla1 part  of 
~ t s  forelgn exchange t o  purchase low p r l o r i t y  commodltles, a num- 
ber o f  essential commodities e i the r  were not acquired or  were pur- 
chased wlth I C A  funds. For example, I C A  financed a major par t  of 
the  f e r t l l l z e r  requlred by Korea, and only i n  1959 and 1960 d l d  Ko- 
rea  flnance a sizable amount of f e r t i l n e r  with i t s  own foreign ex- 
change. A s  another example, the  Korean Government refused t o  per- 
m i t  ~ t s  mlnis t r les  t o  spend forelgn exchange tha t  they had earned 
t o  import spare pa r t s  and supplies needed i n  t h e i r  income-earnlng 
operations. Instead these ltems were financed by I C A .  
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Increase i n  f o r e i ~ n  exchange reserves 
A major jus t i f ica t ion  for  nonproject aid t o  Korea was the i m -  
portat ion of commodities which were needed by the Korean economy 
and fo r  the purchase of which Korea's own foreign exchange earn- 
ings were insuff ic ient .  However, Korea's foreign exchange re-  
serves have increased substant ia l ly  since the s t a r t  of the I C A  pro- 
gram, indicating tha t  aid funds were used t o  subs t i tu te  f o r  or sup- 
plement Korean foreign exchange rather  than t o  expand the import 
of reportedly essent ia l  commodities. Between December 1955 and 
July 1961, Korean foreign exchange and gold holdings increased by 
$87 million, or  90 percent over the 1955 level .  Some of these re- 
serves were deposited i n  interest-bearing accounts i n  the United 
States  and several other countries; annual i n t e r e s t  earnings for  
1959 amounted to  the equivalent of $3.7 mill ion whlch i s  more than 
10 percent of a l l  commodity export earnings. I C A  informed us tha t  
i t s  a id  program had not contemplated such an increase. 
Despite the  large increase i n  reserves, the  Unlted Sta tes  i n  
March 1961 made a cash grant of $20 mill ion t o  the Korean Govern- 
ment, as a s t ab i l i za t ion  fund against expected reductions i n  for-  
elgn exchange reserves due t o  the adjustment of the exchange r a t e .  
The grant was not necessary f o r  the purpose f o r  which it  was made, 
and i n  June 1961 there were no de f in i t e  plans f o r  ~ t s  use. A t  
t ha t  tlme the grant was on deposit i n  an interest-bearing account 
i n  a United Sta tes  bank. According t o  the agency, an economlc 
slowdown prevented the expected increase i n  demand f o r  dol lars .  
The agency informed us tha t  ear ly  i n  1962 the use of $15 mlll lon 
from the stabilization fund was approved f o r  the  procurement of 
fertilizer and other procurement had begun from the remaining 
$5 milllon. 
A fac tor  responsible f o r  the increase I n  Korean foreign ex- 
change reserves was the f a i l u r e  of the Korean Government t o  s e l l  
a l l  the dol la rs  earned by i t  from transactions with the US/UN 
forces In  Korea. Korean-United Sta tes  agreements provided f o r  
sa l e  of these dol la rs  i n  order t o  produce hwan revenues f o r  the 
Korean Government and t o  reduce the  burden on I C A  f o r  financing es- 
sen t i a l  imports. Besides increasing the pressure on I C A  aid funds, 
the f a l l u r e  t o  use dol la rs  received from US/UN forces resulted i n  
the loss  of a recognized source of s ignif icant  hwan revenues. As 
we pomt out i n  another section of t h l s  report  (p .  74-1, the re- 
ported shortage of hwan revenues was responsible f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  
make maximum use of Korean production by Korean mi l i ta ry  forces 
thereby requiring United Sta tes  dol la r  aid t o  provide from outside 
sources cer ta in  products whlch could have been purchased i n  Korea. 
As of November 30, 1960, the  Bank of Korea reported unsold 
dol la rs  recelved from the US/UN forces to ta l ing  over $40 mlllion. 
I f  a l l  or  a substant ia l  part  of t h i s  sum had been sold f o r  hwan, 
the Korean Government would have had a large amount of hwan funds 
available f o r  mi l l ta ry  or  c i v l l i a n  purposes fo r  which aid f m d s  
were used d l rec t ly  o r  mdirec t ly .  
Korean production capability not utilized 
One of the basic purposes of the aid program in Korea has 
been to provide those commodities and services which the country 
is unable to produce, acquire, or otherwise provide from its own 
resources. To a significant extent, however, aid funds under the 
economic and military assistance programs were used to import com- 
modities which could have been produced in Korea. Failure to uti- 
lize this productive capacity caused higher dollar costs to the 
United States than were necessary. 
Imports of cotton under the ICA aid and Public Law 480 pro- 
grams and soybeans under both the ICA and the MAP programs have 
been responsible in large measure for reducing Korean production 
of these commodities. ICA and MAP have discontinued the financing 
of soybean imports with United States funds, The financing of cot- 
ton imports has continued at highlevels and, as the Korean textile 
industry expanded, imports of raw cotton have increased. Accord- 
ing to the agency the importing of more expensive finished and 
semifinished cotton products was elimmated. Furthermore, the MAP 
program was financing the purchase of materlal for the Korean mili- 
tary forces which could be produced by Korean industry. Increased 
procurement from Korean sources would assist In the development 
and stimulation of local industry, which is a major objective of 
the mutual security program in Korea. 
Cotton 
Obligations for cotton imports under the ICA economlc assist- 
ance program totaled $176.6 million through fiscal year 1961, Gr 
about 10 percent of the entire ICA aid program. In addition, the 
United States financed '$52.9 million worth of cotton under titles 
I and I1 of Public Law 480. 
Cotton has been grown in Korea for hundreds of years; during 
the Japanese occupation stress was placed on expandmg Korean cot- 
ton production and a textile industry was gradually established. 
Korean cotton production has greatly decreased since the advent 
of the ICA aid program; in 1954 Korea produced 104 million pounds 
of cotton and in 1959 only 54 milllon pounds, whlle United States- 
flnanced imports increased from $18.8 million in 1954 to $34.6 mil- 
lion in 1959. Costs of Unlted States cotton to Korean textile man- 
ufacturers were substantially lower than the cost of Korean- 
produced cotton. As a result, Korean cotton is currently used 
mostly for homespun goods in rural areas, since the textlle manu- 
facturers can earn greater profits by using United States-financed 
cotton. 
One major objective of the ICA program in Korea has been to 
reduce rural proverty and increase the income of farmers by diver- 
sifylng their production and reducing their dependence on rice. 
Despite thls objective and a Korean Government request to keep ag- 
rlcultural commodity lmports at a minlmum level in order to de- 
velop Korean agriculture, the United States has continued to fl- 
nance a high level of cotton ~mports. The Korean Ministry of Agri- 
culture has recognized the need to promote Korean self-sufficiency 
and reduce dependence on outslde ald and has recently announced a 
plan to Increase Korean cotton productlon. 
The agency claims that although cotton has been produced in 
Korea for many years 1ts productlon has not been profitable be- 
cause the cllmate and sol1 are not suited to growlng quality cot- 
ton and that Korean cotton cannot be used to stnn comrnerclal goods 
but 1s llrnlted mainly to paddlng for wmter clbthing and stuf?ing 
for mattresses and qullts. The agency further clams that whlle 
Korea could grow more cotton such-additional production would re- 
place needed agricultural production which makes a greater eco- 
nomlc contrlbutlon to Korea's needs. 
However, according to lnformatlon obtamed at the Mission, Ko- 
rean cotton has been used In Korean textlle plants About 100 mil- 
lion pounds were produced annually for the textlle lndustry In the 
perlod from 1937 to 1944; between 1950 and 1954 substantial quan- 
titles were used In Korean textlle plants, and In 1955 CEB ap- 
proved the use of local currency to purchase Korean cotton for the 
textlle mdustry. Moreover, during the Japanese occupation Korean 
cotton was used by the textlle Industry to manufacture cotton 
sheetlng for export to Japan and other countries 
We were also Informed at the Mlssion that concentration by 
Unlted States agencles on the dlsposal of Unlted States cotton In 
Korea to allevlate the Unlted States cotton surplus problem was a 
factor ln the declme of Korean cotton production. 
Korea 1s known as the "homeI1 of the soybean, thls crop has 
tradltlonally been a major food source for the Korean people Ko- 
rea exported substantial quantltles of soybeans before the advent 
of Unlted States aid, slnce that tlme soybean productlon has not 
kept pace wlth Korea's ~ncreased requlrernents occasioned by the 
countryls growlng population and soybean exports have been reduced 
to only minor quantltles Soybean ylelds per acre are reported to 
be lower in Korea than In any other prlnclpal soybean-producing 
country, and both the yleld per acre and the total productlon have 
declmed from the level existlng prlor to the start of the ICA pro- 
gram. Although ICA technical studles show that the application of 
fertlllzer, and the use of other lmproved agricultural practices, 
could result ln substantial increases In soybean ylelds, fertl- 
llzer, though a major component of the ICA program, vas not allo- 
cated for soybean productlon untll 1961. 
Since 1957 large quantities of soybeans have been imported 
into Korea under the military assistance program for consumption 
by the Korean armed forces, In May 1960, ICA persuaded United 
States military authorities to terminate soybean imports for the 
Korean military forces, However, a month later ICA authorized 
$1 million for the importation of soybeans as part of the economic 
aid program. Since imports under the military assistance program 
were considered by ICA a disincentive to Korean production, it is 
difficult to understand why ICA permitted the importation of soy- 
beans under the economic aid program after it had requested termi- 
nation of military assistance imports, An ICA study dated August 
1960 estimated that substantial quantities of soybeans imported un- 
der the military program had been diverted to civilian use and 
that this diversion had a depressing effect on the Korean economy. 
ICA justified the $1 million authorization by citing the,need to 
meet an immediate requirement for soybean oil. However, only 
$530,000 of the authorization was taken up by Korean importers 
over a period of about 6 months3 the authorization was extended 
several times; and the balance of $470,000 was finally deobligated 
in February 1962. It appears from these events that there was 
little if any need for the issuance of this authorization, 
The agency informed us that it recognized the potential of Ko- 
rea for increased soybean production and that the Korean Ministry 
of Agriculture had recently taken action to increase production; 
however, the Ministry had not requested ICA assistance in this mat- 
ter. 
ICA stated that its policy directive concerning agricultural 
production prohibits the use of aid funds to increase foreign pro- 
duction of cotton and other nonfood agricultural product s that- are 
in world surplus. In the case of Korean cotton, however it would 
appear that an increase in production would not necessarily con- 
flict with the policy beaausex 
1. Decreased financing of cotton imports would enable a reduc- 
tion in United States aid and would most likely tend to in- 
crease Korean cotton production, 
2. The present level of Korean ootton production is signifi- 
cantly below the level existing at the start of the ICA 
program and prior to the Korean war, Therefore restoring 
production to its former level should not be considered as 
an increase, particularly since one of the objectives of 
the ICA program is to restore Korea's economy to pre- 
Korean war levels. 
It should also be noted that, despite the ICA policy direc- 
tive, ICA-financed fertilizer has been allocated to Korean cotton, 
although by so applying fertilizer United States assistance is 
being used t o  Increase the p r o d u c ~ ~ o n  of t h i s  crop which i s  i n  
world surplus. 
The plans of the Revolutionary Government c a l l  fo r  a  200- 
percent increase i n  cotton production. The government also ex- 
pects an increased local  demand fo r  soybeans due t o  population in-  
creases. 
Material fo r  Korean mil i tary forces 
Mllitary assistance funds were 
commodities f o r  the Korean mil i tary 
Korean industry. 
used t o  
forces,  
finance the import 
whlch are produced 
The Unlted States  Country Team i n  Korea--which 1s headed by 
the Ambassador and includes the Director of the I C A  Mlssion and 
the Commander i n  Chief, United States Forces Korea--decided i n  
1960 tha t  commercial-type material previously furnished t o  the Ko- 
rean mll l tary forces under the mil i tary asslstance program would 
be shifted over a  perlod of years t o  the Korean mil i tary budget. 
Beglnnlng i n  1961 clothing and cer ta in  food items fo r  use of the 
mil l tary forces, which had previously been mported, were procured 
from Korean sources. Thls s h i f t  was designed t o  permlt the Korean 
mil l tary forces t o  procure more of t h e n  own requirements loca l ly  
and thus a s s i s t  i n  the stimulation of loca l  ~ndus t ry .  
A t  the tune of our renew it was evident tha t  Korean industry 
was able t o  produce many of the items st111 bemg lmported fo r  the 
use of Korean mll l tary forces under the mll l tary assistance pro- 
gram. Korean-made products such as t i r e s ,  tubes, palnt ,  drugs, 
blologlcals,  and medicines were not belng used by Korean mil i tary 
forces or belng pald fo r  by the Korean Government, but instead 
were lmported and paid fo r  from United States  MAP funds. The same 
situation 1s  t rue of products avallable from Dae Han Shipbuilding 
Corporation, discussed on page 144 
An annual ta rge t  of 10 b l l l ion  hwan was se t  by the Country 
Team fo r  the t ransfer  of ltems from the mll l tary assistance pro- 
gram to  the mll l tary budget. We were Informed by I C A  o f f l c l a l s  
tha t  t h l s  ta rge t  was based both on the technical potent la l l ty  of 
the Korean economy and the projected a v a ~ l a b i l i t y  of loca l  cur- 
rency t o  support t h l s  budget. The United States  was supportmg ap- 
proximately 95 percent of the 1961 Korea  mll l tary budget with 
hwan generated by the sale of commodities flnanced by the economic 
asslstance program and by the sale of surplus agricultural commodi- 
ties flnanced under P u b l ~ c  Law 480. 
I C A  wanted t o  h m l t  the amount of procurement transferred t o  
the Korean budget t o  the annual ta rge t  of 10 b l l l lon  hwan so tha t  
loca l  currency (hwan) would continue t o  be avallable In the 
requlred amounts for economlc development a c t l v l t i e s .  We were in- 
formed by the agency tha t  In  the f a l l  of 1961, a s  a r e s u l t  of an 
economic slowdown a f t e r  the revolution, counterpart accumulations 
fa i led  t o  bulld up a t  the antlclpated r a t e  and an interagency 
agreement was reached, recognlzlng the unaval labl l l ty  of addi- 
t lona l  hwan for  mil l tary budget support, so tha t  the MAP transfer 
program was suspended for  1962 
Whlle I C A  must take ~ n t o  account the amount of loca l  currency 
available t o  support the Korean mil l tary budget and t o  achieve 
other United States  objectives I n  Korea, aggressive e f f o r t  i n  t ax  
reform ( p .  78) and collection of f u l l  counterpart funds (p.  152) 
would Increase loca l  currency revenues and gradually enable addi- 
t l ona l  procurement of loca l ly  available commodlt~es f o r  the Korean 
mi l l ta ry  forces. 
Renew of Korean c l v i l  budget 
United Sta tes  ald t o  Korea has been based In  par t  on the need 
t o  secure loca l  currency, over and above the revenues of the Ko- 
rean Government, f o r  support of Korea's ml l i ta ry  budget and f o r  
economlc development a c t l v l t l e s .  The United Sta tes  has a d l r ec t  
i n t e r e s t ,  therefore,  i n  the use tha t  the Korean Government i s  mak- 
ing of i t s  own loca l  currency revenues and the degree of economy 
with which governmental operations are carrled out. 
I C A  o f f i c i a l s  reported tha t  the Korean Government res is ted 
any e f f o r t s  t o  r enew or  lnfluence the preparation of the c l v l l  
budget. Unlted States  ml l i ta ry  authorities revlew and advlse on 
the formulation of the Korean mi l l ta ry  budget. 
I C A  was able as a part  of ~ t s  advlsory e f f o r t  t o  r enew the 
adminlstratlve operatlons of the Korean Offlce of Supply (OSROK) 
whlch handles c l v l l  government procurement. I C A  studles In  June 
1960 disclosed tha t  OSROK operatlons were uneconomical I n  tha t  cer- 
t a m  storage locations rented by OSROK were v i r t u a l l y  unused, or  
were otherwise unnecessary and tha t  storage ra t e s  and cargo- 
handllng charges paid by O ~ R O K  were f a r  higher than commercial 
charges f o r  comparable services. Another I C A  study i n  January 
1961 pomted out tha t  improved management and the closlng of unnec- 
essary of f ices  could resu l t  i n  savmgs of adminlstratlve expenses 
totaling about 400 mllllon hwan, or nearly 50 percent of the t o t a l  
amount budgeted f o r  1960 adm~nls t ra t ive  expenses. 
The agency, I n  March 1962, advlsed tha t  these studies have 
had some lnfluence i n  improvmg OSROK operatlons. A s  of Octo- 
ber 31, 1961, OSROK, by closmg a l l  provincial of f lces ,  reducmg 
port personnel t o  reasonable requirements, and reorganlzlng the 
main o f f ~ c e ,  was able t o  e f fec t  personnel reductions of 701 employ- 
ees from a t o t a l  complement of 1,064 a t  June 30, 1961. 
The agency agrees tha t  the  Mission had l i t t l e  influence with 
previous Korean Governments i n  joint  budgeting of t o t a l  resources 
because these governments considered joint budgeting p o l i t i c a l l y  
infeasible .  The agency claims however t h a t  the  present Korean Gov- 
ernment has made available t o  the Misslon various data on the 1962 
budget and has discussed budget problems with Mission personnel 
but has not permitted Misslon lnspectlon of so-called Specla1 Ac- 
counts which A I D  s t a t e s  are areas of the c i v i l  budget, the review 
of which would be especial ly  useful.  A I D  a lso s ta ted  t o  us tha t  
the  counterpart budget f o r  calendar year 1962 r e f l e c t s  Mission 
views regarding p r i o r i t y  investment sectors and tha t  the &ssion 
had had a meaningful influence on the a l locat ion of t o t a l  counter- 
par t  resources. 
Recornmendatlons 
The f u l l  and most productive utilization of Korean resources 
and capabl l i t les  i s  e s sen t i a l  t o  the country's economic develop- 
ment and 1s of deep m t e r e s t  t o  the United S ta te s  since the manner 
of such u t i l i z a t i o n  has a d i r ec t  bearing on the extent of outslde 
assistance needed. Accordingly, and on the basls of the  considera- 
t ions  discussed above, we recommend t h a t  the responsible United 
Sta tes  agencies: 
1. Negotiate with the Korean Government t o  amend the b i l a t e r a l  
agreement of February 8, 1961, t o  requlre the use by the 
Korean Government of Korean foreign exchange earned from 
US/UN forces i n  the manner prescribed I n  the 1952 Economic 
Coordination Agreement. 
2. Review the proposed use by the Korean Government of i t s  
foreign exchange and exert  some degree of influence regard- 
m g  such use, par t icu lar ly  as t o  the types of commodities 
t o  be imported, the amount of foreign exchange t o  be used, 
and coordination of use wlth comrnodlty import aid funds. 
3.  Reexamine current policy with respect t o  the use of ald 
funds f o r  increasing the production of agr icu l tura l  prod- 
uc ts  i n  world surplus I n  the l i g h t  of the circumstances ap- 
pllcable i n  Korea as outllned above. Such reexamination 
should be addressed principally t o  the  consideration of 
whether or  not ( a )  the circumstances i n  Korea were lntended 
t o  be included i n  the current policy and ( b )  Increased pro- 
duction of cotton and soybeans would be i n  the best long- 
range economic i n t e r e s t s  of Korea, pa r t i cu la r ly  i n  view of 
the a t t l tude  and plans of the Korean Government, and re la-  
tsvely l e s s  detrimental t o  the United Sta tes  i n t e r e s t s  as  
contemplated by the policy. 
4. Consider a l l  feasible actlons tha t  w ~ l l  encourage and per- 
m i t  maxlmum loca l  procurement of Items f o r  the  Korean 
military forces that can be obta~ned in Korea as a means 
of strengthening and developing industry withln Korea. 
5. Intensify their efforts to review all significant segments 
of the Korean civil budget in the course of its formula- 
tion or prior to its finalization and exercise an effec- 
tlve advisory role in the determination of amounts to be 
budgeted for the respective civil functions. 
NEED FOR TAX REFORM 
An inequitable tax system, combined with an unsound collec- 
tion structure and ineffective administration by the Korean Govern- 
ment, has greatly hampered economic growth in Korea and by reason 
thereof has oontributed to the continued need for substantial out- 
side assistance. ICA recognized the urgency of comprehensive tax 
reorganization as a means to increase government revenues, over- 
come widespread Lax evasion and other illegal practices, encourage 
business activity, and attract foreign investment. Technical as- 
sistance initiated in 1959 through an ICA-financed contract was 
terminated by the oontractor before completion of the contract 
work. At the oonclusion of our field review, ICA was endeavoring 
to recruit two tax advisors in response to request of the Korean 
Government for assistance in the tax field. The Revolutionary Gov- 
ernment recently announced a new tax reform plan which would dras- 
tically modify tax revisions recommended by the contractor prior 
to its withdrawal and enacted into law by the previous Korean Gov- 
ernment. The contractor in its final report stated that, until 
such time as satisfactory tax reform was accomplished, economic 
growth and development of Korea would be stultified. 
Contract for studs of tax refo~m 
Since the inauguration of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the 
country has had eight separate tax reforms, however, none of these 
reforms has been sufficiently comprehensive and effective to put 
the country on a sound tax basis. In 1959 ICA executed a contract 
with a United States nonprofit institution to assist the Korean 
Government in reforming its tax structure. The contract was for 
about 2 years but was terminated by the contractor after only 
about a year of effort by its full field staff. This matter is 
discussed further on succeeding pages of this section. 
Some of the principal characteristics of the Korean tax sys- 
tem, as described in the final report of the contractor and other 
data available to us, are summarized below. 
Certain tax rates, particularly personal and corporation 
income taxes, have gone beyond their optimum levels, with 
the sesult that they have induced an even larger order of 
tax evasion. According to the contractor excessive rates 
of taxation compelled those in industrial and business ac- 
tivity to engage in wholesale tax evasion as a means of 
economic survival. The Revolutionary Government, which 
came into power in May 1961, reported that tax evasion was 
a common business practice and was in fact a prerequislte 
for staying in business and also that the illicit accumu- 
lation of wealth which was a major cause of two govern- 
mental overturns was actually rooted in the tax system. 
2, The extensive use of the a rb i t r a ry  assessment ra ther  than 
self-assessment ( the  preparation of income tax returns by 
taxpayers i n  the United States  const i tutes  a  se l f -  
assessment system) leads to  taxpayer-tax o f f i c i a l  collu- 
sion which i n  turn r e s u l t s  i n  los s  of revenue to  the pub- 
l i c  treasury. The contractor reported tha t  apparently 
there was an organized program of collecting bribes from 
taxpayers i n  re turn fo r  reductions i n  a rb i t r a ry  assess- 
ment s . 
3.  Despite reported widespread collusion between taxpayers 
and tax  o f f i c i a l s ,  there appeared to  be unjus t i f iab le  ad- 
ministrat ive leniency with respect t o  the dere l ic t ion  of 
t ax  o f f i c i a l s .  
4. A s h i f t  from d i rec t  taxation ( i .e .  personal income taxes) 
t o  indi rec t  taxation (i,e, aommodity taxes) would tend t o  
reduce consumption and encourage a  higher r a t e  of capi ta l  
formation, 
The contractor s  f i n a l  report ,  rendered i n  November 1960, 
s ta ted the opinion tha t  economic progress i n  Korea was dependent 
upon a  tax  environment which would induce and encourage savings 
and capi ta l  formation and t h a t ,  u n t i l  such an environment was 
created, economio progress i n  Korea would be s t u l t i f i e d ,  I C A  in- 
formed us tha t  there was a  need fo r  domestic cap i t a l  t o  assure the 
u t i l i z a t i o n  of capi ta l  goods financed by aid funds. 
The services under the contract contemplated a  work program 
i n  three stages, as follows* 
1. Revise national ,  provincial,  and loca l  taxes, 
2. Reorganzze the administrative s t ructure ,  functions, and 
personnel of the Korean Taxation Bureau. 
3. Break the chain of fraud which existed with respect  t o  tax- 
payers and tax  o f f i c i a l s .  
In the time tha t  the contract group worked i n  Korea it  
drafted 13 tax  law revisions,  a l l  of which were enacted into  law 
by the then Korean Government during and subsequent to  the tanwe 
of the group i n  Korea. 
The s t a f f  mernbe~s of the contract group objected to  the re- 
visions submitted by the group's director  because the revisions 
were too closely modeled on American laws, and not sui ted t o  
Korean conditions, and had not been sufficiently studied by the 
group prior t o  t he i r  recommendation t o  the Korean Government. A l -  
though the I C A  Mlssion informed us tha t  the tax  law revisions en- 
acted by the Korean Government significantly contributed to  
positive tax reform and wexa essential to economic growth, the Mis- 
sion subsequently informed us that, as a result of the objections 
of the contractor's staff members to the revisions proposed by the 
group's director, it had doubts as to the validity of these laws. 
These doubts were confirmed by the proposed plan of the Revolution- 
ary Government to make a thorough overhaul of the entire tax struc- 
ture of Korea by abolishing or merging 21 different types of taxes 
into 8 new types and readjusting the collection authority between 
national and local governments. 
The program contemplated under the contract was not completed 
at the time the contractor withdrew, primarily in regard to tax 
collection practices and other phases of tax administration. We 
were informed by ICA officials that the Revolutionary Government 
had requested assistance in improving tax administration and that 
ICA was endeavoring to recruit two tax advisors. At the time of 
our review, ICA recruitment efforts had not been successful and no 
assistance was being given the Korean Government in this area. 
The agency advised that one tax administration advisor had 
been sent to Korea early in 1962, that the Korean Government had 
intensified its own efforts in the field of taxation and adminis- 
tration, and that on January 1, 1962, substantial changes in the 
tax structure of the nation became effective to accelerate the de- 
velopment of the national economy and to provide for a more effi- 
cient tax administration, in particular the elimination of cor- 
rupt practices and taxpayer-tax offioial collusion. 
Withdrawal of United States contractor 
The contractor began operatim in Korea under a letter of in- 
tent dated May 29, 1959, whlch was superseded by a formal contract 
dated November 20, 1959, for about a 2-year period. The contract 
staff began arriving in June 1959 and by December was up to full 
strength of six persons. In August 1960 the contractor notified 
ICA of its intent to terminate the contract, and all contract ac- 
tivities were concluded by November 1960. The contractor gave the 
following reasons for its decision to terminate the contract. 
1, Dissension within the contract staff. 
2. Unsatisfactory relations between the contract staff and 
some Koreans in the Ministry of Finance; however, relations 
with principal ministry officials were satisfactory. 
3. Unsatisfactory relations between the contract staff and 
the Mission, 
The contractor stated that it would prefer to reconstitute 
the contract staff but, in n e w  of the strained relations within 
that staff and with officials of the Mission, it could see no way 
in which a satisfactory reorganization of the contract staff could 
be accomplished. 
ICA considered that dissension within the contract group was 
the overriding reason for termination and that this dissension con- 
cerned technical differences of opinion as to the type of tax laws 
to be recommended and the best timing for their introduction. 
From our review of the contract files, we believe that an impor- 
tant factor in the contract termination was the contractorrs dis- 
satisfaction with the administrative support furnished by the Mis- 
sion, particularly as to motor vehicles. Also, it appeared that 
there was serious staff dissension about such matters as being re- 
quired to work on Korean and herlcan holidays and not receiving 
adequate housing. 
In May 1960 the contractor pointed out to ICA/Washington that 
past dlsputes with the Mission over the subject of automotive 
transport had convinced the contractor that unless the problem was 
solved it would be unwilling to continue the contract, Although 
ICA/Washington and the contractor had written agreement concerning 
the use of vehicles, disputes continued over the interpretation of 
certaln provisions of this agreement. The contractor concluded 
that it was unwilling to have its fleld staff subject to continued 
harassment in this respect, In a letter to the Amerlcan Arnbas- 
sador to Korea, the contractor stated that it was tragic that an 
operation of such significance faced probable extinction because 
of petty housekeeping harassment by the Mission. 
We noted that certain of the restrictions applied by the Mis- 
sion to the contractor's staff were not followed by the Mlssion 
for other contract groups or for its own employees. For example, 
one order to which the contractor objected was that its staff ride 
busses from their homes to thelr offlces rather than Misslon 
sedans whioh the group previously had been using. For other con- 
tract groups in Korea, sedan rather than bus transportation was 
provided between housing areas and offices and, desplte the avail- 
ability of bus t~ansportation, many of the principal Mission of- 
ficials were furnished sedans for such transportation. 
A expenditures for the services covered by this contract to- 
183,000, and counterpart funds in the amount of 30 mlllion 
hwan were also expended In connection with these services. 
Conclusion and recommendation 
It IS a matter of major misfortune that such a highly Impor- 
tant task as tax reorganizat~on was thwarted by what seem to be 
petty misunderstandings. It would seem that the presence of the 
contract group in an effective capacity would have been especially 
helpful at the time that the Revolutionary Government announced 
its plans for tax reform since these plans in some respects appear 
to be inconsistent with tax revision laws proposed by the contract 
group and enacted into law. In view of the paramount importance 
of effective tax reform to the success of United States aid in 
Korea and the interest manifested by the Revolutionary Government 
in obtaining assistance in this area, we recommend that AID aug- 
ment its current assistance in order to accelerate the establish- 
ment of a sound and effective tax system. 
Tax revenues lost through 
disproportionately low tax rate on gasoline 
While certain direct taxes, such as income taxes, were consid- 
ered to be too high, certain indirect taxes, such as commodity 
taxes, may have been too low. 
Because of the low tax rate on the sale of motor vehicle gas- 
oline, the price of gasoline sold to civilian users in Korea was 
considerably below gasoline prices in other non-gasoline-producing 
countries, with the result that tax revenues on sales of gasoline 
were substantially less than could reasonably have been assessed. 
All legal supplies of motor vehicle gasoline used by the ci- 
vilian economy were financed by ICA.~ The price at which the gas- 
oline was sold to the users comprised (1) the hwan equivalent of 
the price paid to the gasoline suppliers by ICA (about 10 cents a 
gallon), (2) customs tax and commodity tax, and ( 3 )  certain han- 
dling charges and profit allowed to the gasoline distributors. 
Until January 1961 the oommodity tax rate applicable to gasoline 
was at a level which permitted gasoline to be sold at a much lower 
price than the price at which gasoline was sold in other non- 
gasoline-producing countries. For example, selllng prices per gal- 
lon based on official rates of exchange prior to January l, 1961, 
were in France 78 cents* Italy, 75 cents; Taiwan, 55 cents; Japan, 
50 centsj ~ h i l l ~ ~ i n e s ,  46 cents; and Korea, 40 cents. ICA con- 
tinued finanoing gasoline without requiring a more adequate tax 
rate despite ~ t s  recognition that a higher tax rate would help to 
achieve its aim of discouraging nonessential consumption. It was 
not until January 1961, when the commodity tax on gasoline was 
doubled and the official hwan-dollar exchange rate was revised, 
that gasoline prices in Korea were brought into line with the gaso- 
line prices in Japan; however,prices were still below the level of 
those in France and Italy. We understand from the agency that the 
tax rate on gasoline has been further increased by 50 percent of 
the rate adopted in January 1961. 
l ~ o r  discussion of illegal supplies of motor vehicle gasoline, see 
page 117. 
Because of  the l o w  tax r a t e ,  subs tan t ia l  po tent ia l  tax  reve- 
nues were l o s t  to  the Korean Government, thereby adding t o  the 
pressure for  higher United States dol lar  aid.  We estimate tha t  i f  
the tax r a t e  established i n  Jangary 1961 had been i n  e f f e c t  i n  
1959 and 1960, and assuming the same authorized consumption leve ls ,  
addit ional  taxes i n  the hwan equivalent of approximately $30 m i l -  
l i o n  would have been earned. 
CORRUPTION IN KOREA 
It has been widely recognized by United States authorities 
that large-scale corruptlon wlthln the Korean Government, princi- 
pally smce 1953, has been a major deterrent to economlc progress 
in Korea According to the Revolutionary Government, corruption 
and lnefficlency were largely responsible for what it considered a 
condltlon of economic stagnation In the country but aid provided 
by the Unlted States and the United Natlons was, in general, 
wlsely and efficiently expended. In its report "New Directions in 
the Natlonal Economy," dated July 1961, the Revolutionary Govern- 
ment Identifled corruptlon in certaln sectors of the economy as be- 
ing of slgnlflcant gravlty. 
Agricultural cooperatives and the Agriculture Bank, In han- 
dlmg the release of farm credlts and fertsllzer under the 
government dlstrlbutlon program, took beneflts due farmers 
and made them pawns of polltlcs. 
State-operated busmesses provlded polltlcal funds to poll- 
tlclans In power 
Most ald-lmported raw materrals were allocated to owners 
of plants (designated end-users) and under the low-pegged 
exchange rate they were able to make fantastic proflts. 
Only a prlvlleged few had access to bank credlt, and busi- 
nessmen had to turn to usurlous prlvate money lenders. 
Many entrepreneurs went Into collaboration wlth polltl- 
clans and bureaucrats Bankers ~ssued illegltlmate loans 
In connivance wlth polltlclans and ranklng government of- 
f lclals 
Because of prohlbltlvely hlgh tax rates and arbitrary as- 
sessment by tax offlclals, the keepmg of two sets of books 
was a common practlce and tax evasson was necessary to 
stay In busmess. 
Misconduct and abuses by government offlclals reflected 
low moral and dlsclplmary standards whlch were attrlbut- 
able In large part to low government salarles 
The Revolutionary Government further reported that prellml- 
nary lnvestlgatlons had disclosed a total of 72 6 bllllon hwan In 
llllclt wealth accumulated since July 1953 and that one group of 
13 busmessmen publlcly acknowledged tax evaslon in the equivalent 
of more than $33 milllon and volunteered full restltutlon plus 
penalties 
ICA followed the usual programing and admmistratlve control 
practices that are common to most country aid programs. These 
practices consisted generally of (I) end-use audits of commodities 
and projects financed from dollar and counterpart funds, (2) tech- 
nical assistance in projects of public administration designed to 
improve budgeting, accounting, auditing, reporting, and methods of 
assessing and collecting taxes, (3) advisory service on supply man- 
agement including preparation of specifications and bid invita- 
tions, screening bids, and awarding contracts, and (4) investiga- 
tion, by the regional inspector of the Office of the Inspector Gen- 
eral and Comptroller, of specific cases where fraud was suspected. 
ICA advised us that, in addition to these practices, with specific 
reference to the Korea program it had encouraged the establishment 
of rate commissions and other regulatory-type activities and urged 
the inclusion In the Foreign Ald Control Law of a requirement that 
adequate records be kept by importers, distributors, and retailers 
and that the adoption of a unitary exchange rate in February 1961 
which was sponsored by the responsible United States agencies 
closed the avenue to many forms of corruption. 
The audit and investigative practices mentioned above are di- 
rected to the utilization of aid funds only and do not encompass 
practices and actions wlthin the Korean Government having to do 
with Korean funds or other resources. It seems clear that, 
whether or not ald funds are dlrectly mvolved, the consequences 
of corruption on the economlc vltallty of the country dlluted the 
effectiveness of the aid program. These factors, the apparent rec- 
ognition of the existence of extensive corruption over a period of 
years, the substantial annual level of aid, the unhealthy state of 
the economy, and the known questionable integrity of the political 
structure added up to a set of circumstances whlch seemed to us of 
such extraordinary character and of such potentially serlous finan- 
cial jeopardy to the economlc objectlvesofthe ald program as to 
warrant some special effort by the responsible United States agen- 
cies. The aim of such effort as we see it would have been to as- 
certain some spec~flcs as to the dunensions of corruption, the eco- 
nomlc sectors in whlch it was present; and the deficiencies in pol- 
icles, practices, procedures, and related control effectiveness 
whlch would facilitate or encourage corruption, and to pursue a 
vigorous course of frequent and strong confrontation of the Korean 
Government withln the farthest limits of foreign pollcy. The rec- 
ord does not evidence that such effort was made, and it was appar- 
ent from our discussions wlth responsible Mission officials that 
they bellevedthat adequate action had been and was bemg taken, 
that ICA responsiblllty extends to the proper use of aid funds 
only, and that corruption is an internal problem the mitigation of 
which depends primarily on the smcerlty and vigor of the Korean 
Government 
In the course of our review of this subject, our representa- 
tives met wlth the Chlef of the Investigating Committee of the Rev- 
olutionary Government and apprised him of our interest in the in- 
vestigations by his committee and also lnitlated discussion 
regarding access to investigation and audit reports of the Korean 
Board of Audit This discussion subsequently led to arrangements 
between the Board and the Mlssion for the exchange of audit re- 
ports. The investigation reports were not completed at the time 
of our meeting, and we suggested to the Misslon that it follow up 
to obtain coples of such reports for use In familiarizing itself 
with the results of the lnvestrgations and the remedial administra- 
tive measures that seemed to be mdicated. 
Agency comments 
The agency agreed that the above presentation is a substan- 
tially unblased statement on corruptlon In Korea and that the ac- 
tlons recommended below are generally moderate. It requested,how- 
ever,that reference should be made to (1) repeated Mlssion studies 
of corruptlon In Korean government and busmess actlvlties, ( 2 )  
Mlssion efforts to elimmate corruption through tralning of govern- 
ment officials In publlc admlnlstratlon and through audits, and 
(3) the tradltlonal acceptance of corruptlon In Korean life. The 
agency also called attention to the referral, by the Offlce of In- 
spector General and Comptroller, to the Korean Government agencies, 
of slgnlflcant matters investigated over the past 2 years and to 
the dlfflcultles lnvolved In Mlssion exploration of corruption in 
Korean sectors beyond the ald program. 
The flrst two of the above references are part of the regular 
actlvltles carrled on In most ald-recelvlng countries and are en- 
compassed In the descrlptlon of these actlvlties on page 85. 
Conclusion and recommendation 
We cannot say what lf any beneflclal results might have been 
realized ~f the responsible Unlted States agencles had mstltuted 
any speclal effort such as we have suggested. It is reasonable to 
belleve that such an effort would at least have had the salutary 
effect of demonstratmg to the Korean authorltles, more convinc- 
ingly than general dsscusslons, the sharp dissatisfaction of the 
Unlted States and the danger to the aid program. It seems to us, 
however, that the attltude of ICA has been narrow and passive. In 
the light of the very slzable aid investment In Korea and the es- 
sentlallty of economic and polltlcal mtegrity and efflclency to 
the effectiveness of that ald, the Unlted States has a very direct 
concern wlth all workmgs of the Korea economy. 
We further belleve that thls concern should be manifested In 
posltlve actlon by the responsible Unlted States agencies to the 
end that corruptlon may be rnlnlmlzed with resultant benefit to eco- 
nomic advancement In Korea and the purposes of the ald program. 
In llne therewith, we recommend that these agencles (1) apprise 
themselves of the speciflc nature and extent of corruption and in- 
efficiency In Korea through review of government investigative and 
audlt reports and such other means as may be necessary and 
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feasible, in order to identify the sources of problems and the im- 
pact thereof on the aid program, (2) determine by direct examina- 
tion or through cooperative action with the responsible Korean au- 
dit agency the adequacy of management policies and controls in the 
respective Korean operating agencies and follow through for such 
improvements as may be indicated, and ( 3 )  maintain on a continuing 
basis regular contacts at the highest levels of the Korean Govern- 
ment to evidence clearly the deep and sustained concern of the 
United States about corruption and inefficiency as they affect the 
intended benefits of the aid program and to give the impetus of 
high authority to positive action on corrective measures. 
EXCESSIVE COST AND UNWISE USE OF INVESTMENT FUraDS 
Extremely high interest rates in Korea on agricultural and in- 
dustrial loans impeded efforts to channel funds lnto productive 
uses and thus retarded development of the economy, The high rates 
were attributable mainly to the rnsufficiency of capital in Korea 
and the fundamental deficiencies in the traditional banklng and 
monetary structure. These condltlons fostered the accumulation of 
funds outslde regular banklng institutions and the making of loans 
to farmers and private buslness at usurlous Interest rates. The 
consequences perpetuated a state of heavy debt, low living stand- 
ards, and minlmal purchasing power in the agricultural commun~.ty, 
which comprises more than half the country population, and chan- 
neled funds Into nonbasic but profitable enterprises rather than 
essential industrial undertakings, thereby discouraging industrial 
growth. 
It appears that ICA considered rts function in the fleld of 
loan capital and interest rates as one of advfce and encouragement 
on basic monetary and economic reforms. Misslon offxclals stated 
to us that thelr work over the past years laid the foundation for 
the emergency measures instituted by the Revolutionary Government 
to relieve the farmers from their oppressive debt burden and to re- 
lease addltlonal funds for mdustrlal loans in the small and me- 
dlum industry sector 
Recent estimates by the Korean Government Indicate that rates 
In the unorganized money market ranged between 4 percent and 6 per- 
cent per month. The importance of the unorganized money mar~et in 
providing funds is evidenced by surveys conducted by the Bank of 
Korea and the Tax Bureau of the Korean Government whlch showed 
that the dependence of enterprises upon private loans is generally 
higher than upon bank loans, 
Since Korea's financial structure could not collect people's 
savings effectively nor dlstrlbute them to each economic sector 
adequately, unlque mstitutions evolved which are generally un- 
known In other countries. Thus IfKye1s," or household mutual loan 
organizations, were developed to promote good wlll among partlcl- 
pant faulies, to provide mutual support, and to perform the func- 
t~ons of savings institutions. An analysis by the Bank of Korea 
of the reasons underlying the prosperity of the flKye's'l ~llus- 
trates at the same tlme the fundamental deficiencies in the pre- 
vailing organized banklng and monetary structure. These deflcien- 
cies include the followmg factors. 
1. There has been no way of compensating for the depreciation 
of currency as a result of Inflation, through the rela- 
tively low interest rates obtainable on deposits in commer- 
cial banks. 
2, Government budget deficits necessitated the enforcement of 
a tightened financial policy and financial facilities have 
been difficult to obtain for enterprises. 
3 .  Compared with the high rate of incremental profit on the 
investment of capital, mterest rates on deposits with 
bankmg institutions, particularly on fixed deposits, have 
been extremely low. 
4. The lack of public confidence in enterprises and the dis- 
torted lnterest rate structure have made it impossible for 
enterprises to obtain prlvate investment funds directly by 
sales of stocks or debentures. 
ICA also pointed out that essentially the establishing of in- 
terest rates had become an attempt to estzmate the rlsk element 
and to hedge against continued dllution of the purchasing power of 
money rather than the fixmg of a charge for the use of funds for 
productive use and that this disparity was recognized as a poten- 
tial source of corruption and mlsapproprlation of resources. This 
disparity and ~ t s  incentive to corruption as reported by the Revo- 
lutionary Government are described on page 84. Further econornlc 
effects reported by the Revolutionary Government were: 
1. Farm prices were kept at levels considerably lower than 
other prices wlth the result that farmers hardly managed 
to recover the actual cost of production and, In the end, 
lost the wlll to produce. Even when there was a will, ef- 
flclent farm operat~on was hampered by shortage of funds 
and farmers were frequently compelled to resort to usurl- 
ous loans or to the practlce of mortgagmg rlce crops be- 
fore harvest. 
The mpoverlshment of the rural economy reduced the pur- 
chasmg power of the domestlc market for products of small- 
and medlum-slzed mdustrles, and these mdustrles came to 
suffer from inventory surpluses. Only one tenth of the 
government funds available for investment and loans to the 
prlvate sector were allocated to these small- and medlum- 
sized lndustrles, and no other measures were taken to aid 
these industries . 
While preclse ~nformatlon as to the magnitude of capital 
shortage in Korea 1s difficult to come by, several estimates have 
been made whlch serve to illustrate the seriousness of the ~mbal- 
ance between funds available through regular banking channels and 
capital requirements. Statlstlcs compiled by the Agricultural 
Bank showed that the debts of the T'ural population in Korea reached 
a total of about 95,6 blllion hwan as of September 1960 Regard- 
m g  the industrial sector, the Korean Reconstruction Bank 
estimated a requirement of 33 bllllon hwan for working capital 
loans on the part of only those flrms which the bank had assisted 
by means of long-term loans. 
As one of the flrst emergency measures taken by the Revolu- 
tionary Government upon assumlng power, a decree was issued whlch 
provided, among other thlngs , that: 
1. Debts of farmers or fishermen that carry an interest rate 
of more than 20 percent a year shall be defmed as usurl- 
OUS . 
2. Usurlous loans shall be suspended, 
3 Both creditors and debtors shall report their usurlous 
money deals. 
4. Usurlous debts shall be screened wlth the government and 
after clearance shall be guaranteed by the government on 
an annual basls and repald by the debtors. 
ICA informed us that In accordance wlth the foregomg decree 
a total of 50 bllllon hwan was reported to the government as usuri- 
ous debts. 
Addltlonal emergency measures taken In July 1961 to speed eco- 
nomlc development lncluded (1) the release of additional funds for 
agrlcultural production credlts, (2) the grantlng of loans to 
farmers through hens on agrlcultural products, wlth the release 
of these loan funds In advance to obvlate the practice among needy 
farmers of sellmg rlce crops before harvest, (3) the merglng of 
agrlcultural cooperatives wlth the Agricultural Bank, and (4)  the 
release of loans to about 1,000 small and medlwn mdustry firms 
for worklng capltal needs. 
In the banklng fleld the emergency measures Involved (1) the 
promulgation of a law drastically restrlctlng the votlng powers of 
large stockholders and emphaslzlng the publlc responslbilitles In- 
volved in banklng, (2) ralslng Interest rates on tlme deposlts by 
50 percent In an effort to reduce the gap between bank and curb 
rates and to discourage hoarding and attract savings into banks, 
(3) reduction of reserve requirements in order to expand lendlng 
capacity, and (4) ln~tiatlon of plans for the establishment of a 
small and medlwn industry bank. 
In general ICA concurred ln the emergency actions undertaken 
by the new government, as belng in the direction pointed out to 
prevlous governments over a perlod of tune. ICA in recent years 
sponsored the creatlon of several loan funds (by allocation of 
counterpart funds) In the Korean Reconstruction Bank, Korean Agri- 
cultural Bank, and the Bank of Korea. 
It is obvious that the efforts of previous Korean Governments 
and of ICA were not sufficiently effective to (1) assure an ade- 
quate flow of capital to the agrlcultural and industrial sectors 
of the economy, (2) appreciably reduce market interest rates as a 
means of facllltating the flow of resources m t o  productive uses 
to further economic development, and (3) provide a necessary sta- 
bllity and confidence whlch would attract needed funds Into tlme 
deposlts in the regular banklng ~nstitutlons. 
From our discussion with responsible Misslon personnel it ap- 
pears that the Misslon vlewed ~ t s  role as one of providing advice 
and of bemg a "catalytic agent" on getting the Korean Government 
to undertake needed monetary and economlc reforms. Thus, while 
the Mlsslon dld not partlclpate In the draftmg of the emergency 
measures previously referred to, ~t clams that the groundwork for 
these measures was lald over a period of tlme In the many discus- 
slons and programs inltlated under the guldance of Misslon ad- 
vlsers. For example, the Mlsslon polnted out that the current 
over-all program of ratlonallzation of lnterest rates 1s traceable 
to early 1960 dlscusslons prefacmg and accompanying the normaliza- 
tlon of exchange rates. 
Conclusion and agency response 
The pollcy of ICA as Indicated above was addressed to broad 
basic concepts In whlch ~ t s  efforts were calculated to realize per- 
manent beneflts over a long perlod. Thls polacy was not adapted 
to deallng wlth lmmedlate problems and suggests the questlon of 
whether some or all of the condltlons agalnst whlch the emergency 
measures of the Revolutlonary Government were directed, partlcu- 
larly those to relleve the financial pllght of the agrlcultural 
commlty, could have been alleviated by ICA and previous Korean 
Governments lf the pollcy of ICA had been geared to meetlng exlst- 
m g  demands for short-range beneflts as well as formulatmg and 
sponsormg fundamental long-range reforms. There would seem to be 
no questlon, however, that the contmuance over a number of years 
of ~nsufflclent loan funds and prohlbltlve interest rates ob- 
structed In signlflcant degree the forward movement of the Korean 
economy. 
The agency advlsed us In March 1962 that banklng and flnan- 
cia1 advlsers were recently sent to Korea to revlew the total fis- 
cal problem, lnflatlonary aspects of new mvestment, and credit 
instltutlons; also that progress made durlng the summer and fall 
of 1961 by the Revolutlonary Government in attacking usurious csed- 
 tors, creatlng a new Industry Bank, and examining ways of making 
more and lower cost capltal available to varlous sectors of the 
economy has been In conformity with AID concern for action In this 
area. 
COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM 
The commodity rmport program has been the largest segment of 
the aid program, aggregating $917.6 milllon for the 5 years, 
1957-61, and $1,342.7 mlllion smce the termination of Korea hos- 
tillties In 1953. The nature of the program and the operating pro- 
cedures are described beglnnlng at page 57. Our exammation dis- 
closed various conditions whlch we believe very slgnlflcantly ham- 
pered the progress of the ard program. They deal with the shift 
in imports from capltal to consumable goods, the unwise loosenlng 
of control by ICA over the types of commodities imported, collu- 
slve biddlng for ICA funds, the financing of industrial enter- 
prises as nonproject aid and the unsound administration thereof, 
defective practices followed In the fertlllzer program, the encour- 
agement of luxury wants, and avoidable shortages in gasolme and 
automotive spare parts whlch were responsible In large part for 
pilferage of mllltary supplies. Each of these conditions is dls- 
cussed In the succeeding sections. 
CHARACTER AND CONTROL OF COMMODITY IMPORTS 
WERE NOT CONDUCIVE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In recent years an Increasing proportion of ICA commodity im- 
port assistance was devoted to consumable goods desplte Korea's 
need for capltal investment. Slgnlflcant amounts of ICA funds 
were earmarked for comparatively low priorrty consumer goods or at 
the tune of our renew were not bemg used whlle essentlal actlvl- 
tles, such as power development, were delayed or not undertaken. 
Moreover, as a result of revlslng ~ t s  procurement authorlzatlon 
practices In 1961, ICA had less control over the cornmodlty composi- 
tion of the Import program and hence less means of channeling 
available resources Into those areas whlch would provlde the great- 
est impetus to economlc growth. 
Shift to consumable goods 
Responsible Unlted States officials have stressed that a 
viable economy In Korea can be achieved only by capital investment 
which wlll enable Korea to produce the goods required for Internal 
consumption and for export In order to earn the foreign exchange 
needed to pay for essentlal ~mports. Korea lacks the funds for 
necessary capital investment but, if forelgn ald funds were used 
to the fullest posslble extent to provide capital facilities, in- 
creasing progress towards economlc development may be achieved. De- 
spite this acknowledged fact, the ICA program In Korea tended in- 
creasingly in recent years toward flnanclng consumable goods which, 
when consumed, left Korea In relatively the same position as be- 
fore the ald was extended and dld not contribute to economlc ad- 
vancement. 
The following table shows the increasing trend In the use of 
ICA funds for financing consumable goods. 
Obligations in fiscal year (note a) 
B.2 1958 19 59 1960 1961 
Investment-type goods: 
Project 
Nonproject (includes ma- 
chinery and consumable- 
type goods used for in- 
vestment ) 
Total 
Consumable goods : 
Nonproject 
Ratio of consumable goods to 
investment-type goods 
aAdjusted to December 31, 1960, except that 1961 obligations are 
as of June 30, 1961. 
b~oes not include cash grant of $20 mlllion given to Korea in 1961, 
for whlch no flrm plans had been developed at June 30, 1961. 
In 1959, the Dlrector of ICA stated that the agency's general 
pollcy for Korea was to use a greater proportlon of aid funds for 
capltal development whlle reducing the amounts devoted to consumer 
goods In 1960 and 1961 the Arnerlcan Ambassador to Korea stressed 
the necessity of capltal Investment lf Korea was to achleve self- 
sufficiency. In 1960 the Department of State, in reporting to the 
Congress on the prospects of varlous ald-receiving countries' be- 
coming self-sufflclent, stated that In the case of Korea a larger 
proportlon of ald funds would be spent for capltal goods. In Octo- 
ber 1960 the Korean Government, recognlzlng the need for increased 
capltal investment, requested that the emphasis of the aid program 
be shlfted from mamtenance of consumption to accelerated invest- 
ment In order to achleve growth and a vlable economy. The Mlssion 
Dlrector In Aprll 1961 acknowledged the need for capital Invest- 
ment while polntlng out that forelgn exchange available to Korea 
for that purpose was insufficient. 
Nevertheless, the ICA program in 1961 increased the ratio of 
consumable goods in the ald program. The significance of this in- 
crease was heightened by a change In ICA procurement authorization 
practice whlch permitted the Korean market a choice as to whether 
or not the very limited funds earmarked in the past for capital in- 
vestment would be used for that purpose or for additional consum- 
able goods. (See next section.) 
At June 30 ,  1961, approximately $51.7 million obligated in 
1961 and $1.6 milllon obligated in 1960 had been available, at the 
Bank of Korea, for some time to Korean importers to finance cer- 
tain consumable commodities, such as synthetic yarns, chemicals, 
and pulp, but had not been taken up by the mporters. The agency 
reported that at January 31, 1962, approximately $12.2 million and 
$1.1 milllon of the above funds obligated in 1961 and 1960, respec- 
tively, were st111 available to Korean importers. 
According to ICA the lack of demand for these funds on the 
part of the Korean economy was due to the following factors: 
1. Political uncertainty resultmg from the change of govern- 
ment lncludlng speclal investigation by the Revolutionary 
Government of businessmen accused of lllegal profiteering. 
2. Increase in the offlclalhwan-dollar exchange rate which 
had ralsed the prlces of imported commodities for which 
the bidding rates had been below the revlsed rate of 
1300-1. 
3. The Increased lmport costs due to the Presldent8s balance 
of payments directive of November 1960, curtailrng procure- 
ment in specrfled countries and emphasizing procurement 
from Unlted States sources. 
While ICA funds were unused or belng used for low prlority 
consumer ~mports, ICA was reluctant to make funds available for 
other actlvltles In the publlc sector whlch were more essential to 
Korean economlc development and which were delayed or were not be- 
lng undertaken. Although the power shortage has been recognized 
as one of Korea's most critical problems, a propose@ power plant 
at Pusan to be constructed by the International General Electrlc 
Company was delayed because the Korean Government was not able to 
set aside all the funds needed to flnance thrs plant. At the sane 
time, TCA funds sufficient to finance this plant were made avail- 
able for the mportation of rayon and nylon yarns and other consum- 
able goods. Also a shortage of railroad cars had been adversely 
affecting the economic progress of Korea and, although ICA recog- 
nized the need for additional railroad rolling stock by the Korean 
Natlonal Railroad, aid funds sufficient for this type of capital 
investment were not made available. 
Reduced control over commodity composition 
In past years, ICA exercised control over the comrnodsty im- 
port program through the issuance of procurement authorizations 
(PA) which specified the amount and type of commodity authorized 
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for import by Korea with aid funds. In fiscal year 1961, a %ulti- 
codev PA in the amount of $40 million waf issued which included 
nine different commodity classifications and which permitted Ko- 
rean industry to purchase commodities in any one of the different 
commodity classifications included therein in the quantitfes that 
it, rather than ICA, determined were necessary. Under the multi- 
code PA there were no amounts specified as the minimum or maximum 
for any commodity classification and the types and amounts of com- 
modities to be imported were left largely to market forces as evi- 
denced in applications by Korean business for import foreign ex- 
change. Thus Korean business was in a position to purchase any 
amount of any eligible commodity irrespective of its benefit to 
the Korean economy. Mission industrial technicians advised 
against adopting this new policy on the ground that it would work 
agamst the best interests of the Korean economy. Korean business 
will usually buy those commodities which yield the greatest profit, 
and such comodlties may not be those essential or even beneficial 
to Korean economic growth. 
Of the commodities eligible under the multicode procurement 
authorization, those for which the demand was strongest were the 
commodities used to produce consumer goods, such as pulp, chernlcal 
preparations, and rayon yarn. At the conclusion of our field re- 
view the most popular ICA commodity under the multicode PA was 
pulp, which is used chiefly to produce newsprint and paper. 
The Korean business community has not shown any notable con- 
cern for the economic welfare of Korea rn the past and on occasion 
has not abided by agreements with ICA. For example, each year ICA 
financed imports of substantial quantities of phosphatic ferti- 
lizers whlch are considered essential for Korean agriculture. 
Since this type of fertilizer has not tradrtionally been popular 
with Korean farmer~~fertillzer importers earn lower profit on its 
sale than on the sale of ICA-financed nitrogenous fertilizer. In 
past years, when making United States aid funds available for com- 
mercial procurement of fertilizer, ICA required Korean importers to 
procure a specific amount of phosphates along with nitrogenous fer- 
tilizers. In 1961 ICA released the importers from the phosphate 
purchase requirement because they agreed to purchase phosphate 
voluntarily. However, of $4,0k0,000 made available as of June 30, 
1961 for commercial procurement of phosphate fertilizers, only 
$10,600 was used while at the same time ICA funds for nitrogenous 
'A commod~ty classification may include a large number of differ- 
ent though related individual commodities; for example, the tex- 
tile products classification might include rayon or nylon yarn, 
cloth, or other fmished textile goods. 
fertilizers were substantially oversubscribed. According to the 
records at the Mission, members of the Korean Traders Association, 
at a meeting in July 1960 to discuss the fertilizer program, in- 
formed Mlssion personnel that their duty was only to sell those 
items whlch would give them the most profit. Since May 1961, all 
imported fertilizer has been procured by the government. 
We seriously question whether the policy of permitting market 
forces to determine the types and quantities of commodlties to be 
imported is compatible wlth the accepted premise of Korean eco- 
nomic underdevelopment and the present status of Korean economic 
and political maturity. It is our view that, until such time as 
Korea gets much further along the road to economic self-sufficiency, 
commodity ~mports should be controlled so as to assure that for- 
eign exchange, from both Korean and outside aid, is devoted in ap- 
proprlate measure to capital goods whlch will further economlc 
progress. 
The adoptlon of the multlcode PA also had the effect in 1961 
of avoidlng loss of the authority to deobligate and reobligate 
funds whlch the Congress had terminated by omltting such authority 
from the 1961 Mutual Security Appropriation Act. This authority 
had been included In prlor yearsf appropriation acts, and ICA had 
made extensive use of the authority to transfer funds from one ac- 
tlvlty to another. Flscal year 1961 funds deobligated after the 
close of the flscal year could not be reused and reverted to the 
Unlted States Treasury. 
The multlcode PA plan (whlch makes a number of commodities 
eligible for flnanclng on one document) adopted by ICA permitted 
the shlftlng of financing from one commodity to another wlthout 
the necessity for deobllgation. In requesting ICA approval of the 
new multlcode plan, the Mlsslon asked that the shlftlng of funds 
between the varrous commodlties Included in the multrcode PA be  in^ 
terpreted liberally so as to avold application of the deobllgation 
and reobl~gation procedures for whach legislative authority had 
been dlscontlnued. 
The authority to deobligate and reobllgate funds was rein- 
stated In the foreign assistance appropriation act for 1962. 
The program presentation to the Congress for fiscal year 1962 
continued the emphasls on consumable goods, in lieu of investment 
goods, for fmancing as usupporting assistance." While it is the 
expressed policy of the admmistration to finance economic develop- 
ment through development loans, we believe it should be feasible 
and would be desirable to include capital goods in the supporting 
assistance program to the maximum extent practical and shift as 
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much as possible of appropriate consumables for import with Korean 
foreign exchange. We believe that, for a country such as Korea 
facing the need for extensive economic development, the use of aid 
funds for capital purposes tends to encourage greater financial re- 
sponsibility by the recipient country in the use of its foreign ex- 
change and gives a stamp of visible and lasting benefit to the aid 
program. 
Pro~osed action and agencv response 
In consideration of the matters disoussed above, we proposed 
to ICA that: 
1. It should reach agreement with the Korean Government on a 
system of prloritles for the allocation of both Korean for- 
ergn exchange and ald funds designated for commodity im- 
ports, so that, over and beyond the financing required for 
the mlnlmum quantities of essential consumable goods, prl- 
ority would be given to capital goods in the order of 
thelr considered importance to economic advancement. 
2. As an integral part of the system of priorities proposed 
In (1) above, ICA should reconsrder its polrcy in respect 
to the multlcode procurement authorization from the stand- 
point of the need In Korea for commodity rmport control 
through more speciflc commodity limltat~on In procurement 
authorizations. 
The agency expressed concurrence with the proposal that em- 
phasls be placed on flnanclng capital goods to the extent practi- 
cable and that the use of Korean forelgn exchange be encouraged in 
every way posslble for consumable goods and stated that such prln- 
clples are in conformity wlth current development fund concepts of 
AID. The agency further reported that a comprehensive review was 
belng made of its procurement pollcles and procedures (including 
the use of rnulticode PA1s), to revise its methods and operations 
to current program concepts and objectlves. 
COLLUSIVE BIDDING FOR ICA FUNDS 
For a number of years aid funds made available for financing 
commodity imports were allocated to Korean importers through sev- 
eral systems of auction bidding. (See p. 57.) In the several 
years before the exchange rate reform in February 1961, local cur- 
rency,in amounts not known but acknowledged to be considerable, 
was lost to the Korean Government through collusive bidding by Ko- 
rean private industry. The effects of this collusion lessened the 
resources of Korea for meeting its economic and defense needs and 
thus increased the pressures for higher dollar aid, enabled the 
collusive bidders to realize windfall profits, and encouragedloose 
ethical standards of Korean business practices. 
Under the system in effect between 1958 and the date of the 
exchange rate reform in February 1961, bids consisted of (1) the 
hwan equivalent of the dollars applied for computed at the offi- 
cial rate of exchange (which was considerably less than the market 
rate) and (2) a foreign exchange tax at a minmum of 150 hwan per 
dollar. Award was made on the highest bid on the foreign exchange 
tax, which ranged from the minimum of 150 hwan per dollar to as 
high as 800 hwan per dollar. The extent of competition generally 
determined the amount of the tax, the more competition the higher 
the tax. The degree of competition depended on the type of commod 
~ t y  for which ICA funds were being auctioned, the amount of such 
funds, and the number of eligible bidders. 
Bidding was restricted by allowing only direct end-users (man- 
ufacturers or processors) to purchase certain ICA funds. Korean 
traders were excluded to prevent speculation and profiteering in 
these commodities and to insure a source of raw materials for Ko- 
rean industry. Bowever, this restricted bidding also made it pos- 
sible for the eligible bldders to conspire to secure ICA funds at 
the minimum bid prlce which was considerably less than the market 
rate of exchange. For example, during calendar year 1960 the offi- 
clal rate of exchange was 650 hwan to 1 dollar so that minimum 
bids (official rate plus minimum foreign exchange tax) were 800 
hwan. During this time the market exchange rate was about 1,200 
hwan to 1 dollar. The eligible bidders agreed among themselves 
for each to bid for a stated amount of dollars at the minimum bid 
price, the total amount of all bids being equal to the total ICA 
funds being auctioned. 
In an effort to persuade the Korean Government to ease I t s  re- 
strictions on bidder eligibility, ICA in 1956 made available an ad- 
ditional $25 million in aid in return for which the Korean Govern- 
ment agreed to (1) ease the s ecified end-user system by broaden- 
ing bidder eligibility and (2 adopt all feasible measures to maxi- 
mize internal hwan revenues. 
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Although subsequently there was an easlng of the specified 
bidder system, restrictions on bidder ellglbility continued for 
certaln commodltles, notably cotton. In December 1960 ICA made 
representations to the Korean Government to end the specified bid- 
der system because of ~ t s  discrlmlnatory aspects agamst nonmem- 
bers of selected industrial groups and ~ t s  restriction of free com- 
petition; however, the degree to whlch restrlctlons would be 
llfted was left to the discretion of the Korean Government. 
Cotton 
Bidding for ICA cotton funds was probably the most flagrant 
example of collusive bldding In the commodity import program. Un- 
der the rules drawn up by the Korean Government and agreed to by 
ICA, only members of the Splnners and Weavers of Korea (SWAK) were 
eliglble to bld. As a consequence, SWAK1s control was so complete 
that other end-users were unable to obtaln cotton needed in their 
operations even though, In at least one case, the end-user's ma- 
chmery had been fmanced by ICA under the project assistance pro- 
gram. Some of the plants of these end-users were shut down for pe- 
mods up to 9 months because they had no cotton 
In 1957, under a new pollcy promulgated by the Combrned Eco- 
nomlc Board, restrlctlon of ellglblllty solely to speclfred end- 
users to bld for ald funds was no longer permrtted. The new pol- 
~ c y  earmarked a portlon of ald funds for blddlng open to all appli- 
cants. However, for a few commodltles, such as cotton and wheat, 
restrlctlon of bldder ellglblllty was continued. 
Blds tendered by SWAK members were always at the mmlmum bld 
prlce. In addltlon, the dollar value of the blds generally ex- 
actly equaled the dollar value of the ICA funds belng offered, 
whlch lndlcated that the blds resulted from preblddlng consults- 
tlons among SWAK members. We renewed the results of 20 auctlons 
of cotton dollars held between November 1957 and December 1960 
Of 186 blds offered, 184 were identical, and In most cases the dol- 
lar value of the blds totaled almost exactly the same as the funds 
auctioned and therefore there were no unsuccessful bldders After 
the fall of the Rhee government, the new Korean Government wanted 
to make cotton bld auctlons competltlve, however, ICA refused to 
end the close control by SWAK (except to allow small end-user asso- 
clatlons whose plants were Idle to buy ICA-fmanced cotton) be- 
cause lt belleved that only SWAK was competent to purchase cotton 
from Unlted States suppliers. ICA refusal to permlt open cotton 
auctlons 1s hard to understand smce lt had previously urged the 
Korean Government to allow open auctlons. 
ICA recognized that slgnlficant hwan revenues were lost be- 
cause of the low level of forelgn exchange tax blds for cotton 
funds. In an effort to lncrease such revenues, the mlnlmum for- 
elgn exchange tax for cotton was mcreased m flscal year 1961 
from the 150 hwan minimum tax,  applicable t o  a l l  commodities t o  
270 hwan per dol lar  and agam t o  310 hwan per dol la r .  We estimate 
t h a t ,  i f  t h l s  added tax had been in  e f fec t  durlng f i s c a l  year 1960, 
hwan revenues from the sa le  of cotton dol la rs  In  tha t  year would 
have been Increased by the equivalent of about $7.4 milllon. ICA 
agreed tha t  t h l s  loss  of revenue represented ''windfall p rof l t s r l  t o  
SWAK members. 
Rayon yarn 
I n  1957, i n  accordance with the new CEB policy permitting 
open bidding fo r  speclfled portions of I C A  aid funds (see above), 
a par t  of the I C A  funds designated fo r  rayon yarn financing was 
made available fo r  auction t o  both end-users and t raders ,  with the 
balance s e t  aside so le ly  f o r  end-users. Recognizing t h a t  collu- 
s lon was practiced when bidder e l l g l b i l i t y  was r e s t r l c t e d ,  with a 
r e su l tmg  loss  of hwan revenues, I C A  favored increasing t h a t  por- 
t i o n  of ald funds earmarked fo r  open biddlng; f o r  calendar year 
1960, 35 percent of rayon funds was allocated f o r  open blddlng and 
65 percent was r e s t r i c t ed  t o  speclfied end-users, and the Korean 
Government proposed the same r a t e  f o r  1961. However, the matter 
of apportioning funds became academic because of the  abolishment 
of the auction system i n  Aprll 1961, a f t e r  the adoption of a uni- 
tary exchange r a t e ,  and the ava i l ab l l l ty  of foreign exchange t o  
a l l  applicants due t o  a slowdown I n  Korean business ac t lv l ty .  
(See pp. 103 and 104. ) 
Our renew of bids made a t  both open and res t r l c t ed  rayon 
fund auctlons showed t h a t  the blds a t  the open auctlons were usu- 
a l l y  higher than the b i d s  a t  auctlons a t  which bidder e l l g i b l l i t y  
was r e s t r l c t ed .  Furthermore, the t o t a l  of the blds a t  the re-  
s t r l c t e d  auctlons almost exactly equalled the amount of funds a m -  
tioned and there were no unsuccessful bidders, whrle a t  the open 
auctlons the aggregate blds generally exceeded the funds auctioned 
and there were some unsuccessful bidders. 
In  the case of rayon yarn, complications arose a s  the r e s u l t  
of openlng auctlons t o  other than end-users. Traders who Imported 
rayon wlth funds obtalned a t  open auctlons hoarded t h e n  stocks t o  
c r e a t e , a r t i f l c l a l  shortages and sold a t  r e s u l t m g  hlgh pr ices;  the 
domestlc pr lce  of rayon rose over 80 percent between January and 
August 1959, Certaln measures were adopted t o  r e s t r i c t  t h i s  prac- 
zice,  such as  requlrlng t raders  t o  dlspose of t h e l r  stocks wlthin 
a speclfied perlod or lose  fur ther  e l l g l b l l i t y  t o  b i d .  However, 
the need t o  maxlmlze hwan revenues was considered of su f f l c l en t  i m -  
portance to  contlnue the trader e l l g i b l l l t y  t o  b l d ,  ~ r r e s p e c t l v e  
of t h e n  undesirable actlons.  
There seems t o  be no questlon tha t  In  the aggregate the Ko- 
rean Government was deprived of very substant ia l  revenues because 
100 
r+ 
of collusive biddang and that economlc progress in Korea was sig- 
niflcantly slowed down to the detriment of the aid program. This 
matter of collus~on is part of the general corruption picture in 
Korea which is the subject of separate discussion in this report, 
but we are deallng wath it here because of its speclfic character 
and ldentificatlon wath the commodity lmport program. 
DEFECTS IN FINANCING OF 
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AS NONPROJECT AID 
ICA financed as nonproject assistance under the commodity im- 
port program, the establishment and major expansion of industrial 
enterprises similar in basic characteristics to projects financed 
under the project assistance program, This type of financing has 
had two fundamental defects: 
1. The absence of any system of priorities in approving indi- 
vidual enterprises and in allocating aid funds contributed 
to unbalanced industrial expansion, as reflected by the 
overexpanslon of some industries and the failure of other 
essential industries to receive needed assistance, 
2. The annual program presentation to the Congress did not 
show that nonproject funds were being used to finance the 
establishment and expansion of industrial enterprises as 
slngle-package actinties (projects) basically the same as 
projects under the project assistance program. 
Absence of ~rloritles 
contributed to unbalanced exmnsion 
Individuals or groups desiring to establish a new Industry or 
expand or modernize an existlng facility and requiring no technl- 
cal or flnanclal asslstance other than foreign exchange for the im- 
port of equipment, filed applications for approval of the enter- 
prise by the Saleables Review Committee (SRC) of the CEB. Renew 
by SRC was designed to eliminate from eligibility for ICA financ- 
ing such comrnodlties as would (1) result In overinvestment, (2) 
compete with ICA-flnanced projects, (3) duplicate machlnery al- 
ready idle in Korea, (4) not be suitable to the present industrial 
level, and ( 5 )  displace Items made or which could be made in Korea. 
We understand that the SRC renew also covered the over-all as- 
pects of the proposed enterprise in the same manner and scope as 
the review of proposed projects under the project asslstance pro- 
gram. 
Approval by SRC did not assure the foreign exchange but 
merely made the applicant eliglble to bid at an auction of ICA 
funds for industrial machlnery. Thus the applicant had to compete 
with other approved applicants for equipment for other types or 
the same type of mdustry. ICA funds were auctioned by lndlvidual 
procurement authorization, and generally all industrial machlnery 
was covered in one authorization under the same commodity classifi- 
cation of industrial machinery. Since SRC approved appllcatlons 
aggregating In amount considerably more than the aid funds being 
auctioned and did not have any priority system as to approved 
applications, only the hlghest bldders recelved an allocation of 
ICA funds Total brds greatly exceeded the funds auctioned for fi- 
nancmg of Industrial equlpment. For example, in 1958 blds total- 
Ing nearly $35 milllon were made for $8.5 milllon of ald funds. 
Thus obtalnlng forelgn exchange for these enterprlses became more 
a matter of the fmanclal resources of the applicant and his wlll- 
lngness to bid high enough rather than the relative essentlallty 
of the enterprise to the economlc benefit of the country. Large 
numbers of applicants did not obtaln ald funds because they dld 
not or could not bld hlgh enough. Durlng the flrst 8 months of 
1959,only 101 of 174 bidders for industrial machlnery were success- 
ful. 
The manner In whlch thls type of flnanclng was administered 
contributed to unbalanced and costly economlc development The 
textlle lndustry whlch is the largest In Korea was rebullt and ex- 
panded largely wlth ICA nonproject funds. Mlssion techniclam re- 
ported that, as a result of thls aid, they consldered the textlle 
Industry overexpanded, prlnclpally In the cotton area, and conse- 
quently during 1960 ICA wlthheld approval of appllcatlons for tex- 
tile machlnery flnanclng. In a March 1960 auctlon the successful 
bldders mcludeda number of textlle companles whlch proposed to 
lmport addltlonal or replacement spinnlng equlpment whlle among 
the unsuccessful bldders were two companles which proposed to Im- 
port rnachlnery for manufacturing flshlng nets. As polnted out 
above the textlle Industry was consldered overexpanded, and rt had 
been established that Korean production of flshlng nets was insuf- 
flcient to meet Korean requirements The Korean sugar-reflnlng 
and flour-mllllng industries whlch also recelved extensive flnanc- 
ing from nonproject funds to lmport machlnery were consldered by 
ICA as overexpanded. 
The n e w  expressed by ICA was that, lf potentla1 investors 
were unwllllng or unable to bld high enough to obtaln forelgn ex- 
change, ~t was unllkely that thew enterprlses could operate suc- 
cessfully We belleve that as a generalization In the framework 
of the ald program thls n e w  1s unsound Some mdastrles or com- 
panles are better flnanced than others but may not be as essential. 
Moreover we note that, wlth respect to lndustrles financed as proj- 
ects under the project assistance program, In many cases Korean 
sponsors lacked sufficient capltal even for operation but ald was 
glven on the overridmg proposltlon that the enterprise was con- 
sidered important to Korean economic advancement A mlsslon re- 
port dated July 1958 called attention to overexpansion and wasted 
funds In idle machlnery resulting from the lack of any systematic 
program for allocatmg nonproject aid funds earmarked for machln- 
ery . 
After the adoptlon of the unltary rate of exchange In Febru- 
ary 1961, the auctlon of ald funds was discontinued At the com- 
pletion of our fleld work, business actlvlty was slow principally 
as an effect of the exchange rate adjustment, aid funds were avail- 
able, and foreign exchange was being allocated to all applicants. 
However, this condition was obviously temporary slnce continuance 
of the commodity import program stems in large part from the insuf- 
ficlency of Korean resources to satlsfy total lmport requirements. 
Thus lt may be expected that in due course applications for for- 
elgn exchange wlll exceed the total avallable, rncludlng aid funds, 
and the danger if not Ilkellhood of lndustrlal over and under de- 
velopment wlll contrnue unless effective measures are lnstltuted 
to assure that avallable forelgn exchange 1s allocated to those in- 
dustrlal sectors of hlghest need to economlc development. 
Conclusion and recommendation 
We belleve that the remedy for the sltuatlon described above 
lles In establlshlng prlorltles In the allocation of ald funds, 
and also Korean forelgn exchange, to approved enterprlses and ~nte- 
gratlng such prlorltles Into the system of prlorltles recommended 
wlth respect to capltal and consumable goods (see p. 9 7 ) .  Accord- 
mgly, we recommend such actlon. 
Inadequate disclosure to the Congress 
The annual program presentatlon to the Congress has classl- 
fled ard under two maln categories--project and nonproject Proj- 
ect ald has generally been considered to lnvolve Integrated under- 
takings deslgned to accomplish speclflc tasks A llst of major 
projects, In belng and proposed, has been submitted to the respon- 
slble congressional committees along wlth the program presentation. 
For nonproject ald, the presentatlon shows a breakdown by about 
5 to 8 broad types of cornrnodltles includmg a dellneatlon of capl- 
tal and consumable commodstles and accompanied by a narrative as 
to the purpose and necessity of the proposed ald What 1s not 
brought out In the presentatlon, however, 1s that some nonproject 
funds have been used to flnance new or exlstlng enterprlses under 
substantially the same condltlons as exlst In the flnancmg of 
projects, also In some cases the nonproject funds were for the 
same enterprlse that was recelvlng project assistance funds as a 
project. For example, for one project In the Industry program, 
ICA approved the use of $25'0,000 of project funds for the purchase 
of textlle dyelng and flnlshlng equlpment whlle, under the nonproj- 
ect program, ICA funds In the amount of $144,000 were approved for 
the procurement of addltlonal lndustrlal machinery by the same com- 
pany for the same enterprlse In another ~nstance, project funds 
In the amount of $110,000 were provlded for the purchase of flour 
mlll conveying equlpment whlle $270,000 In nonproject funds was 
used by the same flour mlll for flour mlll processlng equlpment 
In st111 another case, ICA project funds In the amount of $470,000 
were used prlmarlly for the purchase of textlle-processing equip- 
ment by a plant, subsequently, the same company was approved by 
ICA for $800,000 In nonproject funds for addltlonal textlle- 
processlng equlpment. 
ICA has not maintained its records in such a way as to make 
it practicable to determine how much of the total nonproject funds 
were used for financlng enterprises as distinguished from indlvid- 
ual pieces of equipment for various industrial plants. It 1s 
worthy of note that nonproject funds proposed for industrial ma- 
chmery and vehlcles In the program presentation for flscal year 
1961 amounted to $24.6 mlllion whlle the total proposed for the en- 
tire project assistance program amounted to $15 mllllono 
We observed In our audlt that ICA made basically the same 
technlcal and financial renew of package enterprises financed 
from nonproject funds as lt dld of projects under the project as- 
slstance program Further, the same statement issued by ICA for 
lnternal management control purposes, certlfymg as to compliance 
with sectlon 517 of the Mutual Securlty Act of 1954, on projects 
under the project assistance program, was also lssued as to enter- 
prises flnanced from nonproject funds. Sectlon 517 provlded that 
funds could not be obligated for any actlvity -chat was estmated 
to cost In excess of $100,000 and that requlred substantlve techni- 
cal or flnanclal planning before such planning and firm cost esti- 
mates were developed 
I C A  clams that the enterprlses flnanced from nonproject 
funds dlffer from projects ln that the former requlre no govern- 
ment flnanclng and no technlcal assistance whereas In the case of 
projects the sponsors generally have to obtaln loans from the corn- 
terpart fund for Investment capital and sometlmes for operatlng 
funds and the sponsors need technlcal assistance In plannmg, con- 
structlng, and operatlng the project We belleve that these dlf- 
ferences are more procedural than substantlve and that In all 
baslc respects the enterprlses flnanced from nonproject funds are 
the same as projects flnanced under the project assistance program. 
The principal defects In the nonproject flnanclng of the 
entlre-package enterprlses are that the program breakdown between 
project and nonproject ald as shown In the annual program presenta- 
tlon to the Congress 1s ~naccurate, that the amounts of ald shown 
for lndlvldual projects In the llstlng of major projects are also 
maccurate for those projects whlch have recelved nonproject funds; 
and that, by reason of these maccuracles and the lack of clear 
disclosure about thls type of flnanclng, the presentation IS m u -  
leadlng and the responsible congressional committees are at a dls- 
advantage In thelr analysls and judgments on proposed ald pro- 
grams. 
The agency advlsed In March 1962 that thls sltuatlon wlll ul- 
tlmately resolve itself slnce (1) the commodity asslstanee compo- 
nent of the project program is belng reduced as a result of a se- 
view of the program durlng 1962, (2) there has been a slgnlflcant 
revislon of Investment financlng tendlng toward a reduced prollfer- 
atlon of projects, and (3) new leglslatlon provldes that major 
4 projects be funded by loans requiring different accounting and re- 
porting requirements. These considerations relate primarily to fi- 
nancing under the project assistance program and would still per- 
mit nonproject financrng of single-package enterprises from cer- 
tain funds authorized under The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
Re commendation 
We recommend that, insofar as the financing of entire-package 
enterprises under the commodity import program, such as described 
above, may be continued, the agency develop some effective means 
of overcomrng the defects in the program presentation as cited 
herein, We further recommend that the agency discontinue the prac- 
tlce of large-scale flnaneing of the same industrial plants from 
two sources--nonproject and project funds--as this practice tends 
toward confusion in project cost recording and inaccurate progect 
reporting., 
DEFICIENCIES I N  FERTILIZER PROGRAM 
F e r t i l i z e r  has been the pr inc ipa l  commodity import financed 
by I C A .  Total I C A  financing aggregated $119.5 million for  the pe- 
r iod 19%56 and $235.7 milllon from 1957 through 1961. The pro- 
gram has been more cost ly  and l e s s  beneficial  t o  the Korean agri-  
cu l tu ra l  sector than it should have been pr incipal ly  because of 
the following conditions : 
From 1959 through 1960 the program did not have the bene- 
f i t  of necessary technical guidance by the Mission. 
I C A  did not par t ic ipa te  i n  the determination by the Korean 
Government as to  the quant i t ies  and types of f e r t i l i z e r  t o  
be imported or  as t o  the use of f e r t l l ~ z e r  within the agrid 
cu l tu ra l  sector. 
Procurement costs were higher than necessary because of 
( a )  faxlure to  purchase i n  off season and (b)  the alloca- 
t ion  of increased purchasing of f e r t i l i z e r  t o  Korean p r i -  
vate busmess whlch paid a higher pr ice  for  f e r t i l l z e r  
than the Korean Government had paid. 
Delay In  u t i l l z l n g  f e r t i l i z e r  produced by the ICA-financed 
Chung- ju f e r t l l l z e r  plant  resulted I n  loss  to  the farmers 
of a subs tan t la l  quanti ty of f e r t l l i z e r  for  a t  l e a s t  one 
farmlng season. 
Laok of technlcal mldance by mlsslon 
Although ICA-flnanced f e r t i l l z e r  imports averaged In excess 
of $40 mllllon annually, the Mission d i d  not have a f e r t l l i z e r  
technician from 1959 through 1960. The functlons of such a technl- 
clan i n  the Korea program Included (1) a d n e e  on the types of fer-  
t i l l z e r  t o  procure, crop allocations, and f e r t l l i z e r  handlmg and 
d is t r lbut lon  and (2)  ms t ruc t ion  t o  Korean farmers as to  the bene- 
fits and use of varlous types of f e r t l l l z e r  (potash and phosphate) 
not t radzt lonal ly  used by them. These functlons require extensive 
contact wlth farmers throughout the oountry as well as work a t  the 
M i s s ~ ~ n  a d the Korean Mlnlstry of Agriculture. In n e w  of the 
magnitude of the f e r t l l l z e r  a c t l v l t y  and ~ t s  slgnlflcance In  the 
Korean economlc s t ructure ,  these technlcal servlces were important 
~f not essentsal  t o  the achievement of the agricultural objectives 
of the a id  program. 
ICA asslgned a f e r t l l l z e r  advlser to  ~ t s  Ivhsslon In 1956. 
Prlor to  tha t  tune the Korean f e r t l l l z e r  program had been the sub- 
ject of congressional cr l t lc lsm for fau l ty  procurement practices. 
I C A  reported tha t ,  through the work of the advlsor, substan- 
t l a l  savmgs In  procurement costs were reallzed and procedures 
were devlsed for  a balanced f e r t i l i z e r  import program. Also exten- 
sive black market operations were reportedly curbed. Upon depar- 
ture of the advisor i n  July 1959 and contrary t o  h i s  recommenda- 
t ion ,  I C A  allowed the posit lon to  lapse and undertook to  admmlster 
the program by commlttee wlthout the benefl t  of a full- tune techni- 
c a l  advlsor. Thereafter the committees and subcommittees whlch 
attempted to  handle a l l  ~ n d l v l d u a l  problems grew so numerous tha t  
l a t e  In  1959 the exist ing system was abolished and a new over-all  
commlttee was established. Thls commltteeTs f l r s t  declslon was 
tha t  the program could not be admlnlstered by the commlttee method 
and tha t  a technical advlsor was necessary. Subsequently, In  Octo- 
ber 1960, a fertilizer advlsor was asslgned to  the Mlssion. A t  
the tlme of our f l e l d  renew,  the Mlsslon f e r t i l l z e r  s t a f f  con- 
s l s t ed  of one Amerlcan techniclan and a Korean assistant. 
Although its e f fec t  1s not measurable, we belleve tha t  the 
lack of a f e r t l l l z e r  technlclan hmdered the program s lgnl f lcant ly  
and also contributed t o  the condltlons described In the followl.lg 
pages. 
The agency clalmed t h a t ,  desplte the absence of a f e r t l l l z e r  
technlclan, effective work, such as f l e l d  demonstrations on the 
use of unpopular f e r t l l l z e r s ,  had been carrled on under the super- 
vls lon of Mlsslon agricultural advlsers and tha t  t h l s  work was 
used as a gulde In  determlnlng the levels  and kmds of f e r t l l l z e r  
whlch now make up the Korean f e r t l l l z e r  program 
We recommend t h a t ,  ~f the program continues a t  a leve l  ap- 
proachlng tha t  of past  years,  conslderatlon be glven to  lncreaslng 
the strength of the f e r t l l l z e r  advlsory s t a f f  wlth the objective 
of fur ther  lmprovlng the admlnlstratlon of t h l s  important program. 
I C A  excluded from baslc f e r t l l l z e r  declslons 
Beyond determlnmg the amount of annual fundlng, I C A  had lit- 
t l e  volce i n  determlnlng the manner I n  whlch f e r t l l l z e r  would be 
used. The Mlsslon dld not have f r e e  access t o  agronomic and eco- 
nomlc 3ata  used by the Korean Mlnlstry of Agriculture t o  determine 
Korean f e r t l l l z e r  requirements and expressed i t s  doubts as t o  the 
basls  f o r  the  Mlnlstryls decisions. 
u 
I C A  was not consulted nor was ~ t s  advlce heeded by the Korean 
Government on matters such as the quant l t les  of the varlous types 
of f e r t l l l z e r  t o  be lmported and the purpose f o r  whlch f e r t i l l z e r  
was t o  be used. For example, the Korean Government d l d  not a l lo-  
cate ICA-fmanced f e r t l l l z e r  t o  the Korean soybean crop In  the 
past and, as  a consequence, the low yleld  of soybeans required the 
Un~ted  States t o  flnance subs tan t la l  soybean lmports f o r  use of 
the Korean Army and c i v i l l a n  populace, (See p. 72 .  ) 
The Mlssionfs chief agr icu l tura l  technologist reported tha t  
biological  evidence indicated wastefhl use of United States a id  
f'unds because of Korean insistence on purohasing too high a propor- 
t ion of nitrogenous f e r t i l i z e r ,  A f e r t i l i z e r  consulting team em- 
ployed by I C A  i n  1956 reported tha t  there were msuf f l c i en t  data 
available i n  Korea on which t o  make basic determinat~ons regarding 
Korean f e r t i l i z e r  requirements, 
Despite large annual commitments for  the purchase of phos- 
phatic and potasslc f e r t l l l z e r s ,  the Misslon had difficulty In ob- 
taining data showing the value of these fertilizers to Korean agri- 
culture. I C A  records showed tha t  as l a t e  as 1960, 7 years a f t e r  
inception of the aid program, the Misslon did not know Korea's 
yearly f e r t i l l z e r  requirements; economic factors  a f fec tmg  f e r t i -  
l i z e r  use;  major crop requ~rements; o r  ac tua l  crop allocations in- 
cluding crop c lass ,  acreage, and time of allocation. 
In  May 1960, the Mlss~on prevailed on the Korean Ministry of 
Agriculture to  permlt an Arnerlcan technical advlsor to  have access 
to  the Mmistry 's  agr icu l tura l  data on the ground tha t  I C A  was pro- 
vldlng "fmancfng *** of f e r t l l l z e r  goods fo r  a program about 
which i t  actual ly  knows very l i t t l e . "  When the American advlsor 
reported t o  the Ministry, Korean o f f i c i a l s  were re luctant  t o  fur- 
nlsh him wlth a l l  data requested, but from the llmlted data fur- 
nished he reported that the f e r t l l l z e r  program as conducted In the 
past  was unsound on an agronomic basls and needed d ras t l c  revlslon. 
A t  the conclusion of our f l e l d  audit  (June 1961), the Mission's 
f e r t ~ l l z e r  advlsor was worklng on a full-time basls a t  the Korean 
Minis t ry .  
F e r t i l i z e r  procurement costs hlgher than necessary 
I C A  pald higher prlces fo r  f e r t i l l z e r  than were necessary be- 
cause of (1) the f a i lu re  to  take advantage of off-season pr ices  
even though the compensatmg benefi ts  of timely del iver ies  were 
not reallzed and (2 )  insistence on the use of the l e s s  economical 
commercial procurement channels. 
Failure t o  take advantage of off-season pr ices  
World market prlces for  f e r t i l l z e r  are  governed i n  p a r t  by 
the date of delivery; ~f dellvery 1s scheduled during the period 
of greates t  demand, pr lces  are  hlgher than zf dellvery zs sched- 
uled before or a f t e r  the peak f e r t l l l z e r  application periods. For 
f e r t i l i z e r  procured from the Unated States ,  hlgher prices are  paid 
i f  delivery 1s requested between February and July,  while, Tor fer-  
t i l i z e r  procured from Japan, prlces are higher ~f delivery i s  
scheduled between Apr11 through July. The pr lce  of nitrogenous 
f e r t i l i z e r  delivered durlng the off season 1s generally about 
20 percent lower than the price charged for  delivery during the 
demand season. For phosphatic f e r t i l l z e r ,  the savmg i s  about 
10 percent. In  Korea the peak f e r t i l i z e r  demand perloas a re  be- 
tween A p r i l  and June for  basic applications of f e r t i l i z e r  to  the 
r i c e  crop and September to  October fo r  application t o  the barley 
crop. ICA f e r t i l i z e r  was usually ordered fo r  delivery during the 
demand season, yet  because of delays i n  delivery and i n  moving the 
f e r t i l i z e r  from Korean ports  t o  the farmmg areas,  the f e r t i l i z e r  
was not available t o  the farmers when needed. Consequently the 
intended benefi t  of the hlgher pr ice  was not obtained and the fer-  
t i l l z e r  might well have been purchased for  off-season delivery and 
a corresponding dol la r  saving realized.  
Although untlmely f e r t l l i z e r  del iver ies  had been a problem i n  
the Korean program for  a long time, i t  was not u n t i l  the end of 
f i s c a l  year 1961 tha t  steps were taken to  program I C A  f e r t l l i z e r  
procurement well l n  advance of need In  order t o  assure tlmely de- 
l ive r i e s .  I C A  Informed us tha t  In  the past  i t  had been unable t o  
program i n  t h l s  manner because neither I C A  funds nor Korean-owned 
forelgn exchange was available i n  suf f lc len t  amounts. However, 
our review lndlcated tha t  the Increased Korean forelgn exchange 
reserves (see p .  70) would have financed subs tan t la l  advance pro- 
curement. 
Higher  costs of Korean commercial procurement 
Fertilizer financed by I C A  was procured p r i m a r ~ l y  by Korean 
Government agencies and Korean business f i r m s .  I C A  pollcy had 
been t o  channel an ~ncreas ing  percentage of fertilizer procurement 
through Korean busmass firms, although it recognized t h a t  f e r t i -  
l i z e r  procured by these firms was more cos t ly  than f e r t l l i z e r  pro- 
cured by the Korean Government and despite advice of the Mission's 
supply advisers tha t  the  Korean commercial community was not suff i -  
c ien t ly  responsible t o  par t ic ipa te  i n  the f e r t i l i z e r  program. 
Untl l  f l s c a l  year l956? f e r t i l i z e r  was procured by Korean aqd 
Unlted States Government agencles. In  tha t  year, i n  p a r t i a l  con- 
s lderat lon fo r  addlt lonal  a id  to  Korea, a port lon of a ld  funds was 
s e t  aslde for  commercial procurement of f e r t i l i z e r .  I C A  continued 
t o  advocate f u l l e r  use of comerc la l  procurement channels, and the 
percentage so al located lncreased u n t i l  short ly  a f t e r  May 1961 
when ,the new Korean Government ins l s ted  on 100-percent government 
procurement. 
I C A  records show tha t  f e r t i l i z e r  procured through commercial 
channels was more cost ly  to  ICA than f e r t i l i z e r  procured by Korean 
Government agencles. A Mlsslon analysis of urea f e r t l l l z e r  pur- 
chases under the f i s c a l  year 1959 f e r t l l i z e r  program showed tha t  
commercial procurement costs were nearly $8 a ton higher than the 
cost of government-procured f e r t l l i z e r ,  primarily because the gov- 
ernment purchased i n  larger  quantities than dld the comrnerclal fer- 
t l l i z e r  dealers.  The 1959 program included 26,300 metric tons of 
commercially procured urea. The dol la r  cost  of t h l s  urea was 
approximately $200,000 higher than comparable cost of government- 
procured urea. 
Korean dealers have not been re l i ab le  or  trustworthy i n  t h e i r  
dealings i n  aid-financed f e r t i l i z e r .  An ICA audi t  of commercially 
procured and dis t r ibuted f e r t i l i z e r  disclosed tha t  the dealers did 
not maintain records showing the actual  utilization and dis t r ibu-  
t ion  of imported f e r t l l i z e r  valued a t  $6 mlllion. Also the deal- 
e r s  d i d  not l ive  up to  an understanding with I C A  for  f i s c a l  year 
1961 tha t  they would lmport a specifled quantl ty of phosphate fer-  
t i l i z e r  needed by Korean farmers but on whlch the dealers earned 
smaller p ro f i t s  than on the more popular nitrogenous f e r t i l i z e r s .  
Of $4,0k0,000 authorized for  commercial importation of phosphates, 
a t  June 30, 1961, only $10,000 had been used, and the balance was 
reprogramed for  procurement of f e r t l l i z e r  durmg f i s c a l  year 1962. 
Regarding procurement by Korean commercial dealers ,  the Mis- 
s ion ' s  Offlce of Supply Management (SM) made the following s ta te -  
ment : 
"We, of course, support the I C A  policy of maximum empha- 
s l s  on placmg procurement i n  normal channels of trade. 
However, experience wlth prevlous f e r t l l l z e r  programs 
handled by the commerclal community has caused SM to con- 
clude t h a t  the commerclal community 1s not qul te  ready 
to  f u l l y  meet t h l s  responslbl l i ty .  Thls conclusion i s  
based on the f ac t  tha t  pr lces  pald under our commercial 
procurement program for  f e r t i l x z e r  were excessive and, 
of more ~mportance, there was throughout Korea maldlstrl- 
butlon of f e r h l l z e r .  
ItTherefore, SM belleves tha t  the commerclal community 
should not be permitted to  participate i n  the FY 1961 
f e r t l l l z e r  program to  the degree i t  has i n  the past  un- 
l e s s  act lon i s  taken tha t  would eliminate or  substan- 
t i a l l y  mlnimize these deficiencies. If 
I C A  Informed us t h a t ,  because of the new Korean mil i tary gov- 
ernment's insistence on 100-percent Government procurement, there 
no longer was a problem of overcommg the disadvantages of hlgh 
pr lces  pald by the commerclal sector.  
Delay In  u t l l l z i n g  production 
of Chung-ju f e r t l l l z e r  plant  
Because of ~ t s  high pr lce ,  the production of the ICA-financed 
Chung-ju f e r t l l l z e r  plant  was not u t l l l z e d  fo r  an extended period. 
This delay was harmful to  the Korean farmers and the f inancia l  op- 
erations of the plant .  
The Chung-ju f e r t i l i z e r  plant  was one of the l a rges t  ICA- 
financed projects I n  Korea, and i t s  production was expected to  
111 
provide approximately one fourth of Korea's f e r t i l i z e r  require- 
ments. The plant  was completed i n  l a t e  1960, and management was 
assumed by an agency of the Korean Government, operating with the 
advice and assistance of an American contractor. Fe r t i l i ze r  pro- 
duced by the plant  through May 1961 was as follows: 
Calendar gear Metric tons 
1960 
1961 (through May) 13,34-4 iL!LzB 
Total 
Of t h i s  production, only 14,421 metric tons had been sold by 
May 31, 1961, pr incipal ly  because i t s  pr ice ,  which was fixed t o  
cover a l l  costs of production plus a 10-percent p ro f i t ,  was 
higher than the f e r t l l i z e r  dealers and trade associations were 
will ing t o  bid a t  the  several auctions a t  which the Chung-ju prod- 
u c t  was offered. 
Subsequent t o  our f l e l d  examination, I C A  informed us tha t  the 
Chung-ju inventory was being turned over to  the Korean National 
Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, an association of v i l lage  co- 
operatives, a t  a pr ice  corresponding to  tha t  of f e r t i l i z e r  m- 
ported under the commodity import program. 
The delay i n  adopting a plan which would permit the use of 
the Chung- ju production was responsible for  the loss  to  the Korean 
farmers of a substantial quantl ty of badly needed f e r t i l i z e r  for  
a t  l e a s t  one plantlng season. Furthermore, the f a i lu re  to  s e l l  
the production, and thus earn revenues, necessitated re lease of 
counterpart finds t o  enable the plant  to  continue i t s  operations. 
The agency lnformed us I n  March 1962 tha t  the Korean Govern- 
ment had been advised tha t  (1) sa les  of domestically produced fer-  
t i l i z e r  t o  farmers should be a t  the same p r i c e  as Imported f e r t l -  
l i z e r s ,  or lower i f  possible, and ( 2 )  domestically' produced f e r t i -  
l i z e r s  should be included i n  the basic government f e r t l l i z e r  ra- 
t ion  for  r i c e ,  barley, and soybeans to  insure f u l l u t i l l z a t i o n  of 
the domestic production 
AID PROGRAM ENCOURAGED MEW LUXURY WANTS 
AND UNECONOMICAL IMPORTING 
Despite Korea's extreme t rade  imbalance and the  low standard 
of l i v i n g  of most of the  Korean people, United S t a t e s  a id  funds f i -  
nanced imports of luxury or  semiluxury mater ia ls  such a s  top qual- 
i t y  wool and nylon yarns which were used t o  produce wearing ap- 
pare l .  Before the  a id  program the  Korean population dressed in 
clothing made predominantly from cot ton and s i l k ,  both of which 
were produced loca l ly .  Thus consumption hab i t s  beyond the  stand- 
ard possible t o  be maintamed a t  present  by the  country 's  economic 
resources were encouraged, a i d  funds were not  u t i l i z e d  t o  the  bes t  
advantage of the  Korean economy; and l o c a l  indus t r ies ,  pa r t i cu-  
l a r l y  cotton,  were adversely af fected.  ICA t echnica l  personnel r e -  
ported t h a t  i t  was unwise t o  continue fmancing these  mater ia ls  be- 
cause of t h e i r  very high qua l l ty ,  r e l a ~ i v e  cos t ,  and luxurious na- 
ture .  The agency a t t r i b u t e d  the  use of such a id  funds t o  the  pres-  
sure  of Western mfluences  and the  demands of an industrializing 
economy. 
The a i d  program a l s o  flnanced the  import of pulp without tak-  
ing advantage of economies t h a t  could be rea l ized  through the  use 
of wastepaper i n  mix wlth chemlcal pulp In  the  manufacture of ce r -  
t a i n  kinds of paper. 
Wool 
-
The a l d  program financed the  import of about $20 mil l ion 
worth of wool tops--a wool product from which worsted c l o t h  fo r  
men's and women's clothlng i s  made--and a l s o  t he  import of substan- 
t i a l  machinery f o r  Korean firms t o  produce worsted c l o t h  from wool 
tops. Wool tops were among the  p r inc ipa l  commodities Imported 
with Korean forexgn exchange; Korean wool top imports t o t a l ed  $5.8 mll l ion and $2.3 mll l ion i n  1959 and 1960, respect ively .  In 
order t o  reduce the  cos t  t o  Korea of wool tops,  I C A  agreed i n  1960 
t o  provlde $1.5 mil l ion t o  purchase machinery which would produce 
wool tops from l e s s  cos t ly  raw wool. 
ICA recognized on a number of occasions t h a t  wool tops were 
not the  type of commodity which should be financed with United 
S t a t e s  a ld  m d s .  The agency planned t o  reduce I ts  financing of 
wool tops i n  1959 and eliminate ~t e n t i r e l y  In  1960 but d id  not  do 
so  a t  the  m s i s t e n c e  of the  Korean Government. 
In  addi t ion the  wool tops purchased were of a higher qua l i t y  
than the  average used fo r  worsted c l o t h  production i n  the  United 
S ta tes  and i n  New Zealand which i s  a major wool producer, The M i s -  
s i o n ' s  t e x t i l e  advisor reported that i t  was a mistake t o  finance 
fo r  domestic Korean use the  highest  qua l l t y  wool tops fo r  process- 
ing worsted fabr ics .  
Early i n  f i s c a l  year 1958, the ICA Washington of f ice  ex- 
pressed t o  the Mission ~ t s  concern about the high qual i ty  of wool 
tops being financed, pointed out tha t  a id  funds should be used for  
grades of wool tops more nearly i n  proportion t o  those used by the 
r e s t  of the world, and suggested tha t  Korean foreign exchange be 
used for  the purchase of the luxury grades, Although I C A  imposed 
res t r i c t ions  on the hlgher qual i ty  grades, the  qual i ty  of wool 
tops financed with a id  funds continued t o  be higher than the aver- 
age qual i ty  used i n  the Unlted States.  For example, the wool tops 
financed i n  1958 under the a ~ d  program were as high as &-count 
quali ty;  i n  f i s c a l  years 1959 and 1960 as much as 50 percent of 
I C A  wool top procurement funds were authorized t o  purchase62-count 
tops. I C A  records indicate tha t  the best worsteds for durabi l i ty ,  
low mamtenance, and medium prlce  are manufactured from tops of 
48-60 count, 
The agency advised tha t  action had been taken t o  l i m i t  the 
64-count qual i ty  but lack of technical a b l l i t y  oh the par t  of the 
Korean spinning m l l l  technicians made it inadvisable t o  go fur ther  
in lowering the grades of wool tops, tha t  c lo th  made from lower 
grade wools and wool tops requlres more technical how-how, and 
tha t  only recently had the lndustry demonstrated x t s  capacity t o  
f i n i s h  fabr ics  utl lxzrng the lower grades of wool. The agency 
a lso  pointed out tha t  the prlces of the higher count wool tops 
from Australia, where most wool tops for Korea were procured, were 
more favorable than the prices of lower count tops from the United 
States  and therefore no savxngs i n  foreign exchange would have 
been realized from purchases of the lower count wool tops and fur- 
ther tha t  Australia did not offer  lower count tops for export. 
Nylon yarns 
Mylon yarn mports  ln to  Korea have been used largely t o  pro- 
duce 100-percent-nylon s t r e t ch  socks and other wearlng apparel. 
Before the a i d  program, no nylon yarn was mported in to  Korea and 
men's socks were produced from cotton and other cheaper fabrics.  
Through 1958, a id  funds and Korean forexgn exchange had been used 
t o  import $9.3 million worth of hylon yarn. In 1958 I C A  l m i t e d  
i t s  funding of nylon t o  $500,000 and for  1959 and 1960 designated 
nylon as lne l lg lb le  for  a id  flnanclng for the followmg reasons: 
Korean use of 100 percent nylon i n  sock manufacture was 
considered a waste of foreign exchange. 
Nylon was very expensive, costing from $1 t o  $5 a pound 
whereas rayon, which could be used as a substr tute ,  costs 
only about 50 cents a pound. 
The sa le  of nylon socks hurt  the market of the cotton pro- 
ducers whose ~mports  were a lso bemg financed by ICA.  
4. The reduction i n  aid funds necessitated economies in the  
ZCA program. 
Kowever, the demand created for nylon was such tha t  increas- 
ing amounts of Korean foreign exchan e were used t o  purchase t h i s  
conunodity--$4.9 million ~n 1959 and f 6.1 million m 1960. Nylon 
was a high-profit item which was very popular with the Korean busi- 
ness community. 
In recognition of the d r a m  on foreign exchange from the i m -  
portat ion of nylon yarn and the f ac t  tha t  Korean demand for  nylon 
yarn had become an established element of the economy, I C A  ap- 
proved the use of $496,000 for the importation of machinery t o  pro- 
duce, i n  Korea, nylon filament yarn from l e s s  expensive raw mate- 
r i a l s .  I C A  a lso approved applications for  financing nylon- 
processing machinery a f t e r  pressure was reportedly exerted by the 
Korean Government t o  secure t h i s  machinery. The Development Loan 
Fund also approved a loan i n  the  amount of $3.2 million t o  estab- 
l i s h  a nylon filament plant.  
In 1961 the restriction against nylon imports applled i n  1959 
and 1960 was dropped and I C A  fznanced $6.2 million worth of nylon 
yarn imports. Although I C A  industry advlsors had opposed t h i s  f i -  
nancing ~t was approved on the ground tha t ,  since substant ia l  
amounts of Korean forelgn exchange were being used t o  purchase ny- 
lon, it was useless t o  t r y  t o  exclude nylon from the country- 
The agency s ta ted  tha t  i t  had never advocated large imports 
of nylon and tha t  it had recommended to the Korean Government tha t  
nylon be used as reenforcing material m the production of cotton 
socks ra ther  than i n  the production of 100-percent-nylon socks. 
The agency also polnted out tha t  lmported nylon and domestically 
produced nylon yarn were used i n  production of t l r e s  and f i s h  nets .  
Uneconom~cal use of pulp i n  paper manufacture 
I C A  f iman~ced prac t ica l ly  a l l  of Korea ' s chemical pulp imports, 
a large  pa^% of which were used i n  the manufacture of paper and pa- 
per produc$s other than newsprint. Due consideration does not ap- 
pear t o  have been given pr ior  t o  1960 t o  the economies which could 
be reallzed through the use sf wastepaper m the manufacture of ge- 
per and paper products other than newspr~nt;  w e  mderstand tha t  
wastepaper cannot be used kn  the manufacture of newsprmt. The 
cost of imported wastepaper i s  about $70 a ton, compared with chem- 
~ c a l  pulp costs of $140 a ton. According t o  I C A  technical data,  
finished paper may conslst  of from 10 t o  20 percent wastepaper. 
I C A  estlrnated annual savlngs i n  excess of $2130,000 i n  foreign ex- 
change costs through the substitut[ion of imported wastepaper for  a 
portion of chemical pulp imports. These savings would be increased 
t o  the extent tha t  loca l ly  available wastepaper was used. 
Despite these potent ia l  economies, the pr incipal  paper manu- 
facturers  m Korea did not use imported wastepaper or a l l  ava i l -  
able domestlc wastepaper i n  t h e i r  operations, although according 
t o  I C A  the qual i ty  of the paper produced would not have been ad- 
versely affected. The reasons glven was tha t  they lacked de- 
inking f a c l l i t l e s  necessary t o  process wastepaper in to  sui table  
form for  manufacture of bond paper and tha t  Korea's wastepaper was 
of poor q u a l ~ t y  and too expensive. ICA informed us tha t  some do- 
mestlc wastepaper i s  used In the manufacture of cer ta in  paper 
products. 
In 1960 I C A  poznted out t o  the Korean Ministry of Reconstsuc- 
t lon  the substantla1 savlngs which could be real lzed through the 
use of wastepaper and de-mkmg facilities. Thereafter a pulp pro- 
curement authorlzatlon was amended t o  provlde $50,000 for  the i m -  
port  of wastepaper. In 1961 provlslon was not made for  the use of 
wastepaper desplte the f a c t  tha t  $6 mllllon of azd funds were e s t l -  
mated by I C A  for pulp procurement durlng tha t  year. 
The agency s ta ted  tha t ,  smce  the 1960 funds authorized for  
the lmport of wastepaper were not u t l l l a e d ,  no f l s c a l  year 1961 
funds were designated for  t h r s  purpose. 
The agency fur ther  Informed us tha t  l t  has contmued t o  spon- 
sor the use of wastepaper In paper manufacturing but tha t  apppar- 
ent ly  the Industry does not yet  f u l l y  understand or has not become 
convmced of z t s  advantages. 
Conclusion and recommendation 
The above s l tua t lons  I l l u s t r a t e  the danger of perrnlttlng the 
worklng of market forces to  determrne the commodltles to  be m- 
ported. (See p. 94.) Moreover, they lndlcate a need for  more 
austere and r e a l l s t l c  standards as t o  the types of Imported commod- 
l t l e s  f o r  whlch Korean forelgn exchange and ald  funds should be 
used, and a more a l e r t  screening of resources t o  assure t h e n  u t l -  
l l z a t l o n  for  purposes of more essential and las t lng  benefl t  t o  the 
Korean economy. 
We recommend tha t  A I D  take appropriate measures t o  meet t h i s  
need as lt re l a t e s  t o  a ld  funds and negotiate with the Korean Gov- 
ernment for  the adoptlon of s i m ~ l a r  measures regarding the use of 
Korean forelgn exchange. 
The Korean Government was unwllllng to ~mport a11 the gaso- 
line that ICA estlmated was needed for clvlllan use and consist- 
ently refused to permlt the clvlllan economy to secure and use au- 
tomotlve spare parts excess to milltary requlrements. The short- 
ages of these ~tems for clvlllan use were responsible In a slgnlfi- 
cant measure for the large-scale Illegal dlverslon of stocks of 
these commodities provided for the Korean and Unlted States mlli- 
tary forces stationed In Korea. 
The Unlted States fmanced all Korean gasolme requlrements 
for the Korean mllltary forces as part of the mllltary assistance 
program and for the clvlllan economy as part of the economlc as- 
sls tance program. 
The Korean Government refused to permlt the use of ICA funds 
to Import all the gasollne that ICA estlmated was requlred by the 
clvlllan economy. For example, In July 1960 the Korean Government 
estlmated lts flscal year 1961 clvillan petroleum requlrements at 
$15 mllllon whlle ICA estlmated them at $24.6 mllllon. We were In- 
formed that underestlmatlng requlrements had been consistently 
practiced slnce the lnceptlon of the ICA program. 
As a result of shortage of gasollne for clvllian use, mlll- 
tary gasollne stocks were illegally dlverted to clvlllan use In an 
amount estlmated by ICA In 1960 at 19 mllllon gallons annuall T' valued at about $1.9 mllllon. Thls amount represents about 2 per- 
cent of the avexage annual Issues to all Unlted Natlons and Korean 
mllltary forces In Korea. The Korean Government reported that the 
reason for zts uznwlllingness to Import more gasollne was ~ t s  de- 
sire to reduce fuel consumption by llmltlng the number of vehicles 
and by dleselizlng large transport unlts. We were lnformed by ICA, 
personnel that a prlnclpal factor In past Korean Government re- 
fusal to accept more gasolme was the government's awareness that 
a part of ~ t s  clvlllan gasollne requlrements could be met from 
black-market sources without uslng ~ t s  llmlted forelgn exchange OF 
ald funds. An audlt by ICA disclosed that the gasolme-rationing 
system was lneffectlve and that black-marketing and other undeslr- 
able practices, whlch favored certam consumers, forced other con- 
sumers to obtaln thelr requlred supplles through illegal channels. 
ICA advlsed us that the Korean Government finally accepted a 
reallstlc fundlng level for g a s o h m  and other petroleum products 
for calendar year 1961 and was studylng the posslblllty of eliml- 
natlng the ratlonlng system. 
Automotive spare par t s  
Usable automotive spare par ts  excess to  mi l i ta ry  requirements 
have been scrapped or exported from Korea although there  was no 
legit imate source of supply for  a number of these par t s  fo r  the c i -  
v i l i a n  motor f l e e t .  Consequently, there  has been a continumg 
large-scale i l l e g a l  diversion of automotive par t s  from mil i tary 
stocks In  Korea. 
Korean Government pollcy prohibited the re-use by the c i v i l -  
Ian economy of serviceable automotive par ts  removed from unusable 
mll i tary vehlcles. These vehlcles and t h e n  component par ts  were 
required to  be mutilated to  prevent t h e n  fur ther  use and then dis-  
posed of as  scrap fo r  s t e e l  productlon. T h ~ s  policy was deslgned 
to  prevent vehlcles from reachlng the c l v l l ~ a n  f l e e t  through unau- 
thorlzed reassembly. However, cer ta ln  of these par ts  were usable 
and necessary to  malntaln the exlst lng c l v l l l a n  f l e e t ,  f o r  whlch, 
In  the absence of a legit imate source of supply, used par ts  were 
pl l fered from mll l tary stocks or ~ l l e g a l l y  dlverted from the scrap 
plpellne. Many of these par ts  were not manufactured I n  Korea, and 
~t was not the pollcy of I C A  o r  the Korean Government to  make 
funds available f o r  t h e n  importation. Other parts  pi l fered or 
dlverted a re  manufactured In  Korea, and t h e l r  I l l e g a l  sa l e  has un- 
fairly competed wlth the legltlmate auto par ts  ~ n d u s t r y .  
Under an agreement between the Governments of the Unlted 
Sta tes  and Korea, excess par ts  from Unlted Sta tes  vehlcles could 
not be dlsposed of In  Korea except upon speclf lc  approval by the 
Korean Government. In  accordance wlth t h l s  agreement, Unlted 
Sta tes  mllrtary excess par ts  were b a n g  exported from Korea a l -  
though slmllar  par ts  were not manufactured I n  Korea. 
In  December 1960, Unlted Sta tes  Army author l t les ,  concerned 
about jeopardy to  the combat readmess of Korean armed forces be- 
cause of large-scale par ts  pilferage, requested, wlth I C A  approval, 
the Korean Mlnlstry of Commerce and Industry ( M C I )  to  revlse  l t s  
pollcy to  permlt the sa le  t o  the c l v l l l a n  economy of those excess 
par ts  not manufactured In  Korea. The Army proposed tha t  those 
par ts  whlch would not compete wlth Korean productlon be made avail- 
able fo r  c l v ~ l l a n  needs, taking precautions to  make unusable any 
par ts ,  particularly vehlcle frames, whlch could be used f o r  ve- 
h lc l e  reassembly. 
A t  the tlme of our renew,  MCI had not responded to  the 
Unlted Sta tes  Army's proposal. I C A ,  despite ~ t s  e a r h e r  concur- 
rence, mformed us tha t  ~t d l d  not favor t h l s  proposal and would 
do nothlng to fur ther  the proposal because l t  belleved the pro- 
posed sa le  of par ts  would undermine Korean e f fo r t s  to  h m l t  the 
motor vehlcle f l e e t  and would compete wlth the Korean auto par ts  
~ n d u s  t ry .  
Thls I C A  position does not appear sound since adoptlon of the 
plan would* 
1. Not conflict wlth present Korean auto parts production. 
Only those parts not manufactured In Korea would be sold. 
Unlted States Army records show that these types of parts 
were generally those whlch were being pilfered. 
2. Provide a source of Income to the Korean auto parts indus- 
try and addltlonal revenue to the Korean Government. 
3. Establish a distrlbutlon system whlch could control the 
dlsposal of military excess auto parts and curtail illegal 
competltlon wlth the auto parts Industry on parts whlch 
are manufactured In Korea. The absence of such control 
has seriously handicapped the industry. 
4. Lessen the mcentfve for dlverslon of parts from milltary 
forces in Korea. 
In the llght of the above conslderatlons, we recommend that 
ICA reexamme ~ t s  present posltion in thls matter and actlvely en- 
courage the Korean Government to permlt the sale of those automo- 
tlve parts that are excess to requirements of the mllltary forces 
In Korea and that are not manufactured In Korea. 
PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
United S t a t e s  a i d  through p r o j e c t  a s s i s t a n c e  was widely d ive r -  
s i f i e d  and included undertakings i n  practically a l l  major s e c t o r s  
of t h e  pub l i c  and p r l v a t e  economy of Korea. Direc t  d o l l a r  a id  t o  
p r o j e c t  a s s i s t a n c e  amounted t o  $504.6 m i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  f i s c a l  yea r s  
1954 thraugh 1961. A l i s t i n g  of major p r o j e c t s  and d o l l a r  a i d  f i -  
nancing l s  presented I n  schedule 4. I C A  sharply deemphasized pro j -  
e c t  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  the  p a s t  2 yea r s  and has been endeavoring t o  d i -  
g e s t  and evalua te  e x i s t i n g  p r o j e c t s  I n  order  t o  improve adminls tra-  
t l o n  of some and t e rmmate  o r  cu t  back o the r s .  For purposes of our 
examination, we se lec ted  f o r  d e t a l l e d  review a c t l v i t i e s  i n  power, 
m d u s t r y ,  housing, h e a l t h ,  h lgher  educat ion,  and voca t iona l  educa- 
t l o n  because we considered them bas ic  t o  any program of economic 
development i n  Korea and a representative c r o s s  s e c t i o n  of the  
over -a l l  p r o j e c t  assistance program. Each of these  a c t l v i t i e s  i s  
discussed i n  succeeding sec t ions .  We found t h a t  f o r  the  most p a r t  
i n  each of these  a c t l v i t i e s  t h e  p r o j e c t s  were heavi ly  handicapped 
by plannlng and operational d e f l c i e n c l e s  whlch i n  varylng degree 
prevented the  p r o j e c t s  from achievmg a satisfactory measure of 
success.  
CONTINUING POWER SHORTAGE 
E l e c t r i c  power i s  one of t h e  corners tones  of economlc develop- 
ment I n  Korea. I t s  continued and progressively Increas ing  shor t -  
age,  I n  s p i t e  of s u b s t a n t l a l  a l d  (more than  $70 m l l l l o n )  and coun- 
t e r p a r t  funds f o r  f inancing  power p r o j e c t s ,  has  been a major d e t e r -  
r e n t  t o  economlc development. F l n a n c l a l  l n s t a b l l i t y  of the  power 
companies, caused mainly by an inadequate r a t e  s t r u c t u r e ;  extended 
de lays  I n  lmplementlng ald-fmanced power p r o j e c t s ;  and f a l l u r e  t o  
agree upon a dependable long-range power plan have deprlved t h e  
power system of s l g n l f  l c a n t l y  g r e a t e r  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  supply Korea s 
requirements. As a consequence t h e  present  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  of 
Korea has  been unable t o  r e a l l z e  ~ t s  productive capaci ty  and f u r -  
t h e r  l n d u s t r l a l  expansion has  been ~ n h l b i t e d .  
The partition of Korea fo l lowmg the  end of World War I1 de-  
pr lved t h a t  p a r t  of the  peninsula whlch subsequently became the  Re- 
publ ic  of Korea of t h e  major source of i t s  e l e c t r l c  power supply. 
Nevertheless,  I C A  f inanced a program of m d u s t r l a l  expansion with- 
out f u l l y  assessing t h e  expected a v a l l a b i l l t y  of adequate power t o  
operate  these  ~ n d u s t r i e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  e l e c t r i c  power has  been 
ra t ioned t o  r e s l d e n t l a l  and commercial customers i n  Korea and t h e  
shortage 1s expected t o  worsen over the  next  few years .  Indus- 
trial f a c i l i t i e s  including those fmanced by I C A  funds have been 
unable t o  operate  f u l l y  because of a l a c k  of power. The sec t lons  
of t h i s  r e p o r t  whlch d i s c u s s  t h e  p r o j e c t s  I n  indus t ry ,  h e a l t h ,  and 
educat ion c l e a r l y  evidence the  ex ten t  of power shortage and i t s  
detrimental e f f e c t s  on t h e  purposes of those p r o j e c t s .  We under- 
stand t h a t  the  Korean Government has  prohib i ted  the  establ ishment  
of new Indus t r ia l  plants unless they provide t h e i r  own power- 
generating f a c l l l t i e s .  
Despite the l a rge  amount of I C A  aid i n  t h i s  area, generating 
capacity has not kept pace with demand. In  January 1961 an ICA 
contractor reported tha t  the capacity of the generating plants was 
about 80,000 kilowatts l e s s  than the peak load which would be sup- 
plied i f  there were no load re s t r i c t ions  and pointed out tha t  t o  
keep pace with anticipated growth through 1966 an addit ional  
484,000 kilowatts of generating capacity would be required. Mis- 
sion o f f i c i a l s  reported tha t  the power shortage i s  l ike ly  t o  in- 
crease u n t l l  1964. It was our understanding a t  the time we com- 
pleted our f i e l d  work tha t  decisions had not been reached a s  t o  
the types and locations of addit ional  plants t o  meet the need f o r  
e l e c t r l c  power. 
In March 1962 the agency reported t o  us  tha t  it had approved 
a loan of $20.9 mill lon f o r  a 132,000-kilowatt thermal plant a t  
Pusan and tha t  ~t was considering the expansion of the Kunsan ther-  
mal plant (see p .  123) from an or ig ina l  design capaclty of 33,000 
kilowatts t o  66,000. It a lso reported tha t  the Korean Government 
had recently taken ce r t a in  actions wlth i t s  own foreign exchange 
t o  a l l ev ia t e  the power shortage. 
Inadequate r a t e  s t ructure  
The Korean power system had comprised a generating company, 
the Korea Electr lc  Power Company (KEPCO), and two d ls t r lbut ing  
companles, the Seoul Elec t r lc  Company (SECO) and the South Korea 
Elec t r lc  Company (SKECO), whlch purchase the power generated by 
KEPCO and r e s e l l  ~t t o  Korea's power consumers. Power r a t e s  
charged by KEPCO t o  the distributing companles a re  subject t o  reg- 
ula t lon by the Korean Mlnistry of Commerce and Industry. Rates 
charged by the d i s t r lbu tmg companles t o  consumers were s e t  by the 
Korean Natsonal Assembly 
In our prior report  we commented tha t  the power r a t e s  estab- 
lished by the Korean Government d l d  not perrnlt self-sustaining op- 
erat lons  by the power e n t l t i e s  and tha t  t h l s  f a c t  was one of the 
obstacles t o  increased Korean power production (p .  48). In 1956, 
KEPCO1 s cost of generating a kilowatt hour was 6 .O8  hwan (exclu- 
sive of depreclatlon) whlle ~ t s  se l l ing  price t o  the distributing 
companles was 3.35 hwan. 
Effective January 1, 1957, the government substant ia l ly  in- 
creased e l e c t r i c  power r a t e s ,  however, concurrent increases i n  the 
price of coal and In  the cost of transportat ion largely of fse t  the 
increased power *venues. In  1957, KEPCO1s f u e l  cost  per kllowatt 
was approximately the same as  the r a t e  it charged fo r  ~ t s  power 
sales .  Consequently a l l  other d i r ec t  power-generating costs  as  
well as  such lndl rec t  costs as  those of depreciation, rn te res t ,  
and admmistratlon represented a los s  t o  the company. The 
continued unprofitable level of operations resulted in the failure 
of revenues to cover depreciation and other operatlng and mainte- 
nance costs. The company could not amortize ~ t s  indebtedness nor 
acquire funds for new constructlon. Also KEPCO was unable to pay 
its coal suppller which In turn affected the financial standing of 
that company which was also a recipient of ICA aid. In addition, 
it was reported that the two power-distributing companies were in 
such poor flnanclal condltion that, for as long as 3 years, they 
lacked the means to flnance the withdrawal from customs of ICA- 
financed transmission equipment valued at about $3 million. 
Recognlzlng that power development was being delayed because 
of the poor financial condltlon of the power companles, the Unlted 
States, in return for the cash grant of $20 mllllon In 1961 (see 
p. 58, stipulated certaln reforms to be taken by the Korean Gov- 
esnment ~ncludlng utlllty rate revision. The Misslon recommended 
an lnterlm rate Increase of 85 percent pendlng further study of 
the flnanclal status of the power companles. The rate Increase 
subsequently adopted by the Korean Government, In partla1 fulfill- 
ment of the condltlons of supplemental aid, averaged only 49 per- 
cent. However, the Government planned to merge the three power 
companles, whlch lt expected would result In economies In operat- 
ing costs, and also to exempt the new comblned company from lncome 
taxes. The Mlsslon lnformed us that labor, transportation, coal, 
and fuel 011, all of whlch are major items of cost In power opera- 
tlons, have substantially increased smce the date of ~ t s  recornmen- 
datlon for an 85-percent rate Increase. Consequently the Mlsslon 
was unable to advance an oplnlon as to whether the 49-percent In- 
crease adopted by the Government would be sufflclent to put power 
operatlons on a sound flnanclal basls. The three power companles 
were consolidated m t o  the Korea Electric Company on July 1, 1961, 
and substantlal staff reductions and slmpllcatlon of organization 
and operatlons were mstltuted. 
Delays In ~ r o ~ e c t  lmplementatlon 
ICA-funded projects have experienced prolonged delays in con- 
tractlng for englneerlng and constructlon servlces 
Chongpy ong Dam 
In 1956, ICA obligated $2 mllllon for rehabllltatlon of the 
Chongpyong Dam, Korea's second largest hydroelectric plant, whlch 
was completed by the Japanese in 1943. The need for the project 
was based on a 1954 survey whlch found that continuing eroslon of 
the dam made acute the danger of complete dam failure. The proJ- 
ect contemplated that a contract would be negotiated with a se- 
lected Amerlcan flrm to study the problem and perform all work nec- 
essary to restore the dam to ~ t s  orlglnal condltion. 
In 1958 and 1959 ICA obligated an additional $4 million which 
was considered necessary to complete the rehabilitation of the dam. 
However, invitations for contract proposals were not issued until 
March 1961, nearly 4 gears after the date at which funds for the 
Project were originally made available and nearly 7 years after 
the initial survey reported an acute danger of dam failure. At 
the conclusion of our field work, bids received by ICA were under 
consideration. 
Contributing to the delay in contracting was the fact that, 
although it had obligated funds for the project in 1956, ICA did 
not have all the necessary data concerning the project on which to 
proceed with the rehabilitation. In 1957 it employed an American 
engineering firm to resurvey the praject; a report on this survey 
was not rendered until February 1959. Subsequently, there was cor- 
respondence between ICA/Washington and the Mission concerning esti- 
mated costs and the availability in Korea of construction equip- 
ment from other completed projects which could be used on this 
project, Further delays were occasioned by the question of 
whether one over-all contract should be used, or whether separate 
contracts for engineering and construction should be let, and by a 
further review of the project in August 1960 by an ICA/Washington 
representative . 
ICA initially informed us that it expected to contract for 
the required services by the end of 1961 and that the project 
would be completed by 1964 which would be 8 years after the sign- 
ing of the project agreement and 10 years after the necessity for 
the project was first pointed out. However in March 1962 the 
agency reported to us that further delay had been occasioned in 
1961 by a change in procurement sources from those permitted under 
the President ' s balance of payments directive to world-wide 
sourcesm the change had been insisted upon by the Mission and the 
Korean Eovernment . This change necessitated a revision of contrac- 
tor proposals which the agency stated reduced the original bid by 
almost $1 million. 
Kunsan thermal power plant 
In February 1958 ICA engaged an American engineering firm to 
select a site in southwest Korea suitable for a thermal power 
plant. A report was rendered in October 1958 recommending Kunsan 
as the most favorable site for this plant. In June 1958 a project 
agreement between ICA and the Korean Government committed 42 mil- 
lion as an initial installment of funds for construction of a 
33,000-kilowat t thermal ower plant. Subsequently ICA funding wa 3 
increased to a total of P 9.8 million, The Korean Government and 
KEPCO were to furnish the hwan funds, estimated in the equivalent 
of (1.8 million, to meet the local costs of the project. 
- 
This project has been unreasonably delayed mainly because of 
the inordinately long period taken to complete each step in the 
contract-negotiating process. It was not u n t i l  March 1960 tha t  a 
temporary l e t t e r  agreement f o r  the engineering was signed and a 
year l a t e r  before a def in i t ive  contract pecame effect ive.  A t  the 
eonclusion of our f i e l d  audit  i n  June 1961, 3 years a f t e r  signing 
the or iginal  project agreement, no contract fo r  construction had 
been made. I C A  informed us  tha t  the plant i s  scheduled f o r  opera- 
t i o n  i n  December 1763. 
The long delay i n  implementing the project i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  un- 
derstand i n  view of an urgent dispatch from the Mission t o  ICA/ 
Washington i n  January 1960, more than a year before the engineer- 
ing contract was concluded, requesting tha t ,  i n  view of the in- 
creasingly serious power shortage which was affecting indus t r i a l  
and mining production, early action be taken to  expedite conclu- 
sion of the necessary contracts.  
The Mission expressed the view tha t  contracting delays a s  ex- 
perienced i n  t h l s  case would be minimized i f  ICA/ldashington repre- 
sentatives and the proposed contractor could negotiate the con- 
t r a c t  i n  Korea with the Mission, the Korean Government, and KEPCO, 
ra ther  than have negotiations conducted i n  Washington between the 
contractor and the ICA/Washington s t a f f ,  The l a t t e r  method, which 
i s  the standard I C A  operating procedure, involves long delays i n  
correspondence and contributes t o  misunderstandings because of the 
lack of face-to-face discussions. 
The Mission also informed us  tha t ,  during the period covered 
by the contract negotiations, the Korean Government was p o l i t i -  
cal ly  unstable wlth three separate governments i n  power and that  
during the period of the interim government which succeeded the 
Rhee Government l i t t l e  decisive actlon was taken. 
The agency advised i n  March 1962 t h a t ,  on the basis of a re-  
cent review of Koreals power-generat~ng capacity, i t  was consider- 
ing expanding the capacity o f  t h i s  plant  t o  66,000 kilowatts  to 
a l lev ia te  the power shortage, 
a i l  e pee on deaendable 
Tong-ower develo~rnent pian 
Power development i s ,  by nature, long-term, cost ly ,  and com- 
plex and i s  an in tegra l  fac tor  In  other areas of economic develop- 
ment. The Mission repeatedly urged the formulation of firm long- 
term plans f o r  power development giving due regard t o  generating 
and transmission f a c i l i t i e s .  The Mission informed us tha t  it was 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  obtain agreement among the varlous interested Korean 
agencies and u t i l i t y  management personnel regarding power develop- 
ment plans, According t o  the Mission there has a lso been a tend- 
ency f o r  the Koreans t o  favor hydrogeneratlng f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  po- 
l i t i c a l  and wprestigell reasons. Related t o  the power s i tua t ion  i s  
the need for increased production of coal used by the thermal 
plants which constztute most of Korea's power-generating capacity. 
In April 1961 the Economic Development Council of the Korean 
Government announced a 5-year power plan to provide an additional 
650,000 kilowatts at a cost of $237 million of which $127 million 
was to be secured from ICA and the Development Loan F'und. Accord- 
ing to the agency this plan is not a detailed plan giving techni- 
cal and economic justification for site selection and construction 
schedules and it contains some unrealistic calculations of natural 
resources, manpower capabilities, and foreign exchange earnings; 
however, the new government accepted it as part of its over-all 5- 
year development plan published in May 1961. 
Questionable economic justification for 
~rolsosed Chuna-ju hvdroelectric ~lant 
One of Korea's largest power projects has been a proposed hy- 
droalectric plant to be constructed on the Han River near the town 
of Chung-ju. This project was originally considered by the Japa- 
nese during their occupation of Korea and was subsequently re- 
viewed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in 1950 and fur- 
ther studied by KEPCO between 1950 and 1957. In 1957, Korea ap- 
plied to the Development Loan Fund (DLF) for a loan of $25 million 
to construct the proposed plant. ICA financed a review of the 
project by an American engineering firm, and an interim report 
made in November 1958 for the use of DLF stated that a suitable 
site was available and, on the basis of certain assumptions, the 
annual power costs would be somewhat less than would be incurred 
by a thermal power plant. In May 1959 DLF loaned KEPCO $1.5 mil- 
lion for engineering design of the plant and a contractor was se- 
lected to provide the necessary engineering services. The latter 
contractor submitted an economic feasibiliEy report on the project 
in June 1960. 
Cost data submitted by KEPCO, the ICA contractor, and the DLF- 
financed contractor differ by substantial amounts ag shown below. 
KEPCO ICA contrac- DLJ? contrac- 
estimate tor estimate tor estimate 
(Nov. 1957) (July 1959) (June 1960) 
Dollar cost $25 million $40.3 million $57.5 million 
Hwan cost 12 billion 14.7 billion 24.3 billion 
After the subm&ssion of the D W  contractorla feasibility re- 
port, the Mission's Power Division reviewed the project and issued 
a report thereon in August 1960. The report raised doubts about 
certain economic aspects of the project, revolving basically 
around the question of whether it would be wiser to provide power 
for Korea by erecting a number of thermal power plants rather than 
by completing a single hydroelectric power-generating f a c i l i t y .  
Generally, hydroelectric plants are  more costly t o  construct but 
cheaper t o  operate, The D L F  contractor estimated tha t  the cost of 
the power produced by the Chung-ju hydro plant would be 65 percent 
of the cost  of power produced by an equivalent thermal plant.  
Also the l i f e  of a hydro plant i s  considerably longer than tha t  of 
a thermal plant.  
The Mission expressed doubt about t h e  val idi ty  of the three 
cost estimates because of' t h e t r  wide variance and a l so  about the 
cost-benefit r a t i o  of 1,02 t o  1 computed by the D L F  contractor be- 
cause i t b e l i e v e d t h a t  cer ta in  cost estimates which the contractor 
used were understated primarily i n  regard t o  taxes, i n t e r e s t ,  and 
general and administrative expenses. The Mission fur ther  ques- 
tioned technical data used by the DIP contractor i n  regard t o  wa- 
t e r  flow. 
A report by a United States agency, dated January 1961, ques- 
tlaned the wisdom of investing about $70 million (dol la r  and equiv- 
a lent  hwan costs)  i n  a hydroelectric plant when a thermal power 
plant could be constructed a t  a significantly lower cost .  It  a l so  
commented on the e f fec t  of such a costly undertaking on Korea's 
a b i l i t y  t o  borrow f o r  other projects  and on the delayed aval labi l -  
i t y  of power due t o  the longer construction period f o r  a hydro 
plant ,  compared wlth a thermal plant.  
In  view of the several conf l ic t s  of views regarding various 
aspects of t h i s  project and the very substant ia l  fmancing which 
it involves, we suggested tha t  the responsible Unlted States agen- 
c i e s  examine a l l  considerations r e l a t ive  t o  the pros and cons of 
hydro and thermal power plants as  they are  pert inent t o  the in- 
s tan t  project before any fur ther  commitments of United States  
funds are  made, The agency reported t h a t ,  a s  of February 1962, a 
decision had been made not t o  finance t h i s  plant and tha t  no con- 
s iderat ion was then being given t o  the development of hydroelec- 
t r i c  projects  i n  the planning fo r  the Korea Electr ic  Company. 
Recommendation 
Because of the overriding importance of power i n  the economic 
future of Korea and the very substantial  investment tha t  the aid 
program represents i n  tha t  future ,  we recommend that  the respon- 
s ib le  United States agencies exert a par t icular ly  vigorous e f fo r t  
t o  (1) encourage and a s s i s t  the Korean Government i n  the formula- 
t ion  of a systematic power devel~prnent plan based on considered de- 
terminations of r e l i ab le  cost estimates, proper locations s izes  
of plants and kinds of power generation (hydro or thermal?, (2) ac- 
celerate  contracting and loan procedures t o  avoid unreasonable de- 
lays i n  project  implementation, and (3) ascer ta in  a t  the e a r l i e s t  
practicable time whether, as  a r e su l t  of the recently increased 
power rates and the corporate merger and other organizational 
changes, power operations are on a self-sustaining basis, so that 
if they are not further action can be initiated promptly toward 
making them so. 
'UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS OF INDUSTRY PROGRAM 
Industrial facilities finanoed by ICA under the small and me- 
dium industry programs were not, for the most part, being success- 
fully operated as business enterprises. At June 30, 1961, only 
14 percent of these enterprises were operating at as much as 
75 percent of capacity and were current in their loan repayments. 
As an example, projects in the once thriving silk Industry were so 
poorly administered that silk production actually decreased, silk 
filature mills were partially unused, and this industry had not 
made Its expected increment to farmers1 income or foreign exchange 
earnings. 
Status of program 
At June 30, 1961, ICA had furnished assistance totaling about 
$29 million to 214 industrial enterprises as subprojects under mas- 
ter project agreements between the United States and Korean Covern- 
ments for promoting small and medium industries. Funds for these 
projects were obligated during fiscal years 1954 through 1958. 
ICA assistance consisted principally of financing machine tools 
and other capital equipment and furnishing technical assistance. 
In addition most of these projects received operating hwan loans 
from the counterpart loan fund administered by the Korea Recon- 
structlon Bank (KRB). 
ICA had not provided any funds for industry projects since 
fiscal year 1958, Six projects totaling about $4 million in 
United States obligations were canceled between January 1 and 
March 31, 1961. 
The status of the 214 industry enterprises at June 30, 1961, 
is summarized below. 
Status 
Completed and operating: 
Over 75% of capacity2 
No overdue loans 
Overdue KRB loans 
Under 75% of capacity: 
No overdue loans 
Overdue KRB loans 
Completed and not operating 
Under construction 
Letters of credit not yet 
opened 
Total 
Percentage Amount of ICA 
Number of number assistance 
The agency pointed t o  the  severa l  changes i n  the  Korean Gov- 
ernment and i n  Korean exchange r a t e s  as  having hampered the  imple- 
mentation of the  Lndustry program and informed us t ha t  as  of Decem- 
ber 15, 1961, a t o t a l  of 135 projects  had been completed; t h a t ,  of 
84 projects  operating a t  over 75 percent of capacity,  48 had over- 
due loansg and t h a t ,  of 51 projects  operating a t  l e s s  than 75 per- 
cent of capaclty,  36 had overdue loans. The agency estimated t h a t  
the  operations of these  projects  added 43 b i l l i o n  hwan t o  the  Ko- 
rean gross nat ional  product during 1961 and gave employment to  
more than 14,000 people. 
Causes of unsat is factory  r e s u l t s  
The poor showing of the  industry p ro jec t s  was due primari ly 
t o  (1) inadequate plannin with respect  t o  avai lable  raw materials  
and prospective markets, ? 2) delays i n  project  implementation 
caused by slow processing of hwan loans and changes i n  project  
plans, (3) financing d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  such as project  sponsor irregu- 
l a r i t i e s ,  excessive s i z e  of project  loans i n  comparison with spon- 
sor  equity, and the  freezing of sponsor deposi ts  fo r  lengthy pe- 
r iods ,  and (4) shortage of power supply. Project  aud i t s  by I C A  
were tardy and infrequent.  
Inadequate planning 
The r ehab i l i t a t i on  of 17 s i l k  f i l a t u r e  m i l l s  was undertaken 
without determining t h a t  a su f f i c i en t  supply of s i l k  cocoons would 
be avai lable  as raw mater ia l  and without taking s teps  t o  see t h a t  
enough mulberry t r e e s  were planted t o  sus ta in  the  fu tu re  require- 
ments f o r  s i l k  cocoons. As a r e s u l t  these m i l l s  operated below 
50 percent of capaclty during calendar year 1960. The s lzab le  d l -  
mensions of t h i s  situation also  evidenced a serious breakdown i n  
coordination between the  industry and ag r i cu l tu ra l  d ivis ions  of 
the  Mission. 
I C A  financed a lacquer p lant  although l a c  t r ee s ,  the  so le  
source of raw mater ia l ,  were only being planted a t  the  same tlme 
t h a t  the  plant  was being constructed and these t r e e s  were not ex- 
pected t o  produce sap f o r  6 or  7 years. A new sponsor had t o  be 
found t o  take over t h i s  en te rpr i se  when the  o r ig ina l  sponsor en- 
countered serious f i nanc i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  while waiting f o r  enough 
l a c  sap t o  begin operations. The agency advised i n  March 1962 
t h a t  the  new sponsor was continuing to  plant l a c  t r e e s ,  whlch had 
been s t a r t e d  i n  1957, and, i n  the  meantime, had i n s t a l l e d  a small 
synthet ic  r e s i n  and varnlsh  manufacturing u n i t  t o  provide r e s i n  
and varnish f o r  l o c a l  consumption. 
During 1955 and 1956 I C A  approved four projects  amounting t o  
$830,000 and provided an addi t ional  $801,000 under the  nonproject 
import program t o  fu rn i sh  equipment to  increase the  capacity of 
the flour-milling industry in Korea. At the time of our review, 
several sponsors had gone bankrupt and this industry had a capac- 
ity four times the likely demand. 
A waste silk plant, established under a program to diversify 
and broaden the cloth and spun yarn sectors of the silk industry, 
was not processing waste silk at the time of our review and is 
not likely to, as it had become deeply entrenched in processing 
worsted yarns. Poor development of domestic outlets for waste 
silk yarns, local demand for worsted yarn, and the financial needs 
of the sponsor to continue operations were the justifications ad- 
vanced for the departure from the original intent of the project. 
In addition, many of the delays in project implementation 
cited in the sucoeeding sections appear to have been due in large 
part to ill-considered planning. 
Delays in project implementation 
Slow processing of loans, protracted indecision in selecting 
proaurement sources, and changes in project plans and project spon- 
sors unduly delayed the execution of p~ojeats with consequent slip- 
page in meeting project targets, substantial increases in cost, 
and financial hardships to project sponsors who had purchased land 
or otherwise used their own funds to start their projects. 
The medium industry development program for fiscal year 1957 
contemplated the expenditure of $13.4 million for 50 subprojects. 
Subsequently 17 subprojects were canceled and $3.9 million, the 
related obligation, was deobligated, Of the 9 5 million obli- 
gated for the remaining 33 subprojects, only 1418 million had been 
expended at June 30, 1961, 
In the spring of 1961, KRB made a special study of the chron- 
ological progress of 34 subprojects which then constituted the pro- 
gram, This study analyzed the number of days taken to process 
each major action from the time the sponsor made his initial de- 
posit, which was required to accompany his application, to the 
time he reoeLved his counterpart loan with which to go forward 
with the project, The study showed that it took an average of 
1,154 days, a r  more than 3 years, to process a project loan from 
application date to issuance, as follows: 
Action 
Average time 
(dam 1 
To issue project proposal and approval 
To issue authorization for import procurement 
To negotiate import procurement and to open letters 
of credit 
To prepare request to CEB for release of local funds 
To obtain CEB approval of request for release of 
local funds 
To request release of funds by Minutry of Finance 
To obtain release of funds by Ministry of Finance 
To prepare loan papers 
Total time 
Projects for the rehabilitation of the Korean silk industry 
were delayed for over 2 years awaiting ICA approval of Japan as 
the procurement source. Mlssion files indicated that avallabillty 
of equipment from United States sources had been thoroughly 
screened and that this equipment was never available from other 
than Japanese sources, 
Plans for a silk weaving and processing plant were completely 
changed 2 years after the project had been approved. Substantial 
inareases in local currency costs resulted. 
Review of LO subprojects for pharmaceutical plants disclosed 
that in five instances it was considered necessary to change the 
plant sites after the projects were initiated. Instead of rehabll- 
itating and modernizing exlsting plants, as originally intended, 
new facilities were erected, 
Dela s were also caused by changes of the approved sponsors. 
Of the 21 2: active projects at the time of our review, 37, or 
17 percent, had experienced sponsor changes necessitating complete 
rafiling of all pertinent documents by the new sponsor. These 
changes were occasianed mainly by insufficient fundsq lack of prod- 
uct market$ and changes in management, stockholders, and aompany 
W P t B  a 
Tha mini at^ af Recanstruotion reported many in~tances of ir- 
regulmitiss on %e part of individual projsot sponsors or Korean 
Gavsrnrnsnt officials, including fnaaau~ate or faEsa financial 
etaternents, klakbacks and rebates from suppliers, and sponsor se- 
Ieat isn based w p o l l t i a a l  pressure s a t k e ~  than ability. Theee 
sponaers and tb8 figs~aw Panlca rlasg~aatbfe $sr asaertaining thsilo 
Piswola l  pe$itien a~penrw3 r e l u a t a a t  to uae independent auditors. 
A 
In many cases project sponsor equity in the proposed enter- 
prise was very small in comparison with the related counterpart 
loans. Followfng are examples of loans greatly in excess of the 
sponsors net assets: 
Number 
of times loan 
Sponsor Net assets Project loan exceeds assets 
(millions of hwan) 
Project sponsors also suffered severe hardship in many cases 
because their deposits were tied up for long periods due to delays 
in project implementation. Upon approval of his application for a 
project, the applicant was required to make an initial minimum de- 
posit of 25 percent of the estimated project cost from hls re- 
sources. Deposits totaling 52 million hwan for 17 silk filature 
mills were tied up for from 1 to 4 years. 
Shdrtage of power supply 
Many industry projects were affected by a shortage of elec- 
tric power which caused delays in project completion, plant shut- 
downs, excessive down time of machinery and equipment, and finan- 
cial hardships to the project sponsors. A few representative il- 
lustrations follow: completion of a new plant for manufacturing 
steel furniture was delayed for approximately 4 months, a ceramic 
arts plant received power only every other day, and a shipyard 
reoeived only 10 percent of its requlhd power and the source of 
the power was over 100 mlles away. 
Om review indicated that availablljity of power supply was 
not sufficientls considered in deterrnlnin~ the feasibility of the 
industry subprojects and In programing them3 nor did there appear 
to have been any meaningful coordination between the program, 
power, and industry elements of the Mission. 
Ineffective audit coveram 
ICA audit coverage of the industry projects was both limited 
m%E;irnely. Only 42 audits, involving 31 projects, were made 
between January 1958 and December 1960. Thirty-slx of these au- 
dfts were of projects financed in fiscal years 1954 and 1955, Au- 
dits after such a long passage of time are unlikely to be helpful 
to management control. In addition there was little ICA action on 
audit findings; proposals to cancel projeats or request refunds 
rarely got beyond the discussion stage. 
The agency stated that, in selecting projects for audit, at- 
tentfon was generally given to those known to be in difficulty and 
that it believed the reluctance to request refunds was natural be- 
cause lt felt that these projects could be salvaged under normal 
conditions with the cooperation of the Korean Government. 
Proposed action and apencs response 
ICA has reoogniaed that its aid to small and medium industry 
programs haa not been used effectively and has informed the Korean 
Government that this is a serious problem area which requires 
prompt resolution. At the time of our review, it seemed unlikely 
that many of the enterprises financed under the small and medium 
industry programs would be reasonably sucaessful for some time to 
come and for some enterprises the prospects seemed slight at any 
time in the foreseeable future, At this advanced stage of the 
program there appear to be no easy solutions for many of the cur- 
rent problems. We emphasized to ICA that it should give appropri- 
ate priorfty to these problems at both the Washington and the Mis- 
sion level and pursue a vigorous and persistent course of positive 
action with the Korean Government toward their resolution, on an 
individual basis, in the moat expeditious and beneficial manner 
practicable in the circmstances. 
The agency reported to us in March 1962 that many steps had 
been taken to resolve the problems of this program, including (1) 
setting up additional operating f'unds, (2) changes in sponsorship, 
(3) auotians of nonoperating projects, (4) taking over and operat- 
ing projects under the supervision of Korean Government agencies, 
and (5) review of the entire industry program on a case-by-case 
basia with a view to possible refuhd requests or canoellations 
where appropriate. 
MAJOR HOUSING PROJECTS HAD NOT ACHIEVED 
THEIR INTENDED GOALS 
United States assistance in housing comprised a number of in- 
dividual projects. Our review was directed to the projects in the 
long-range program and to one large emergency subproject for the 
repair of typhoon damage. Other housing assistance not included 
in our review represented construction projects principally for 
slum clearance and for the resettlement of displaced persons and 
the assimilation of refugees. 
Of the three projects which composed the long-range housing 
program, the major one, involving the constructlon of housing, had 
fallen far behind the timetable fixed for completed units; another, 
for promoting building-material plants, was to be terminated for 
lack of qualified sponsors; and the third one, for housing re- 
search and development, had not undertaken its primary function. 
The emergency subproject, added to the constructlon project, for 
reconstruction of housing because of typhoon damage had benefited 
relatively few familles 2 years after the typhoon. An important 
factor In the delay of the construction project was the procure- 
ment of lumber that was unsatisfactory for the purpose intended. 
During flscal year 1957, ICA and the Korean Government initi- 
ated a 6-year housing program designed to reduce Korea's critical 
housing shortage and contribute to a permanent solution of housing 
problems. The program consisted basically of three projects wlth 
agreed dollar financing of Imported materials and equipment, tech- 
nical assistance, training of Korean participants by ICA, and fi- 
nancing of local costs from counterpart funds and the Korean 
budget and end-users. Program funding as of December 31, 1960, 
was as follows: 
Korean budnet 
funds a d  
ICA Counterpart funds of 
assistance fund s end-users, 
Project 
Housing construction 
Low- and moderate-cost housing 
Minimum-cost housing 
Typhoon rehabilitation 
Total 
Development of building-material plants 
Housing research and development 
Total 
(thousands 
of dollars) {millions of hwan) 
Housrna construction 
This project contemplated two types of housing construction, 
designated as (1) low- and moderate-cost housing and (2) minimum- 
cost housing, The former, which was the major type, was for owner 
occupancy by local residents of low-moderate income who were in 
need of housing and agreed to live in the house for at least 
5 years. Long-term loans (15-year maximum) from the Housing and 
Home Development Fwlld (ICHDF), administered by the Korean Recon- 
struction Bank, were available to (1) cooperatives for their eli- 
gible members, (2) local governments, companies, and institutions 
for sale at no profit to eligible residents and employees, and (3) 
eligible individuals (since 1959), Short-term loans (1-year maxi- 
mum) could be obtamed from the HKDF by bullders for construction 
af houses for sale at a reasonable profit to eligible individuals. 
At July 31 1961, only 5?746 of the 9,700 low- and moderate- 
cost housing m$ts planned in the fiscal year 1957-59 programs had 
been completed. None of the 3,000 units planned in fiscal year 
1960 had been started as of December 31, 1960. Processing of loan 
applications was extremely slow because of inefficient and time- 
consuming procedures within the Korean Government, A partial rem- 
edy was instituted in 1958 when applications were processed direct 
to the KRB rather than through the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs (MOHSA) . 
Material procurement was slow, ill-timed, and in some cases 
pnsatisfactory, Procurement authorization orders were usually not 
issued for 6 months, and jn some cases 12 months or more, after 
the date of the project agreoments. Subsequently much of the ma- 
terial was received near or after the end of the following build- 
ing season. In one case almost six million board feet of lumber 
was received near the end of the second building season after the 
obligation of funds. About two million board feet of hardwood lum- 
ber, purchased at a cost of more than $320,000, was delivered dur- 
ing the latter half of 1960 but was not used on the subproject as 
intended. According to the agency the lumber specified for this 
procurement was Philippine lauan (mahogany), a lumber very much in 
demand for housing construction in Korea. The conditions regulat- 
ing world-wide procurement, normally employed, resulted in the sub- 
stitution of other lumber, When home builders obtaining the HHDF 
loans found that they were unable to obtain Philippine lauan under 
their loans, they withdrew their requests, preferring to procure 
lauan on the open market, The other lumber was subsequently 
shifted to minimum-cost housing and utilized under the Korean slum 
clearance project for 1,750 units, 
The agency claimed that delays in the issuance of procurement 
documents did not slow the construction program as necessary mate- 
rials were borrowed from United States Army and other Mission 
projects. This arrangement undoubtedly alleviated but did not 
overcome construction delays as is evident from the slippage in 
construction described above. 
In 1959 minimum-cost housing was included in the long-range 
program for families which qualified for but had not received aid 
under the 1957 project for displaced persons. Borrowers agreed to 
furnish the labor for construction of their homes on land already 
owned or under long-term leases, The houses were limited to about 
380 square feet per house which was less than half the size of low- 
and moderate-cost housing. 
Although 3,950 self -help housing units were planned, only 
1,W6 wits had been completed and 1 707 units were in constmc- 
tion at July 31, 1961. Much of the Imported material had been 
loaned to the special subproject for reconstruction of typhoon- 
damaged housing because of implementing difficulties; namely, the 
Mission was unable to obtain adequate cooperation of the Korean 
Government and sufficient Mission advisory personnel. 
A special subproject to assist In housing reconstruction 
after the September 1959 typhoon damage was included In the fiscal 
year 1960 program. Eligibility criteria were basically the same 
as under the minimum-cost housing subproject. The assistance was 
primarily for the southeastern section of Korea around Pusan and 
consisted of allocations of United States dollar-funded cement and 
lumber and of Korean Government local currency for 19,000 families 
whose homes suffered typhoon damage. 
As of September 1961, 2 years after the typhoon, only 16 per- 
cent of the 19 000 families had received all the assistance 
planned. All the families received the allotted cement and the lo- 
cal currency provided by the Korean Government for construction 
costs, but only 3,000 received lumber which was borrowed from the 
minimum-cost housing subproject. 
According to the agency, unforeseen delay in obtaining ICA/ 
Washington approval for the dollar allocation for this subproject 
was a major factor in delaying procurement and distribution of the 
imported materials for housing reconstruction but this delay was 
partially compensated by utilizing for this purpose other mate- 
rials already on hand which had been imported under other projects 
and were not immediately required or were surplus. The agency fur- 
ther stated that the remaining 16,000 families subsequently re- 
ceived the United States dollar-funded lumber allocation. 
With respect to other housing construction, Mission reports 
show that 3,200 units of the resettlement and assimilation proj- 
ects had been completed at July 31, 1961, and that 1,750 units of 
the slum clearance projects were under construction at that date 
and all had been completed at February 28, 1962, 
Development of building material plants 
This project was designed to enable manufacturers of building 
materials to obtain loans with which (I) to pay into the counter- 
part f'und the local currency equivalent of the dollar costs of 
needed machinery and equipment to be imported under ICA financing 
and (2) to defray other local costs. The borrower was required to 
invest a minimum of 20 percent of the combined dollar and local 
currency costs. The loans were to be administered by the KRB In 
accordance with the financmg regulations and procedures for loans 
under the small and medium industry programs. (See page 128.) In 
fiscal year 1957, $500,000 was obligated by ICA to finance com- 
modities and 200 million hwan was allocated from the counterpart 
account for the initial operations, planned for completion at the 
end of 1957, with a contemplated addition of $900,000 during the 
next two fiscal years. 
The funds had been obligated prior to initiating a materials 
survey which was to be used as a basis for selection of the plants 
to be developed. A task order for this survey was not issued to 
the consultant firm until August 1958. The survey personnel ar- 
rived in Korea in January 1959, and a final report was submitted 
to the Mlssion in September 1959. Because very few loan applica- 
tions had been proeessed, ICA deobligated $256,000 during 1960 and 
the allocated counterpart was reduced by 113 million hwan. At 
June 30, 1961, no equipment had been imported and no finds had 
been expended. We were informed by ICA that this project was to 
be terminated except as it concerned two manufacturers who were 
determined eligible. Total obligations which at June 30, 1961, 
amounted to $244,000, were to be further reduced to an estimated 
L $100,000. 
Housing research and develo~ment 
The purpose of this project was to contribute a wider knowl- 
edge and employment of improved building materials and designs and 
to obtain more adequate housing legaslation, policies, and plan- 
ning and improved adminlstration, organization, and technical serv- 
ices in the housing sector, as an integral part of the country's 
long-range housing plan. 
Dollar funds were obligated in the amount of $90,000 for ad- 
visory personnel, $33,000 for the training in foreign countries of 
Korean participants, and $44,000 for the importation of commodi- 
ties for construction of demonstration housing. A n  additional $84,000 obligated for commodities was deobligated after delays ex- 
perienced by the Mission and the Korean Government in completing 
agreements, plans, and specifications for research and development 
work. 
Counterpart funds in the amount of 248 rnllllon hwan had been 
approved to finance national housing competitlons, housing surveys, 
and the development and drssemmation of houslng publications. An 
additional 20 rnllllon hwan was approved to flnance mternal han- 
dlmg costs of imported commodltles. 
Activities under this project consisted of holding two na- 
tional housing design competitlons, assisting In three housing dem- 
onstratlon projects, tralnlng flve participants in the United 
States, conducting a national housing essay contest in the Korean 
schools, and publishing l~terature pertainmg to United States 
housing legislation and housing In Korea, However, the types of 
research and development contemplated for the project were not un- 
dertaken and no houslng surveys were made. Efforts to have ade- 
quate housing leglslatlon instituted were not successful. 
A~ency comments 
The Mission had recognized that the instant projects had not 
been successful but stressed that the critical housing shortage in 
Korea underscored the need to continue the housing program pro- 
vided that future implementation could be achieved m a more satis- 
factory manner. The Mission further stated that its housing pro- 
gram was to be reviewed and that the intentions and plans of the 
new Korean Government, together w ~ t h  commitments, were to be ob- 
tained. The composition and extent of the future housing program 
would depend upon the results of these actions. 
The agency reported that, on the basis of a review of the 
Korean housing programs, it was anticipated that no further dollar 
financing would be made available and continuing activities in 
housing construction, research, and development would be financed 
with counterpart funds, 
P R O J E C T  FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HJ3ALTH FACILITIES 
WAS POORLY PLANNED AND ADMINISTE-FBD 
Although estimated for completion by mid-1957? very few of 
the hospitals, health centers, and other facilities included in 
this project were operating satisfactorily at June 30, 1961. Some 
of the structures were not finished; others were either improperly 
constructed or lacked adequate utilities for successful operation. 
Much of the equipment for these facilities was still at the port 
of entry or was unused at the building site. 
As a supplement to earlier projects for reconstructing exist- 
ing facilities damaged in the Korean war, the health facilities im- 
provement project was initiated in fiscal year 1956 to construct 
and equip new medical facilities. A 3-year program was originally 
contemplated. The first phase, to be completed by June 30, 1957, 
encompassed 29 facilities, including a mental hospital, a tubercu- 
losis sanitoriurn, health centers, and provincial hospitals. In 
1956, $700,000 was obligated and more than 400 million hwan in 
counterpart was allocated to finance the first phase. These 
amounts proved to be too low, additional funds had to be provided, 
and the first phase became the entire project with minor changes. 
As of June 1961, a total of $2.2 million had been obligated by ICA 
and 1.7 billion hwan had been allocated for 30 facilities. At the 
time of our review the project was still uncompleted. 
The largest individual facility under the project is a mental 
hospital. Originally, $224,000 was obligated by I C A  and more than 
LOO million hwan was allocated from counterpart funds for a 
TOO-bed hospital. The amounts were grossly insufficient as evi- 
denced by the fact that a 300-bed hospital was being constructed 
at a cost to date of about 1 million dollars and 600 million hwan 
in counterpart. Construction began late in 1957, was suspended 
for a year because of a reported lack of funds, and was estimated 
for completion in December 1961. Equipment furnished by ICA was 
stored at the project site pending completion of construction. 
Other facilities had not been completed at the time of our re- 
view in June 1961 or they could not be used efficiently because of 
limited water and power supply. Some of the equipment for these 
facilities was still stored at the port of entry in Korea because 
construction had not sufficiently advanced to enable installaJion. 
Mission officials reported that in many instances these facilTties 
had been poorly constructed. A laboratory to produce tuberculosis 
vaccine was planned for completion late in 1959 so that fore~gn ex- 
change would not have to be used to import vaccine in 1960. At 
the time of our review installation of laboratory equipment had 
just been completed and trial production runs were beginning. The 
agency attributed the delay to several changes in top officials of 
the Korean Ministry of Health. 
The agency advised in July 1962 that construction of all fa- 
cllities had been completed and at least basic staff and budget 
had been provided by the Korean Central and Provincial Governments. 
The agency also advised that the mental hospital was completed in 
December 1961 and that the vaccine laboratory estimated production 
of 4 million doses in 1962. 
Conclusion 
From our examination it seems clear that this project re- 
ceived little if any considered planning, that technical supervi- 
sion and management control were very limited, and that the funds 
were obligated considerably before the project was ready to use 
them. The record indicates that at the time the initial funds 
were obligated neither engineerlng plans nor cost estimates had 
been developed in anything more than skeleton form. 
PROBLEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION PROGRAM 
The curriculum at the College of Engineering at Seoul Na- 
tional University (SW) was developed without direct knowledge of 
the types of engineers and scientists needed in Korea. As a conse- 
quence Korean economic development probably did not receive the 
full potential benefits of thls branch of higher education; more- 
over assistance was glven to courses which appeared to make a rela- 
tively small contribution toward existing and foreseeable Korean 
economic requirements. In addition much of the equipment fur- 
nished under the program had not been installed and other equip- 
ment had not been utilized because of the lack of power and heat. 
Background and composition of Droaram 
The project for assistance to SNU covered the Colleges of En- 
gineering, Agriculture, Medicine, and Public Administration and en- 
compassed three types of activities involving United States dollar 
financing of commodities and technical services and counterpart 
and Korean budget funds for local costs. United States dollar ob- 
ligations and local currency allocations to June 30, 1961, for 
each of these activities are summarized below. 
Local 
Dollar currency allocations 
obliaations Countemart Korean budget 
Advisory services and training 
under contract with United 
States university 
Procurement of books, supplies, 
and laboratory and classroom 
equipment 
Repair and rehabilitation of 
SNU plant 
Total 
(millions) 
The contract with the United States universfty executed in 
19% called for: 
1. Technical personnel to act as advisors in Korea to the col- 
leges of SNU, 
2. Korean faculty members to receive training in the United 
States at selected universities. 
The contract originally for 3 years was extended several times; it 
expired on June 30, 1961, for the Colleges of Engineering, Agricul- 
ture, and Medicine and ran to June 30, 1962, for the College of 
Public Administration. Under amendments in 1955 and 1956, the 
services of the university were engaged for the procurement of lab- 
oratory and classroom equipment. The university was also re- 
quested to advise in developing plans for the rehabilitation of 
the SNU plant. 
Our review was directed for the most part to the project ac- 
tivities--contract services, equipment procurement, and plant re- 
habflitatlon--in the College of Engineering which in 1960 had an 
enrollment of 1,580 students. Dollar and local currency financing 
for these activities totaled $1.79 million and 1,450 million hwan 
through June 30, 1961. 
A jolnt ICA/Korean Government report in 1960 on a study of 
higher education in Korea stated that the reason so few graduates 
in science and engineering find employment in then fields is be- 
cause there are too many graduates for the current state of the 
economy and the qualifications of the graduates are low. The re- 
port further pointed out that a comprehensive survey should be un- 
dertaken of all Korean industries and government agencies to ob- 
tain an estimate of the number and type of engineers and scien- 
tists that would be needed in the future. 
United States financing to the engineering college provided 
equipment for such courses as Naval Architecture and Marine Engi- 
neering, Aeronautical Ehgineering, and Nuclear Engineering. These 
courses would seem to offer very limited ernp;loyment opportunities 
and to have an unimportant place in the Korean educational picture 
in terms of their present and foreseeable economic value to the 
country. Considering the extensive needs of Korea in the essen- 
tfal sectors of its economy, the financing of equipment for and 
the attendant encouragement of such courses as those named above 
did not appear to be consistent with the most beneficial use of 
aid funds. Thls equipment included such items as a subsonic wind 
tunnel, together with construction of a special facility for hous- 
bng it, and a towing tank used for instructional and research pur- 
poses in ship design. 
The majority of ICA-furnished equipment had not been set up 
and put in use on a permanent basis because of the lack of counter- 
part funds to pay for installation. Furthermore no facilities (ma- 
chine shop and staff of mechanics) had been established for re- 
quired maintenance of this equipment. Equipment purchases for the 
College of Engineering amounted to $1,370,000. According to the 
final report of the university contract advisor in June 1961, more 
than 194 million hwan was required to complete the installation of 
the laboratory equipment. 
The shortage of support utilities such as power, heat, and wa- 
ter seriously handicapped the effective use of the college labora- 
tories and other facilities. Power outages were frequent, pro- 
longed, and detrimental to the conduct of classes, especially for 
laboratory work. The dean of the college reported that only 85 kw, 
or 46 percent of the requlred 184 kw of power supply, was avail- 
able. According to the Misslon, rationing of power will be neces- 
sary until 1964. During two to three of the coldest months of the 
year subfreezing temperatures prevented the use of water in the 
laboratories. The lack of adequate heat for 3 or 4 months greatly 
retarded the efficient use of the laboratories for teaching or for 
research. 
Proposed action and agency response 
In view of the highly important role of education in the eco- 
nomic development of Korea, and in the Interest of the most effec- 
tive utilization of ald funds, we advised ICA that it should de- 
vote the most energetic effort toward (1) encouraging education at 
the college level in such fields as will be in reasonable balance 
with the immediate and near future economic needs and employment 
opportunities of the country, (2) installing equipment and provid- 
ing adequate maintenance facilities, and (3) obtaining by such 
means as may be feasible, including reasonable temporary means, 
the required supply of power, water, and heat. We also stated 
that the agency should follow through with the Korean Government 
on the recommended survey of requirements for engineers and scien- 
tists and on such action as the results of the survey may indicate 
to be appropriate. 
We pointed out to the agency that the termination of the uni- 
versity contract at June 30, 1961, placed the burden of the above 
tasks directly upon it with the resulting responsibility of provkd- 
ing such qualified personnel as may be necessary to carry out 
these tasks. 
Agency comments 
The response of the agency to the conditions described above 
Is summarized as follows: 
The initial efforts of the agency to improve the College of 
Engineering were based upon the most reliable information obtain- 
able at the time and the extreme scarcity of qualified civil, me- 
chanical, and electrical engineers needed for restoration and ad- 
vancement after war devastated the country. 
Under the agency's recently revised education program in Ko- 
rea, academic training is being deemphasized and attention is be- 
ing focused on vocational education needs. In line with this 
shift, the contract with Seoul National University, the secondary 
school project, 60 percent of scholarship grants, and all but one 
of the ICA educational advisory positions are being terminated. 
This turnaround has coincided with the revamping by the present 
government of the Korean educational system, which involves the in- 
troduction in all elementary schools of vocational training and 
the reduction of college enrollments from 145,000 to 50,000 of 
which two thirds are to be channeled to technical and vocational 
junior colleges. 
As of January 1962, two thirds of the equipment had been in- 
stalled and local currency funds had been budgeted in 1962 to com- 
plete the installation, 
In March 1962 the power situation had been improved and a new 
substation was expected to be completed shortly to supply power to 
the Atomic Energy Laboratory and the Seoul National University Col- 
lege of Engineering. 
UNSUCCESSFUL EXPANSION OF 
GOVERNMENT -CONTROLLED SHIPYARD 
The Dae Han Shipbuilding Corporation (Pusan Iron Works), 
which received ICA-financed equipment and machine tools  amounting 
t o  about $2 million was operating on a very limited scale  and much 
of the ICA-furnished equipment was idle .  Although ICA and the Ko- 
rean Government had recognized for several years the need for reor-  
ganizing and refinancing t h i s  corporation, such had not been done 
a t  the  time of our review. 
The Dae Han Shipbuilding Corporation (DHSC) i s  a former Japa- 
nese enterpr ise  now operated by the Korean Government which owns 
more than 97 percent of the corporation's stook. I C A  committed 
82 million i n  June 1955 t o  purchase equipment i n  connection with 
the expansion of the shipyard, including a modern foundry and a 
machine shop. 
The project  had l i t t l e ,  i f  any, planning as t o  basic requi- 
s i t e s  such as (1) the needs of the country for  the various types 
of operations which were established o r  expanded, ( 2 )  the  channel- 
irig of required needs of other government uni t s  t o  the corporation 
ra ther  than outside the country, (3) the coordination of opera- 
t iona l  capacity with the limited ower ava i l ab i l i ty ,  (4) the compe- 
tency of loca l  management, and (5  the f inancial  s t a tus  and re-  
quirements of the corporation. 
P 
A s  a consequence the f a c i l i t y  was largely i d l e  while a t  the 
same time Korean ships were being repaired abroad, duplicate ma- 
chine tool  f a c i l i t i e s  were being established by the Korean m i l i -  
t a ry  forces, and products tha t  could be manufactured by DHSC were 
being imported. Some equipment could not be used because of a 
shortage of e l ec t r i c  power. DHSC encountered f inancial  d i f f i c u l -  
t i e s  and was unable t o  pay the duty on the ICA-financed equipment. 
A t  the time of our v i s l t  the equipment was located i n  the shipyard 
plant  and we were informed by the agency tha t  i n  1958 the Korean 
Government authorized the shipyard t o  i n s t a l l  and make f u l l  use of 
the equipment without pr ior  payment of the duty. 
Low scale of operations 
DHSC was operating substant ia l ly  below i t s  capacity a t  the 
time of our review i n  June 1961 as indicated by the following pro- 
duction data8 
C u m  ent 
Area 
- Capacity production 
Ship construction 3,000 tons a year None 
Ship repair  ~ ~ O , O O O  9' ' 1-/3 
Machine Shop: 
Cast s t e e l  300 l1 JI None 
Forging 300 11 11 Limited 
Machinery work 18,000 man-days 1/3 or l e s s  
I C A  o f f i c i a l s  informed us tha t  DHSC i s  one of the best 
equipped plants i n  the Far East for the construction and repair  of 
small ocean-going and coastal  vessels,  as well as  for the repa i r  
of large ships. In addition, DHSC has the pa ten t ia l  t o  manufac- 
ture  o r  fabr icate  i n  i t s  shops a multitude of other products such 
as cast  iron pipe and castings of a l l  types; heating equipment; 
various s t e e l  works such as bridge and s t ruc tu ra l  girders! various 
types of machine toolse  and components and replacement par t s  for  
the chemical, mining, h . n s p o r t a t i o n  and t e x t i l e  industr ies ,  for  
power plants ,  for  water supply systems, and for other s imilar  pur- 
poses. 
According t o  the Mission, i n  November 1960 approximately 
75 percent of the ICA-financed equipment, valued a t  $2 mlllion, 
had been i d l e  Tor nearly 3 years. 
Need for r eo r~an iza t ion  
For a number of years both ICA and the Korean Government had 
recognized the need for corporate reorganization, including r e f i -  
nancing. In August 1958, ICA o f f i c i a l s  s ta ted  that ;  
If*** the plant could be operated economically under a 
capable and re l i ab le  top management a f t e r  a f inancial  re -  
organization, some technical assistance and other safe- 
guards ***. '' 
DHSC paid 700 million hwan toward the cost  of ICA-financed 
equipment, 15 percent from i t s  o m  funds and the balance-594 m i l -  
l i on  hwan--through a counterpart loan from the Korean Reconstruc- 
t ion Bank, In addition, 368 million hwan was made available from 
counterpart funds t o  finance ins t a l l a t ion  of the equipment. In 
1959, 960 mxllian hwan more of counterpart f'unds was borrowed for 
working cap i t a l  and par t  payment of other obligations. 
Financial statements a t  December 31, 1960, showed the above 
counterpart loans as to ta l ing  1.9 b i l l ion  hwan with accrued in te r -  
e s t  payable of 156 million hwan. Other indus t r ia l  loans and notes 
and accrued in te res t  to ta led 2,3 b i l l ion  hwm, resul t ing i n  a debt 
s t ructure  of over 4.3 b i l l ion  hwan ($3.3 million a t  1,300 hwan t o  
1 ) .  According t o  the agency, in t e res t  charges were accruing a t  
more than 200 million hwan annually. For the calendar years 1957 
through 1960, DHSC operated a t  annual losses which for the 4 years 
aggregated more than 1 b i l l ion  hwan. A Mission audit  report i s -  
sued i n  1959 sharply c r i t i c i zed  the Mission for insuff ic ient  con- 
sideration,  during the planning stage,  of the e f fec t  of the loans 
and the re la ted in te res t  burden on the f inancial  resources and fb- 
ture  earnings of  DHSC. 
A reorganization plan agreeable t o  both I C A  and the Korean 
Government was developed i n  May 1961. T h ~ s  plan included: 
Conversion t o  pr ivate  management by public sa le ,  or lease  
t o  a forelgn firm or group. 
Government guarantees including tax exemption of shipbuild- 
ing material,  r e s t r i c t ions  on the flow of business t o  for -  
eign countries, ease of foreign exchange, shipbuildmg sub- 
s id ies ,  and financing . 
In teres t  exemption on Korean Reconstruction Bank loans, ex- 
tension of repayment period, cancellation of outstanding 
Import duties,  and permission t o  dispose of excess proper- 
ties. 
Action on t h i s  plan which was t o  be completed by the end of May 
was halted upon the change i n  the Korean Government i n  May 1961. 
In March 1962, the agency informed us tha t  the Korean Govern- 
ment had s e t  aside funds i n  i t s  1962 budget whlch the agency fee ls  
should s a t i s f y  the f inancial  requirements of t h l s  f a c i l i t y ,  tha t  
the Korean Government had agreed t o  waive a l l  customs duties and 
taxes on the aforestated ICA-financed equipment, and that  addi- 
t iona l  power' had been recently made available a t  Pusan. 
Korean ships repalred and constructed abroad 
In s p i t e  of the fac t  tha t  the ship repair  divlsion of DHSC 
was operating well below x t s  capacity, government and pr ivately  
owned Korean ships were being repaired i n  facilities outside Korea. 
During 1960 nule vessels owned by the Korea Shlpping Corporation 
fKSC), a government-eontrolled corporation, were repalred outside 
Korea a t  an estimated cost  of $172,000, and plans i n  1961 cal led 
for the repair  i n  Japanese yards of f ive  ships owned by KSC a t  an 
were informed by I C A  o f f i c i a l s  
repgirs. 
estimated cost  of $235,000.~ We 
tha t  DHSC could have made these 
The United States Military 
had considered having i t s  ships 
Sea Transportation Servlce (MSTS) 
repaired by DHSC but decided i n  
1958 not t o  do so because wslders i n  Korea were not c e r t i f i e d  by 
the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and some repairs  performed 
i n  Korea had been condemned. However, subsequent t o  1958, welders 
a t  DHSC were c e r t i f i e d  by ABS, and repairs  t o  a number of ships i n  
1960 and 1961 were surveyed by ABS and others,  DHSC s t i l l  had not 
performed any work for  MSTS although the l a t t e r  had been ap- 
proached a f t e r  ce r t i f i ca t ion  had been received. 
On the other hand, the United Nations Command i n  Korea had d i -  
rected tha t  United States Army ships i n  the area be repaired i n  Ko- 
rea. A t  the time of our review t h i s  policy had resulted i n  repair  
work during 1960 valued a t  about $73,000, and during 1961 a t  about 
$18,000. 
Although DHSC1s estimated annual shipbuilding capacity i s  
3,000 tons, a t o t a l  of only 19939 tons has been constructed since 
the s t a r t  of operaLions i n  1950. According t o  DHSC personnel, the 
yard can construct ships of up t o  3,000 tons each. 
A recent DHSC report pointed out tha t  a contract had just 
been l e t  by the Korem Government for the construction i n  Japan of 
one 50-ton customs pa t ro l  boat and one 100-ton police pa t ro l  boat. 
ICA corespondence i n  1959 indicated tha t  a Korean fishing company 
received i n  Aprll two 80-ton f i shmg vessels which had been ICA- 
financed and bu i l t  in Japan. 
Ruplicate machine tool  f a c i l i t i e s  
Both the Korean Army and Navy were expanding and modernizing 
t h e i r  machine tool  f a c i l i t i e s  even though DHSC machlne shops, lo -  
cated i n  the same area, were largely unused. These mil i tary in-  
s t a l l a t ions  were being equipped with machine tools  received under 
the mil i tary assistance program. 
The Ehgineer Maintenance Depot In Pusan was plannmg a t  the 
time of our review t o  move in to  a new f a c i l i t y  and had recently r e -  
ceived some new machine tools  mcluding dynamotors, a metalizing 
machine, a heat-treating furnance, and a metal planer. ICA o f f i -  
c i a l s  informed us tha t  similar  equlgment was already ins t a l l ed  a t  
DHSC. In addition, about $50,000 worth of machme tools  was ex- 
pected t o  be delivered for the new engineer f a c i l i t y ,  Including a 
la the  engine, threading machines, honing machines, grinders, and 
welding machines. 
Although agreement was reached a number of years ago for DHSC 
t o  accomplish some machine work for the Korean Army Engineers, w e  
were informed by United States mil i tary advisors tha t  the  Army En- 
gineers had obtalned machining equipment and was doing i t s  own 
work. 
A machine tool  replacement program was a l so  under way a t  the  
nearby Korean Navy ship repair  f a c i l i t y  a t  Chinhae. Equipment val-  
ued a t  about $200,000 had been delivered under the mil i tary a s s i s t -  
ance program, Items received during 1959 and 1960 included la thes ,  
grinders, boring machines, a milling machine, and a heavy-duty 
shear. Machinery expected t o  be received under the same program 
included bench grinders, l a thes ,  milling machines, and a sheet 
metal brake. Also, in s t a l l a t ion  plans ca l led  for addit ional  equip- 
ment valued a t  $104,000, including an a i r  compressor, a microfilm 
setup, foundry improvements, laboratary equipment, a cutoff abra- 
s ive machine, and a bending machine. According t o  I C A  o f f i c i a l s ,  
DHSC had almost a l l  of t h i s  equipment i n  i t s  shops, 
Products imported tha t  could be manufactured 
RHSC1s potent ia l  for shop work manufacturing includedt 
Semidiesel and d iese l  engines, 5 HP t o  300 RP 
Varlous types of machine tools  
Structural  s t e e l  work 
Cast Iron pipes 
Steel  rods and bars 
Screws and bol t s  
Radiators and heating systems 
Stoves and boi lers  
Sanitary and drainage pipes 
Water pumps and valves 
A i r  compressors 
Forgings 
Castings 
Building and ship hardware 
Water and 011 storage tanks 
Water meters 
Concrete mixers 
Other--fabrication of spare par t s  for transpastat ion equip- 
ment, weaving m i l l s ,  heavy industry, mining industry, e tc .  
Our discussions with United States  mil i tary advisors d is -  
closed tha t  many of these items were being procured outside Korea 
under the mil i tary assistance program. For example, 19.4 million 
l i n e a l  f ee t  of s t e e l  rods were on order a t  the  time of our review 
a t  the Korean Army Engineer Depot. The Engineer Maintenance Depot 
needed heat-treated nuts and bol ts  which could be supplied by DHSC. 
United States mil i tary advisors s ta ted  tha t  the Korean Ordnance 
Corps used many items shown i n  the above l i s t i n g ,  par t icu lar ly  
transportation equipment spare par t s  which were being delivered un- 
der the mil i tary assistance program. 
Recommendations 
The situation at DHSC as described above represents a signifi- 
cant and unwarranted burden on the Korean economy with consequent 
deterrence to economic development and the effectiveness of United 
States aid. We recommend that the responsible United States agen- 
cies strongly urge the Korea Government to (1) expedite reorgani- 
zation of DHSC along the lines agreed upon in May 1961, (2) ar- 
range for maximum procurement from DHSC by other Korean agencies 
of all those products and services now procured from outside Korea 
which are available at DHSC, and (3) initiate a study with assist- 
ance by I C A  and United States military advisors to determine quan- 
titatively and qualitatively those items that DHSC can supply to 
the Korean military services which are now imported under the mili- 
tary assistmce program, In a separate report to be issued to the 
Congress on our review of the local currency military budget sup- 
port program for Korea, we plan to recommend that the Department 
of Defense in coordination with I C A  reappraise the basis for pro- 
viding and supporting machine tool facilities within the Korean 
military forces which duplicate facilities at DHSC. 
LIMITED SUCCESS OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM 
Despite Korea's urgent need for skilled workers and techni- 
cians, the vocational education program had little success in de- 
veloping trade skills. Because of poor plamlng, implementation, 
and country cooperation, much of the equipment provided by I C A  for 
more than 50 schools had not been used effectively. In recogni- 
tion of this unsatisfactory progress, ICA decided in 1960 to con- 
centrate on one technical school in Seoul which would serve as a 
national demonstration center. 
The United Nations Korea Relief Agency began assisting 
19 technical high schools in 1952. In recognition of Korea's need 
for more technicians in the development and growth of her indus- 
tries, ICA took over the program in 1954. Assistance through 
June 30, 1961, amounted to $2.6 million, chiefly for imports of 
equipment and construction materials, and 1.2 billion hwan from 
the counterpart account, for local expenses, This project assisted 
more than 50 schools all of which were furnished equipment and 
about 30 of which were supplied with materials for expansion of 
their facilities. 
The project appears to have 1 cked studied planning. The spe- 3 cific occupations needed by the KO ean economy were not considered 
and equipment was purchased before agreement was reached on the ap- 
propriate curricula. Korean education has traditionally been ori- 
ented toward collegiate type or theoretical training, with shop or 
plant training considered inferior or not suitable for capable 
youth. Hence, many of the schools being assisted allocated little 
time for the use of ICA-financed equipment as a practical applica- 
tion of theory. Only about 8 percent of the students' time was 
spent on shop work. 
Procurement was not well coordinated so that equipment would 
be delivered reasonably proximate to the completion of related con- 
struction. School equipment was ordered at approximately the same 
time as construction materials and upon receipt had to be stored 
for long periods while school facilities were being constructed. 
Eight of thirty schools whioh we reviewed had received equipment 
at least 12 months or more before completion of sufficient facili- 
ties for their installation. At the Samchock Technical High 
School, to which equipment with the second largest total value was 
f'urnished, electric shop equipment costing almost $60,000 was 
stored for 2-112 years, machine shop equipment costing $80,000 for 
1 year, and woodworking equipment worth $7,000 for at least 
2 years. 
Some schools for whioh equipment was furnished did not have 
the power or other utilities to operate effectively, At the time 
of our review Seoul Technical High School which was the prime 
school being aided in the program, was without electrical power 
every other day. Samchock Technical High School could not demon- 
strate the use of approximately $16,000 worth of its furnished 
electrical equipment because of inadequate electrical wiring. At 
the latter school, the woodworking shop was idle because the shop 
did not have lumber for practice materials. 
In 1960 ZCA recognized the unsatisfactory progress of the pro- 
gram and decided to concentrate its advisory assistance on one vo- 
cational school, the Seoul Technical High School. ICA informed us 
that in this way the program would provide a national demonstra- 
tion school so that the teachers trained, methods developed, and 
instructional materials written in that school would serve as mod- 
els for other sehools, We were informed also that the Korean Min- 
istry of Education was conducting a nationql survey of occupations 
available fbr vocationally trained graduates in industry and the 
skill requirements for these occupations. 
The agency advised, in March 1962, that (1) all equipment fur- 
nished the Korean technical high schools had been installed, (2) 
wirlng had been renewed at the Samchock Technical High School, and 
(3) stand-by generators had been installed at the Seoul Technical 
High School. The agency further stated that the Korean Ministry 
of: Education with the assistance of the Mission was working on a 
program under which shop students would spend more hours per week 
in shop practice utilizing LCA-financed equipment, 
LOCAL CURIPENCY 
The manner in which counterpart funds were generated and the 
purposes for which they were allocated are described beginning at 
page 60, Counte~part funds and other local currencies derived 
from surplus agricultural commodities which were allocated to the 
support of Korean national defense are administered by MAAG. Our 
review of this support program disclosed a failure on the part of 
involved United States agencies to implement appropriate controls 
over budget support funds, together with serious deficiencies In 
the administration of these funds by the Republic of Korea Army. 
This review will be the subject of a separate mport to be issued 
to the Congress, 
In other areas of counterpart operations which are the re- 
sponsibility of ICA through the Mission, we found that (1) the Mis- 
sion did not have control over the deposit of counterpart funds 
adequate to follow up on substantial differences between the 
amounts due and the amounts deposited and (2) the Mission exer- 
cised little surveillance over counterpart loans administered by 
KRB although the need therefor appeared evident from our review, 
These subjects are discussed briefly below. 
INADEQUATE CONTROL OVER DEPOSIT 
OF COUNTERPART FUNDS 
Although the total amounts deposited into the counterpart de- 
posit account were consistentLy and substantially less than the 
total amounts required to be deposited, the records and procedures 
of the Mission were not organized to enable ready determination of 
the difference or what it represented. Thus the Mission was not 
In a position to know whet he^ the local culirency slde of the corn- 
modity import program was being satisfactorily administered, par- 
ticularly in such important aspects as timely and full deposits 
and the expeditious movement of aid-financed commodities into the 
Korean economy based on deposits made or due on individual commod- 
ity shipments. 
This situation had existed since the early years of the pro- 
gram and was pointed out in our previous report issued in 1957. 
In that report we stated that reliance as to deposits was placed 
principally on Korean reports which were unreliable and were not 
being reconciled with the records of the Mission. Our current ex- 
amination found the situation substantially unchanged. 
In 1958 the Mission audit unit attempted to reconcile re- 
quired deposits with actual deposits. The reconciliation dis- 
closed that the required deposits exceeded actual deposits by 
29.9 billion hwan, The Mission informed us that it had informally 
apprised Korean officials of the difference and that for a tempo- 
rary period thereafter deposits increased. 
At the conclusion of our field work in June 1961, the Mission 
was engaged in another reconciliation for the period from fiscal 
year 1954 through December 31, 1960, Tentative results indicated 
a difference of 46.8 billion hwan, equivalent to $36 million at 
the current exchange rate of 1,300 hwan to $1. 
The Mission expressed the belief that most of the difference 
represented a lag in deposits mainly for fertilizer imports and 
for other commodities in customs and that, while the lag might be 
longer than it should be, it would eventually clear up. A review 
which we made of a random selection of procurement authorizations 
showed significant differences between required and actual depos- 
its applicable to commodities imported several years ago. The 
following cases are illustrative. 
Procurement 
authoriza- Required Actual Differ- 
Year - tion Commodi ty deposj t deposit - ence 
(millions of hwan) 
19 54 42 59 Lumber and 
sawmill 
products 415,3 '5.5 409.8 
1955 5001 Fertilizer 2161.8 717-3 1444.5 
19 56 6009 Fertilizer 8726.6 7518.0 1208.6 
19 57 7285 Coal 228.2 0 228.2 
The required amount of counterpart deposits was changed from 
the amount of commensurate value to the amount of sales proceeds 
effective January 1 1961, and incident thereto the Mission devel- 
oped revised accounting and reporting procedures which were in- 
tended to provide among other thmgs, more effective control of 
counterpart deposits. At June 1961 when we completed our field 
work, the revised procedures had not been put into operation. 
Proposed actlon and agency response 
In the light of the conditions described above, we suggested 
to the agency that the Mission (1) complete the reconciliation of 
required and actual deposits in which it was engaged and take posi- 
tive measures for settling the differences and (2) put into effect 
the revised procedures for accountmg, reporting, and controlling 
counterpart deposits. 
The agency advlsed In  March 1962, that (1) counterpart bill- 
ings, deposits, and withdrawals through August 31, 19617 had been 
reconciled by the Mission Controller's Office and (2) current ne- 
gotiations were being held with the Korean Government to simplify 
billing and deposit procedures. With regard to arrears in counter- 
part deposits, AID stated that it was weighing the cost to the 
Korean economy of requiring collection and deposit of such arrears 
against the cost to the aid program of agreeing to write off these 
arrears as an acknowledged subsldy not orlglnally anticipated in 
the United States aid program. 
FAULTY ADMINIS TRATION AND CONTROL 
OF COUNTERPART LOAN PROGRAM 
Our review of the counterpart loan program administered by 
the Korean Reconstruction Bank (KRB) indicated several areas of de- 
ficient operation by KRB and a want of necessary over-all monitor- 
ing by the Mission. Many loans were delinquent as to principal 
and interest and some loans appeared to have been of questionable 
financial risk. We noted several instances in which principal and 
interest payments were not deposited promptly into the counterpart 
account; service charges were being taken on loans in arrears, con- 
trary to CEB authorization; and penalty interest collected was be- 
ing improperly retained by KRB for its own account. The Mission 
had not made and did not have plans for any audits of the eight re- 
volving funds administered by the three government controlled 
banks (KRB, Bank of Korea, and Korean Agricultural Bank). Except 
to the extent required in audits of ICA-financed projects, the Mls- 
sion had not made any audits of other loans under the counterpart 
loan program and had not examined the banks1 lending practices. 
The fund and status reports received by the Mission from KRB did 
not show delinquent loans or the amounts of principal or interest 
In arrears and thus were not sufficiently informative to provide 
a basis for Mission control. 
As described at page 61, a substantial portion of counterpart 
funds was allocated for loans to private and public entities for 
the advancement of Korean mdustry, agriculture, and housing. The 
loan program was assigned by CEB for administration by the three 
government-controlled banks which made individual loans upon ap- 
proval by CEB. Through December 31, 1960, a total of 112.6 bil- 
lion hwan had been allocated for loans by the three banks. 
Bank 
-
Korean Reconstruction Bank 
Korean Agriculture Bank 
Bank of Korea 
Amount 
(billions of hwan) 
Total 
Of the above amount, about 40 billion hwan was segregated in eight 
revolving funds authorized by CEB for loans in specific economic 
areas. 
In reviewing the loan records and bank reports of KRB, we 
noted that many loans were delinquent as to principal and interest. 
With respect to one revolving fund for short-term operating loans, 
25 percent of outstanding loans of 1,2 billion hwan were delin- 
quent. The loan status report of KRB to the Mission for December 
1960 indicated that many loans were delinquent but did not iden- 
tify the loans or the extent of arrears. The Korean Board of Au- 
dit reported that at March 31, 1961, outstanding loans of KRB 
amounted to 164 billion hwan and that principal and interest in 
the amount of 49,6 billion hwan were in arrears. More than half 
of the KRB loans were from counterpart funds. 
A number of loans on projects in the small and medium indus- 
try program greatly exceeded the assets of the project sponsors 
and were thepefore unsound financial risks. These loans are dis- 
cussed on page 132. 
It was not practicable for us to ascertain the extent to 
which collections of principal and interest were not deposited 
promptly in the counterpart account. However, in five of seven 
cases tested, deposits were tardy. In one instance collections 
made in August 1959 had not been deposited at December 31, 1960; 
in another, 10 million hwan collected in October 1959 and February 
1960 on the sale of equipment, which was applicable to reduction 
of the loan on the equipment, was not deposited into the counter- 
part account until January 1961. 
Under the CEB authorization, KRB was entitled to retain from 
collections a service charge of 3 percent a year on the outstand- 
ing balance of each loan but only if the loan was current as to 
principal ant3 interest. However, KRB followed the practice of re- 
taining a proportionate amount of all interest collections for its 
service charge regardless of whether the respective loans were cur- 
rent. The Mission agreed that this practice was not autho~ized 
and stated that, in order to take action to remedy it, a report 
would be obtained from KRB showing the amounts currently due on 
loans on which service charges had been improperly taken. We com- 
puted the service charges on four of those loans which we reviewed 
and determined that the excess charges retained by KRB on these 
four loans amounted to 69.3 million hwan. 
KRB retained for its own account penalty interest collected 
on delinquent loans. Bank officials justified this retention on 
the grounds that no provision was made by CEB for either collec- 
tion or disposition of penalty interest and that the service 
charge was insufficient thereby necessitatfng retention of penalty 
interest as additional revenue to the bank. Mission officials 
stated that, while the CEB regulation dld not specify penalty in- 
terest, the regulation was intended to include all interest. Pen- 
alty interest on seven loans which we reviewed amounted to 71 mil- 
lion hwan- The Mission informed us that the matter of penalty in- 
terest was under discussion with the Korean Government and that an 
agreement would have to be reached before steps could be taken to 
have penalty interest deposited into the counterpart account. 
Proposed action and apency response 
In the light of the conditions outlined above and the impor- 
tance and financial magnitude of the counterpart loan program in 
the over-all aid picture, we proposed that ICA through the Mission: 
1. Resolve with KRB, and the other two banks as may be appro- 
priate, the proper handling of service charges, penalty in- 
terest, and timely deposits. 
2. Arrange with the three banks to revise the form and con- 
tent of their reports on counterpart loans so as to pro- 
vide information necessary to meaningful review by the Mis- 
sion, and initiate within the Mission an effective system 
to insure review and follow-up action on such reports. 
3. Examine the lending and administrative policies and prac- 
tices of the three banks and take such steps as may be nec- 
essary to effectuate any changes which may be indicated by 
such examination. 
4. Make such audits of individual loans or segments of the 
operations of the three banks from time to time as circum- 
stances and sound management judgment may dictate to be 
necessary to round out an effective system of control. 
In March 1962, the Agency advised us (1) that the Mission 
planned to review the several counterpart loan programs and the 
status of repayments in early 1962, (2) that the organization and 
function of the KRB were then under review by the Korean Govern- 
ment and the Mission and (3) that a similar review was planned for 
the loan programs of the other banks but not, at that time, for 
the revolving funds because of staffjng limitations and lower pri- 
ority of the revolving funds in relation to dollar and other local 
currency aid activities. 
SCOPE OF EXAMINATION 
Our examination of the economic and technical assistance pro- 
gram for Korea covered the fiscal years 1957 through 1961 and con- 
sisted principally of a review of the financial and related admin- 
istrative practices and procedures followed by ICA in carrying out 
selected major activities within the over-all program. 
We reviewed program documents, reports, correspondence, and 
other pertinent material available to us at the Washington office 
of ICA and the agency's overseas Mission in Korea, which we vis- 
ited during the spring and summer of 1961 and at various later 
dates, and discussed relevant matters with responsible agency rep- 
resentatives. We also reviewed records of certain agencies of the 
Korean Government on a limited basis and discussed appropriate mat- 
ters with representatives of these agencies. In the field we vis- 
ited selected project sites and reviewed matters relating to proj- 
ects with responsible technical and administrative personnel of 
the Mission and of United States contractors, 
We examined financial records and transactions to the extent 
we deemed appropriate in view of the effectiveness of the system 
of internal control. We had previously made a similar examination 
of transactions for the fiscal years 1954 through 1956. 
OPINION ON FTNANCIAL STATEMENTS 
The accompanying financial statements showing the obligation 
and expenditure of mutual security funds for economic and techni- 
cal assistance to Korea for the fiscal years 1954 through 1961 are 
based on fiscal reports and supporting data available at the Inter- 
national Cooperation Administration in Washington, D . C . ,  and its 
Mission in Korea, We have made certain reclassifications and addid 
tional disalosures which we consider necessary for an informative 
financial presentation. 
An undetermined portion of aid funds was used to finance, as 
nonproject assistance, new and existing enterprises under substan- 
tially the same conditions as those for financmg of projects. 
ICA did not maintain its records in such a way as to make it prac- 
ticable to determine the amount of such financing. 
Except as to the above matter, in our opinion the accompany- 
ing financial statements present fairly the obligations and expend- 
itures incurred by the International Cooperation Administration 
for the economic and technical assistance program for Korea during 
the fiscal years 1954 through 1961. 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
SCHEDULE 1 
Page 1 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES 
BY SOURCE OF FUNDS 
FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
F i sca l  year and a p ~ r o ~ r i a t i o n  Obliaations Ex~end l tu res  
1954- 56 r 
Defense support 
Emergency r e l i e f  
Technical cooperation 
Administration (note b) 
Total,  1954-56 (note c) 
1957 3 
Defense support: 
Current year funds (note d) 
Pr ior  year funds reprogramed 
Consolidation of 1957 and pr ior  year 
appropriations (note e) 
Technical aooperationf 
Current year funds (note d) 
Consolidation of 1957 and, pr ior  year 
appropriations (note e) 
Administration (note b) 
1958 t 
Defense support: 
Current year funds (note d) 
Pr ior  year funds reprogramed 
Consolidation of 1958 and pr ior  yea, 
appropriations (note e) 
Technical cooperationr 
Current year funds (note d) 
Prior  year funds reprogramed 
Consolidation of 1958 and pr ior  year 
appropriations (note e )  
Administration (note b) 
Total,  1958 
SCHEDULE 1 
Page  2 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES 
BY SOURCE OF FUNDS (continued) 
FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
Fisca l  year and aopropriation Obligations 
1959 : 
Defense supportr 
Current year funds (note d) $ 177,261,337 
Pr io r  year funds reprogramed 13,190,177 
Consolidati,on of 1959 and pr ior  year 
appropriations (note e )  65,332,841 
Technical cooperation: 
Current year funds (note d) 3,175,226 
Pr ior  year funds reprogramed 261,207 
Consolidation of 1959 and pr ior  year 
appropriations (note e l  
Administration (nate  b) 
Total,  1959 
1960 8 
Defense support8 
Current year funds (notes d and f )  
Priol year funds reprogramed 
Technical aooperationt 
Current year funds (note d)  
Pr ior  year funds reprogramed 
Administration (note b) 
Total,  1960 
1961 t 
Defense support (note g) 
Technical cooperation 
Administration (note b) 
Total,  1961 
Total,  1954-61 
Expenditures 
INTERNATIONAL COOFERATION ADMINISTRATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES 
BY SOURCE OF FUNDS (continued) 
FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
Notes 
 his schedule and its related schedules (2, 3, and 4) show the activities 
of ICA and its predecessor, the Foreign Operations Administration, under 
the mutual security program The schedules do not include loans by the 
Development Loan Fund or local currency funds derived from the sale of 
surplus agricultural commodities under title I of Public Law 480 which 
were made available for assistance to Korea. 
b~eDreSentS only Mission adminis trative expenses. The agency does not al- 
locate Washington office expenses to individual country programs. 
 his amount excludes mutual security funds applied to United Nations 
Korean Reconstruction Agency ($42 2 million) and civilian relief activ- 
ities of the United States military authorities in Korea ($17 4 mil- 
lion), as shown in our previous audit report for 1954-56 In addition, 
subsequent deobligations, adjustments, and consolidation of accounts for 
liquidation purposes (see note e) in the period 1957-61 reduced total 
obligations from $832,990,600, as shown in our previous audit report for 
1954-56, to $687,046,272 
d~epresents obligations incurred during the current year not subsequently 
deobligated or transferred to consolidation accounts (see note e) 
'~hese amounts represent obligations which had not been liquidated at the 
beginning of the second fiscal year following the year for which the 
funds were appropriated. As authorized by mutual security appropriation 
legislation, these obligations were consolidated each fiscal year into a 
single account for each type of appropriation. Subsequent to consolida- 
tion these obligations were liquidated by expenditure, and some obliga- 
tions may have been deobligated and reobligated However, it is not 
practical to identify such transactions by years. 
f~ncludes $17 5 million provided by the special Presidential fund, 1960 
g~ncludes $20.0 million provided by the special Presidential fund, 1961 
SCHEDULE 2 
SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES 
BY TYPE OF A I D  
FISCAL YEARS 
COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM: 
Agricultural commoditiest 
Fertilizer and pesticides 
Raw cotton 
0 ther 
Industrial machinery, raw mate- 
rial, and semifinished products; 
Textile products 
Industrial machinery and 
equipment 
0 ther 
Fuels I 
Miscellaneous 
Total, commodity imports 
(schedule 3)  
PROJECT ASSIS11ANCEi: 
Commodities and contract servicea 
(schedule 4) 
U.S. technicians 
Technical support 
Participant training 
Total project assistance 
(note a) 
OTHER ASSISTANCE, 
Cash grant for budget support 
Overseas administration 
Emergency relief and assistance 
Ocean freight for voluntary relief 
shipments 
Total, other assistance 
Total, 19 54-61 
Obligations Ex~enditures 
(in thousands? 
'~ncludes $221.3 million recorded by the agency as nonpro ject assistance but 
determined by the agency to be project assistance. 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O O P E R A T I O N  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES 
FOR COMMODITY IMPORT PRWRAM 
BY MAJOR CATEOORY OF COMMODITIES, FISCAL Y.RMC3 1954-61 
AT JUNE 30, 1961 
Commodity category 
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
Fertilizer and pesticides 
Fertilizer (see p 107) 
Pesticides 
Raw cotton (see p 71) 
Grains 
Bread 
coarse 
WOO1 
Raw sugar 
Fats and oils 
Obligations Cumulative 
1954->b -- 1m - 1958 - 1959 - 190 - 1961 - Totar expenditures 
(in thousands) 
~otal, agricultural commodities 229,935 105,638 95 768 86,177 74,158 69,589 661,265 628,638 
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY, RAW MATERIAL, AND 
SEMLFINISHED PRODUCTS 
Textlle D~o~UC'CS 
~ndustriil machinery and equipment 
Chemicals and chemical preparations 
Lumber and sawmill products 
Rubber and rubber products 
Paper, pulp, and paper products 
Iron and steel mill products 
Nonmetallic minerals 
Nonferrous metals 
Vegetable fibers 
Total, industrial machinery, raw material, 
and semiflnished products 117 528 66,065 42,767 59,742 74,734 62 787 423,623 364 gG 
FUELS 
011 and petroleum products 
Coal and related fuels 
Total fuels 51,605 21,127 27,587 25,452 26 0021 23,177 174,969 145,865 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Medlcal and pharmaceutical preparations 
Triangular trade 
Other 
Total, miscellaneous 26,032 17,219 10,655 12,918 11,570 4,445 82,839 78,379 
Total, commodity import program $425,100 - - -  $210,049 $176,7n $184.289 $186,483 $159,998 $1,342,696 $1,217,828 
SCHEDULE 4 
Page I 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
STATUS OF OBLIGATIONS FOR PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
FOR COMMODITIES AND CONTMCT SERVICES 
BY FIELD OF ACTIVITY AND MAJOR PROJECT, FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
AT JUNE 30, 1961 
Field of activity and 
major project 
(note a) 
Obliga- Expend- 
tions itures 
(in thousands) 
TRANSPORTATION: 
Korean national rallroad logistic support 
(note b) 
Railway rolling stock $ 94,590 $ 94,581 
Diesel locomotives 18,854 18,393 17,023 17,022 
Highway and bridge construction and rehabil- 
itatian 15,691 12,480 
Railway construction 10,049 
Railway rehabilitation 9,941 
Cargo vessels 7,560 7,556 6,548 6,548 
Port and harbour improvement 5,248 4,651 
Civil aviation operations improvement 
Inchon port rehabilitation 1,510 1,405 
588 
Streetcar rehabilitation 705 
Other 1 9  273 1,273 
.3.747-3dz5 
Total, transportation 
INDUSTRY AND MINING: 
Chung-Ju fertilizer plant (note c and see 
P. 47) 
Thermal power plants (at Masan, Tangin-Ri, 
and Samchock, see p. 45) 
Rehabilitation and reconstruction of over- 
all transmission and distribution system 
Thermal power plant (at Kunsan, see p. 123) 
Rehabilitation Kwachon power plant (see 
P* 46) 
Medium industry development (fiscal years 
1957-61, see p. 128) 
Coal mine development 
Rehabilitation of Chong Pyong Dam (see 
p.  122) 
SCHEDULE 4 
Page 2 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
STATUS OF OBLIGATIONS FOR PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
FOR COMMODITIES AND CONTRACT SERVICES 
BY FIELD OF ACTIVITY AND MAJOR PROJECT. FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
(continued) I 
AT JUNE 30,  1961 
Field of activity and 
major project 
(note a) 
INDUSTRY AND MINING: (continued) 
Rehabilitation of Yongwol and Tangin-Ri 
power plants 
Development of metals and minerals (other 
than coal) 
Small industry development (fiscal years 
1957-61, see p.  128) 
Seoul central exchange (see p. 46) 
Telecommunication, inside plant equipment 
(see p. 46) 
Pusan Iron Works (see p. 144) 
Waterworks rehabilitation and expansion 
Telecommunication cable and open wire lines 
(see p. 46) 
Seoul telephone cable (see p.  46) 
Extenskon of telecommunication system (see 
p* 46) 
Spun rayon plant 
Other (note d) 
Total, industry and mining 
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: 
Irrigation 
Fisheries development 
Rural warehouses 
Land and water use lmprovernent 
Flood control 
Agricultural extension development 
Other 
Total, agriculture and natural resources 
Obllga- Expend- 
tions itures 
(in thousands) 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
STATUS OF OBLIGATIONS FOR PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
FOR COMMODITIES AND CONTRACT SERVICES 
BY F ~ E L D  OF ACTIVITY AND MAJOR PROJECT. FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
(continued) 
Field of activity and 
major project 
(note a) 
EDUCATION: 
Higher education (see p, 140) 
Improvement teacher training 
Classroom construction 
Secondary education (see p, 150) 
Other 
Tota l ,  education 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT : 
Housing finance, construetion, and planning 
(see p. 134) 
Refugee economic assimulation 
Republic of Korea office building (see 
P* 521 
Public health rehef 
Mission office building (see p. 52) 
Other 
Total, cornunity development 
HEALTH AND SANITATION3 
Waterworks rehabilitation (see p .  47) 
Public health facilities improvement (see 
Pa 139) 
Street and city drainage (see p. 47) 
Disease control 
Enviromental sanitation 
Other 
Total, health and sanitation 
Obliga- Expend- 
tions itures 
(in thousands ) 
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTFiATION 
ASS1 STANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA 
STATUS OF OBLIGATIONS FOR PROJECT ASSISTANCE 
FOR COMMODITIES AND CONTRACT SERVICES 
BY FIELD OF ACTIVITY AND MAJOR PROJECT, FISCAL YEARS 1954-61 
(continued) 
AT JUNE 30, 1961 
Field of activlty and 
major project 
(note a) 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: 
Improvement of government fiscal management 
and statistics 
National police modernization 
Other 
Total, public administration 
GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS. 
Military surplus 
General engineering services (see p. 52) 
Other 
Total, general and miscellaneous 
Total, project assistance 
Obliga- Expend- 
tions itures 
(in thonsands ) 
aIncludes all projects wlth obligations of $1 million or more at 
June 30, 1961. 
b~his project was Initiated in fiscal year 1954 and aid financing 
consisted of $51 million for coal and $43.6 miilion for mainte- 
nance rehabilitation, and operating materials and equipment re- 
quired for continued operation of the railroad system. Since fis- 
cal year 1958 coal and other supplles have been financed as non- 
project assistance under the commodity import program. 
CThe amounts include obligations and expenditures of $5 2'j'4,000 
and $2,909,000 respectively, for a management and training con- 
tract. The obligat~ons and expenditures for plant construction 
were $35,255,000 and $33,862,000, respectively. 
d~ncludes small and medium industry development prior to fiscal 
year 1957--approximately $16 million. These projects were re- 
corded by the agency as nonproject assistance under the account- 
ing system then in effect. 

APPENDIX 
OFFICIALS RESPOMS IBLE FOR ADMINISTRAT ION 
OF THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
FOR KOREA 
STARTING WITH FISCAL YEAR 1957 
SECRETARY OF STATE: 
John Foster Dulles 
Christian A. Herter 
Dean Rusk 
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (note a): 
C. Douglas Dillon 
George W. Ball 
Jan. 21, 1953 
Apr, 2 2 ?  1959 
Jan, 21, 1961 
Feb 3, 1959 
Feb 2, 1961 
DIRECTOR, INTERNAT I ONAL COOPERAT I ON ADMINISTRA- 
TION (formerly Foreign Operations Adminlstra- 
tion) : 
John B. Hollister July 1,1955 
James H. Smith, Jr. Oct, 4, 1957 
James W. Riddleberger Maro 9,1959 
Henry R. Labouisse (note b) Febe 22, 1961 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND 
(note c): 
Lyman L. Lemnltzer June 1955 
George H. Decker July 1, 1957 
AMBASSADOR TO KOREA (note c): 
Walter C. Dowling 
Walter P. McConaughy 
Samuel D. Berger 
July 14, 1956 
Dec. 18, 1959 
June 27, 1961 
DIRECTOR, U. S. OPERATIONS MISSION TO KOREA 
(notes c and d). 
William E. Warne June 26, 1956 
Raymond T . Moyer Aug 20,  1959 
James S. Klllen Sept, 19, 1961 
*In the case of Ambassadors, date of presentation of credentials 
a On February 3, 1959, the Secreta~g of State placed the Interna- 
tional Cooperation Adrninistratlon under the direction and control 
of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, On June 12, 1959, this responsibility, 
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STARTING WITH FISCAL YEAR 1957 
together with the over-all direction and coordination of the mu- 
tual security program, was reassigned to Mr Dillon as Under Sec- 
retary of State. On February 2, 1961, Mr. George W. Ball was con- 
firmed as Under Secretary of State for Economlc Affairs and as- 
sumed the responsibilities for the mutual security program for- 
merly carried out by Mr. Dillon. 
b ~ r .  Henry R.  Labouisse remained Director, International Coopera- 
tion Administration, until the agency termmated on November 3, 
1961. Mr. Fowler Hamilton was named Admlnlstrator of the succes- 
sor agency, Agency for International Development, September 23, 
1961. 
'prior to July 1, 1959, the fleld organization that admrnistered 
the program in Korea was under the over-all jurisdiction of the 
Commander in Chief, the United Nations Command (CINCUWC) and was 
officially designated as the Offlce of the Econornlc Coordinator 
(OEC). This was due to the fact that the CINCUMC was assigned re- 
sponsibility for the entlre aid program in Korea under the Pres- 
idential Memorandum of August 7, 1953, and the head of the OEC 
was designated the senlor economlc staff member of the CIMCUNC, 
On July 1, 1959, responsibility for pollcy coordination of the 
aid program in Korea was transferred to the Amerlcan Ambassador, 
and the Mission was separated from the Unlted Nations Command and 
established as an independent operating mlsslon. 
d~ith the approval of the administration in January 1962, the 
United States Aid Mission to Korea is still known officially 
there as United States Operations Mission to Korea. 
